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This thesis is concerned with various aspects of English anaphora
and a number of related phenomena. Roughly two thirds is devoted to
nominal anaphora. The remainder considers some of the ways in which
constituents other than HP's enter into anaphoric relations*
The discussion of nominal anaphora begins with a consideration of
two quite widely accepted theories of pronouns and shows that they are
fundamentally inadequate* Evidence is then presented for a 'mixed
theory', which recognises more than one kind of pronoun* The two main
kinds of pronoun that must be recognised are bound variables and
•referential pronouns'* The former are much like bound variables in
logic* The latter are a kind of definite description* In their
anaphoric use* they can be termed 'pronouns of laziness** but their
anaphoric use is not fundamentally different from their non-anaphoric
use* There is evidence that so-called 'sentential pronouns' ars
ordinary pronouns of laziness* It appears* however, that what are
termed 'iatensional pronouns' are a third kind of pronoun*
> J \
The discussion of non-nominal anaphora emphasizes the importance
of definite descriptions in English anaphora* It is argued that so
<in its central use)* such* then and there derive from expressions
involving definite descriptions* In its prosententlal use* so appears
to be an idiomatic realization of a sentential pronoun* Certain uses
of so* that and which appear to be idiomatic realizations of and* and
hence only pseudo-anaphora*
Three general conclusions are drawn* firstly that definite
descriptions are central to English anaphora* secondly that English
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1.1* Character and Scope
Anaphora has been studied quite extensively over the last ten
years. It is far from veil understood, however* Xn fact, there
are a host of unresolved questions* This thesis is an attempt to
contribute to the resolution ot some of them* X will investigate
a number of aspects of English anaphora and related phenomena and -
develop a series of theoretical proposals* These proposals will be
based solely on English* X suspect, however, that some of them
will have a much wider applicability* Obviously, though, this will
only be determined by further research*
What, then, is anaphora? As a preliminary characterization,
*
we can say that two elements, A and B, are anaphorically related
if the interpretation of B depends in some way on A* B then is an
anaphor and A is its antecedent* On the basis of this characterize-
■i.
tion, we can say that Brian and he are anaphorically related on one
reading of (1)*
(1) Brian says he is ill*
Similarly, in (2), we can say that Erica and herself are anaphorically
related*
(2) Erica cut herself*
A slightly different case is (3)*
(3) Chris wants to play backgammon*
Here, we can say that Chris and the null subject of play are
anaphorically related*
This characterization enables us to identify a wide range of
anaphoric relations* The following sentences, with the related
2
elements underlined* illustrate.w
(4) George likes curry, and that's true of Mary too.
(5) Sam climbed the tree yesterday* and Jim did it today*
(6) Jim caught typhoid* and it happened to Ruth too.
(7) Mary thinks Callaghan is a martian* but 1 don't believe it.
(3) Carl has a large dog* and a small one.
(9) Steve is anxious* and he's been so for some time.
(10) Joan is looking for a tall Italian* but she won't find
such an Italian here.
(11) Dick is delirious* and he's been like that for days.
(12) Eve was in France in April* and Steve was there in May*
(13) Ruth was here at six* but Jane wasn't here then.
(14) Does Brian like Joui Mitchell? I think so.
(15) Liz plays the violin, and Eve does so too.
I will have something to say about all these relations in the
following chapters.
There is one important class of anaphoric relations that I
will more or less ignore. This is the class of anaphoric relations
that result from deletion processes like VP-deletion, gapping and
sluicing. These relations are illustrated in the following.
(16) Sam likes Buffy Sainte Marie* but Jim doesn't
(17) Jim plays tennis* and Sara £ cricket.
(18) Someone attacked the Rector, but we don't know who £•
1 will consider VP-deletion only Insofar as it provides evidence
about the nature of other anaphoric phenomena. 1 will not consider
gapping or sluicing at all.
The original impetus for this research was an interest in the
ways in which elements other than MP's enter into anaphoric relations.
1 assumed that nominal anaphora was reasonably well understood.
It soon became clear to me that this was not the case. As a result
3
over half of this thesis will be concerned with nominal anaphora*
This will be the most important part of the thesis* In the later
chapters* however* 1 will develop seme proposals about non-nominal
anaphora, I think these will also be of some importance*
1*2* Some Theoretical Preliminaries
Perhaps the main problem facing anyone doing grammatical
research is that there is no established paradigm providing a
framework within which problems can be formulated and solutions
evaluated* For a brief period in the mid sixties Aspects
provided such a paradigm* By 1963* however* Chomsky could write
that *At present* the field is in considerable ferment* and it
will probably be some time before the dust begins to settle'
(Chomsky* 1963>• Since then* the dust clouds have simply grown
bigger* The researcher is now faced with a variety of competing
theoretical perspectives* Host prominent, perhaps* are generative
semantics and the extended standard theory* but there is also case
grammar* both Fillmore*s version (Fillmore* 1963) and Anderson's
localist version (Anderson, 1971* 1977), and* in recent years*
Montague Grammar (Thomason, 1974* Fartee, 1976) and relational
grammar (Johnson, 1974* Col# and Sadock, 1977) have had a major
impact* These perspectives differ in a variety of ways* It is
not always clear* however* whether the differences are real or
merely notational. It is not at all easy* then* to compare and
evaluate them* Perhaps the dust will eventually settle* For the
moment, however, one has to find one's way through the dust clouds
as best one may.
Almost all the assumptions of the Aspects paradigm have been
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challenged over the last ten years. Even Chomsky*s view of grammars
as theories of linguistic competence has been called into question.
It is arguable that the competence-performance distinction was never
very clear. Lakoff <1973a) suggests that three different versions
of the distinction are to be found in Aspects. It is psycholinguistic
findings, however, that have highlighted the problematic status of
the distinction. Some early studies suggested that rules of grammar
were employed directly in perceptual processes. At least since
Fodor and Garrett (1967), however, it has been clear that there is
no simple relation between rules of grammar and perceptual mechanisms.
Fodor, Bever, and Garrett (1975t 368) conclude that *both the
theoretical and experimental arguments for a perceptual model in
which the grammar is concretely recognisable appear dubious*. Xf
the rules and structures that are taken to constitute linguistic
competence play no role in linguistic performance, what sort of
reality do they have? One view, advanced in Bever and Langendoen
(1971), is that they constitute a predictive competence, utilized
in predicting new structures and distinct from the mechanisms of
speech perception and production. A more radical position is
developed in Lakoff and Thompson (1975a, b). They suggest that
*
grammars are simply convenient fictions for representing certain
aspects of linguistic processing, and have no independent mental
reality. They claim that there is a close correspondence between
a version of relational correspondence grammars and the mechanisms
of perception and production. Clearly, this is a major departure
*
from the Aspects paradigm.
Xn what follows, X will ignore this problem. X will assume
5
that linguistic competence in the sense of linguistic knowledge
accessible through the speaker's Intuitions is a legitimate object
of research. 1 will take a grammar to be a theory of linguistic
competence so understood. If this position turns out to be untenable,
and something like Lakoff and Thompson's position proves correct,
ray proposals will require some recasting. 1 don't think, however,
that their basic validity will be affected.
Another basic assumption of the Aspects paradigm that is
challenged by Lakoff and Thompson (and others) is the assumption
that there is a distinction between acceptability and grammaticality.
In contrast to Lakoff and Thompson, writers like Sever and
Langendoen have exploited the distinction much more fully than
Chomsky ever did. (See Bever, Katz# and Langendoen, 1976.) They
argue that there are both sentences that are unacceptable but
grammatical and sentences that are acceptable but ungrammatical.
It seems to me that this distinction is quite well motivated. In
i
the following chapters, however, 1 will largely ignore it. In
general, 1 will use the terras acceptable and grammatical inter¬
changeably. 1 want to stress, however, that 1 do not reject the
distinction.
What form, then, should grammars take? 1 will assume that a
grammar defines an infinite class of derivations, a derivation being
a finite sequence of phrase markers, Fg,..»Pn, where is a
logical structure, and a surface structure. 1 will generally
prefer the terra underlying structure to logical structure. 1 want
• ■ Vt
to stress that initial phrase markers are not just 'logical*.
They underlie surface structures, and facts about surface structure
are relevant to determining their character* A logical structure
6
represents the basic meaning of a sentence* This must be dis¬
tinguished from the propositions it expresses, if we understand
by this term the logical objects that are the bearers of truth
values* Consider here (1)*
(1) 1 am hungry.
This is unambiguous* Clearly, however, it can express .many
different propositions* There are, of course, sentences that
express the same proposition in all contexts* (2) is an obvious
example*
(2) Beavers build dams*
Many sentences, however, are like (1)* Following Stalnaker (1970),
1 assume that it is part of a theory of pragmatics to characterize
the ways in which the propositions a sentence expresses depend on
contextual factors* 1 will touch on one aspect of this question in
Chapter 6*
Following Lakoff (1971), 1 assume that grammars involve both
local and global derivational constraints* Local derivational
constraints or transformations specify ways in which adjacent phrase
markers may differ* Global derivational constraints specify
conditions which certain non-adjacent phrase markers must meet*
Following, for example, R. Lakoff (1972), 1 assume that various
rules will involve contextual conditions* More generally, 1 assume
that every derivation will be associated with a specification of
the contexts in which the sound-meaning correlation it characterises
is possible* 1 will exploit this assumption in the later chapters*
One important assumption that 1 will make is that a simple
unambiguous sentence can have more than one underlying structure*
This assumption is particularly prominent in chapter 4* 1 want to
stress that it is not a new assumption. It is implicit, for
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example, in any framework in which NP*s can originate outside
the sentences in which they appear in surface structure, A well
known example is that of KcCawley (1970a), For HcCawley, Cicero
can originate either inside or outside the complement in a
sentence like (3),
(3) John believes that Cicero denounced Catilllne,
Clearly* this corresponds to a real ambiguity. In the first case*
the identification of the individual who denounced Catiiline as
Cicero is John*s, In the second case, it is the speakers* Cicero
can also originate either inside or outside the complement in a
sentence like (4),
(4) 1 believe that Cicero denounced Catiiline,
Here, however, there is no ambiguity. The complement represents
the speaker*s assessment of reality. Thus, Cicero has the same
status whether it originates inside or outside the complement*
It is clear, then, that the assumption that an unambiguous sentence
can have more than one underlying structure is not new.
It is perhaps worth noting that an analogous assumption is
made in Montague grammar. In Montague grammar* an unambiguous
sentence can have more than one analysis tree. The main reason
for this is that terms (i«e. NP*s) can be introduced directly












Clearly, these do not correspond to distinct readings*
There are some further points that 1 must make about under¬
lying structures* Firstly, 1 assume, with Langacker <1976), that
underlying structures are not universal* My discussion of *«abient*
there and *arabient* jLt in chapters 4 and 9 will provide evidence
for underlying structures that are less *deep* than those commonly
assumed* It is fairly clear that such structures cannot be
universal. Secondly, 1 assume that sentences can have the same
underlying structure if they have the same truth conditions* 1
assume, however, that sentences with the same underlying structure
may differ in pragmatic significance. In chapter 4, I will suggest
that sentences like (8) and (9) can have the same underlying struc¬
ture, although they differ in pragmatic significance*
(8) An Italian Killed his wife,
(9) There was an Italian who killed his wife.
1 do not assume that sentences must have the same underlying
structures if they have the same truth conditions* A simple active-
passive pair like (10) and (11) have the same truth conditions*
(10) Morgoth killed Fingolfin*
(11) Fingolfin was killed by Morgoth*
I assume, however, that there are structures underlying (10) that
do not underlie (11) and vice-versa* It is possible, in fact, that
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such sentences will have no structures in common. X will discuss
this question in chapter 4. X also assume that underlying struc¬
tures contain abstract semantic elements* not lexical items* X
assume that lexical items are introduced fairly late* perhaps at
shallow structure* the output of the cycle* X will have little to
say about lexical insertion until the later chapters* For this
reason* X will generally ignore the normal practice of representing
semantic elements with capital letters* Finally* X assume that
underlying structures are ordered* and that the underlying order
of English is SVO*1
There are quite plausible alternatives to some of the
assumptions X am making* Xt is quite possible* for example* that
underlying structures should be unordered and ordering introduced
fairly late* perhaps at shallow structure* Xf unordered underlying
structures were assumed* it might be possible to replace some of
the movement rules invoked in chapters 11 and 12 by alternative
linearisation rules* Xt is alio possible that derivations should
not consist of phrase markers* One alternative is that they should
I . ' ■ ■
consist of dependency structures (Hays* 1964* Robinson, 1970*
Anderson* 1971* 1977}* Another is that they should consist of
categorial structures (Lyons* 1966* Lewis 1970* Cresswell* 1973)*
A third possibility is that they should consist of relational
networks. This* of course* is the position of relational grammar.
Finally* it is possible that we should dispense with derivations
1* Xt Is by no means certain that underlying structures are ordered*
Xf they are* however* it seems clear that English must be SVO and
'
£
not VSO# as proposed by Metawley (1970b)* See Berman (1974),
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altogether* It is possible that sentence structure should be
represented by a single complex structure rather than by a
sequence of relatively simple structures* This is the central
assumption of Hudson*s (1976) * daughter dependency grammar*. If
any of these possibilities prove correct, my proposals will
require some recasting* 1 think, though, that their basic validity
will generally remain*
1*3* A Note on Interpretive Semantics
The theoretical framework that 1 am assuming here is
essentially a version of generative semantics* This does not mean,
however, that Z undervalue work in the interpretive semantics tradi¬
tion. In fact, X am influenced by such work in a number of
ways* X think, however, that the significance of interpretivist
claims is often unclear. X want, then, to say something about
some of these claims*
The central claim of interpretive semantics in its various
versions is that there is a level of deep structure distinct from
logical structure or semantic Interpretation* In all but the most
recent version of interpretive semantics, deep structure is a level
between semantic representation and surface structure with the
following characteristics*
(l)a* Xt is the level at which lexical insertion applies*
b* Xt is input to the cycle*
c« Xt is related to semantic representation by semantic
interpretation rules and lexical entries*
In the most recent version of interpretive semantics, deep
structure has a somewhat different character, as X will shortly
indicate*
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As Newraeyer (1976) points out, it is natural to interpret
semantic interpretation rules and lexical entries as precyclic
transformations* It seems, in fact, that interpretivists have
assumed quite complex precyclic transformations. Jackendoff (1972)








(NP , NOT OPEN, OPEN))
This assigns (3) the functional structure in (4) (functional structure
being the central component of a semantic representation).
(3) Charlie opened a pistachio nut*
(4) CAUSE(CI!ARLI£, CHANGE
physical
(A PISTACHIO NUT, NOT OPEN, OPEN))
Clearly, (4) is quite different from the deep structure of (3) (which
will be much like its surface structure). Thus, (2) embodies a
quite complex mapping. It is worth comparing this with the kind of
analysis a generativist might propose. Within generative semantics,
J.
the obvious source for (3) is something like (5) (assuming for the
moment predicate*first word order).
(5) ~l
CAUSE CHARLIE
OPEN A PISTACHIO NUT
The derivation of (3) from (5) will involve predicate raising on
12
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S and S and subject-formation. Clearly, equally complex processes
are embodied in (2).
Various trans format ions that have, been assumed by generativists
have been rejected by interpretivlsts. Frequently, however,
analogues of these transformations appear in the semantic component.
It is natural, then, to see interpretivists not as rejecting these
rules but as claiming that they are precyclic. Two such rules are
predicate raising and nominalization* It has generally been assumed
by gencrativists that these are cyclic. Nevmeyer (1976) argues,
however, that they do not interact with any cyclic rules, and there¬
fore that they are precyclic. Clearly, as he points out, his
argument provides significant support for interpretivist
conceptions.
If rules like predicate raising and nominalization were cyclic,
the case for postcycllc lexical insertion would be very strong. If
they are in fact precyclic, the case is much weaker. In fact, the
interpretivist view that lexical insertion is precyclic becomes
quite plausible. X think, however, that there are still reasons
for rejecting it. I will suggest in chapter 12 that as and such
in sentences like the following are realizations of to the extent.
(6) Randall isn*t as sound a batsman as Boycott.
(7) Randall isn*t such a sound batsman as Boycott.
Whether to the extent is realized as as or such depends on its
position, specifically on whether it is followed by an adjective
or an HP. Its position is the result of various (presumably) cyclic
rules. X think, then, that the view that lexical insertion Is
precyclic is probably untenable.
So far my remarks apply equally to the standard theory and the
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extended standard theory. 1 must now say something specifically
about the extended standard theory. The central claim of the
theory is that some rules of semantic interpretation apply to
surface structure or to certain intermediate structures. Following
in essence Lakoff (1971) and McCawley (1974b), I would suggest
that such rules are in effect pxecyclic transformations with associated
global constraints. For example, a rule which says that the scope
of quantifiers corresponds to their surface order is equivalent to
a precyclic lowering rule plus a constraint on surface structure.
Closely associated with the claim that some rules of semantic inter¬
pretation apply to surface structure is the claim that some
transformations 1change meaning*. Following McCawley (1974b), 1
would suggest that a transformation changes meaning if some aspect
of the meaning of the sentence in whose derivation it applies is
predictable from its output but not from its input. For this to
be the case, the input must appear in the derivation of some other
sentence with a different meaning or a different range of meanings.
I think that transformations can change meaning in this sense. 1
doubt, however, whether the phenomenon is as widespread as advocates
of the extended standard theory have assumed. 1 will touch on this
question in chapters 5 and 13.
1 must now consider the roost recent version of interpretive
semantics, the revised extended standard theory (REST) of Chomsky
(1973, 1976). The REST claims that all semantic interpretation is
based on the *enriched* surface structure that is a consequence of
the trace theory of movement rules. Thus, there is no direct
relation between deep structure and semantic interpretation. It is
14
not at all easy to compare the theory with generative semantics*
1 think, however, that there are good reasons for rejecting it*
The REfT claims, in effect, that surface structure is in all
respects closer to semantic representation than any other level of
structure. Only if this is the case, can semantic interpretation be
based solely cn surface structure without unnecessary complexity*
It is easy to show that this is not the case, and that semantic
interpretation based solely on surface structure has to •undo* the
work of various transformations* In his sketch of the theory,
Chomsky pays particular attention to Wh-questions like (8)*
(8) Who did Sauron ensnare?
For Chomsky, the surface structure of (8) will be something like (9)
(where j ii « trace left by who), and its semantic representation,
or 'logical form*, as Chomsky terms it, will be something like (10)*
(9) Who did Sauron ensnare t
(10) For which person x, Sauron ensnared x
Clearly, these structures are quite similar. In particular, the
position of who in surface structure is the same as the position of
the corresponding quantifier phrase in logical form. Here, then,
the theory looks quite plausible. Notice, however, that semantic
interpretation has to undo the work of subject-verb inversion*
Even here, then, the theory faces a problem. Other Wh-questions
pose more serious problems. Consider, for example, (11).
(11) In whom did Aragorn confide?
Here, the surface structure will be something like (12), and the
logical form something like (13).
(12) In vrhora did Aragorn confide t
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(13) For which person x, Aragorn confided in x
Here again, semantic interpretation undoes the work of subject-verb
inversion* It also partially undoes the work of Wh-toovement by
moving the preposition _in back to its original position* Much the
same situation arises with (14)*
(14) Whose fate did Galadrlel predict?
This will have something like (15) as its logical form*
(15) For which person g, Galadriel predicted x*s fate
Here, then, semantic interpretation moves the genitive marking and
fate back to their original position* Again, then, it partially
undoes the work of Wh-movement* It seems, then, that Wh-moveraent
2
provides important evidence against the theory.
At least two other rules provide evidence against the REST*
The first is HP-proposing* This derives (16) from (17)*
"i
(16) A unicorn appears to be approaching*
(17) a appears [_a unicorn to be approaching].& D
For many speakers, (16) is ambiguous* On one reading, it implies
the existence of a unicorn* On the other, there is no such impli¬
cation* On the first reading, a unicorn will presumably have much
the same position in logical form as in surface structure* On the
second reading, however, it will have to be inside the complement
of appear* On this reading, then, semantic interpretation will undo
the work of NP-preposing* The second rule is adverb proposing* In
the simple case, this moves an adverb to the front of its clause,
2* Chomsky (1977a) actually considers an example like (14),
Surprisingly, he does not seem to see any problem in it*
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giving pairs of sentences like the following.
(18) Mary was here yesterday.
(I9) Yesterday, Mary was here.
There are also cases, however, vrhere the adverb is moved to the front
of & higher clause. The following illustrate.
(20) I think Mary was here yesterday.
(21) Yesterday, 1 think Mary was here.
How exactly adverbs should be represented in logical form is not a
simple matter. It seems fairly clear, however, that the interpretation
of sentences like (21) will undo the work of adverb preposing. It
seems, then, that these rules provide quite strong evidence against
the REST. 1 think, then, that the REST is untenable.
1 have now considered the three main versions of interpretive
semantics. There is one general point that I must make in conclusion.
Interpretivists have frequently claimed that the kinds of underlying
structure assumed within generative semantics are not * syntactically
motivated*. There is e problem here. Presumably, by syntactically
raGtiv&ted is meant 'motivated by facts of syntactic well-formedness'.
Thus, fcr it to be meaningful to say that e particular structure is
ox is not syntactically motivated, there must be facts of syntactic
well-formedness independent of any grammar. Both Chomsky and
Jackendoff, however, heve suggested that whether a particular deviant
sentence is syntactically ill-formed or semantically uninterpretabie
should be decided by the grammar. Thus, for Chomsky and Jackendoff,
there are no facts of syntactic well-formedness independent of any
grammar, and it makes no sense to say that a particular structure is
or is not syntactically motivated. 1 don*t think, then, that




TWO THEORIES OF F8DHOUNS
We can begin our investigation of pronouns by considering two
quite widely canvassed theories, which X will call the classical
theory and the bound variable theory* The fomar has been quite
extensively criticized* The latter has so far received little
criticism* 1 will argue that both are inadequate* I will be
concerned, however, not just to show this, but also to establish
the exact nature of their inadequacy* This should give some
insight into the form a more viable theory might take*
2*1* The Classical Theory
By the classical theory 1 mean the kind of theory assumed in
Ross (1969a)* This theory has its roots in Lees and Kliraa (1963),
and owes much to Chomsky (1965)* The theory has been subjected to
a wide range of criticisms, and, although there has been some
attempt at reply, it is doubtful whether anyone would not accept
the theory* The inadequacy of the theory is, 1 think, well
established* It is important, however, to establish the nature of
its inadequacy.
I take the classical theory to involve the following claims*
(A) Pronouns are preferential with their antecedents*
(B) Pronouns have the same underlying form as their
antecedents*
These are separate claims. It is quite possible to make one without
making the other* Lakoff (1976) makes only the first claim* Lees
and Klima made only the second* They were only concerned with the
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distribution of various types of pronoun, not with their inter¬
pretation. They proposed that pronouns derive from the second of
two formally identical HP'e, reflexives resulting where the two
NP's are in the same simplex sentence, ordinary pronouns resulting
elsewhere. Unlike Lees and Klima, Chomsky (1965) was concerned with
both the distribution and the interpretation of pronouns. He
noted the possibility of sentences like (I) and (2), in which the
HP's are normally interpreted as distinct in reference.
(1) John hurt John.
(2) The boy hurt the boy.
In the light of such sentences, he suggested that pronominalization
should require Identity of reference as well as formal identity. He
proposed, therefore, that every referential expression should be
assigned an integer, and that expressions with identical integers
should be understood as having the same reference. Given such
integers, one can require that pronominalization and reflexivization
only apply where the two HP's have identical integers.
Roes (1969a) was primarily concerned with the ordering of
pronominalization. In particular, he sought to show that It is a
cyclic rule. His argument has relevance to various analyses of
pronouns not only to the classical theory. He assumes, however,
that pronouns are introduced by the following rule.
- Z
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<i> 2 « 4
(il) The structural change shown on lino a. above,
FORWARDS PRONOMINALIZAT1CN, is subject to no conditions,
(iii) The structural change shown on line b. above,
BACKWARDS PRONOMINALIZATION, is only permissible if
the HP in term 2 of the structural description (SD) is
dominated by (i.e. contained in) a subordinate clause
which does not dominate (contain) an NP in term 4 of the
SD.
As the conditions make clear, Ross* s rule allows not only forwards
pronominaiisation, but also backwards pronominalization, which
neither Lees and Klima nor Chomsky considered. Ross was not
concerned with reflexives, but a parallel rule to introduce
reflexives would be the following based on Burt (1971).
(4) SD, X-NP-Y-NP-Z
Conditions
(i) 2 « 4
(ii) 2 and 4 are in the same #imp lex sentence.
It is rules like (3) and (4) that I take to constitute the classical
theory.
Perhaps the best known argument against the classical theory is the
Bach-Peters paradox (Bach, 1970). This seeks to show that claim B.
is incompatible with the basic assumption of transformational theory
that phrase markers are finite. Consider (5).
1 2- 3 ^ 3 Ti'Trfr
SC. 1 2
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(5) The pilot who shot at it hit the raig that chased him*
If every pronoun derives from a structure identical to its ante*
cedent, jLt and him in (5) rauat be derived from (6) and (7),
respectively*
(6) the raig that chased him
(7) the pilot who shot at it
But (6) and (7) themselves contain the pronouns him and JLt, bo they
must in turn be derived frees (7) and (6). Clearly, this can go on
indefinitely* It scams, then, that sentences like (5) present an
insuperable problem for the classical theory*
Dougherty (1969, fn* 3*) cites a suggestion of Chomsky's which
appears to offer a solution to the Bach-Peters paradox within the
classical theory* This involves the assumption that relative
clauses appear in the structure in (3) and that the lower of the
two HP's may serve as an antecedent*
(8)
HP S
Given this assumption, (5) could be derived from (9)*
<9> S
the pilot the pilot shot at the raig hit the raig the raig chased the pilot
In the derivation of (5), HP2 would pronominalize HP8, and HP6
A
would pronominalise HP « A similar approach is discussed at
length by Karttunen (1971)* He assumes that the antecedents for
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pronominalization are HP and HP • Again, the problem of infinite
phrase markers will be avoided* It might ©earn, then, that the
Bach-Peters paradox is not the decisive argument against the
classical theory that it was initially taken to be*
Criticisms of such responses to the Bach-Peters paradox have
been developed by Wasow (1972) and Fauconnier (1971)* Both point
out that they involve an infinite number of sources for (5)* The
problem is that it is always possible to expand the lowest HP's in
structures like (9), while still deriving the same surface structure*
We could, for example, expand (9) as (10)*
S
the pilot HP3 VP hit HP12
the pilot shot^at NP^ the raig HP*3
-5 /\ 14
MP 5 the mig chased HP
VP
the mig HP6 VP HP15
7 X\ *4
the isig chased HP the pilot HP
S the pilot shot at HP
the pilot HP9 VP the
the pilot shotat HP10
/\
the mig
Fro® (10), (5) can be derived as follows*
(ll) NP^ pronominalises NP*?
—12 * 10




(10) could itself be expended in the same way with (5) being derived
through additional applications of pronominalization. This is not,
Z think, a complete refutation of such approaches to the Bach-Peters
paradox* If one permits unambiguous sentences to have more than one
source, as 1 will want to, it is not obvious that one should rule
out the possibility of unambiguous sentences with an infinite number
of sources* It certainly casts doubt on such approaches, however*
The crucial problem with Chomsky*s suggestion is that it
involves an untenable analysis of definite descriptions containing
relative clauses* A definite description of the form the + N is
used when there is just one member of the set denoted by N which
the hearer will understand the speaker as referring to* It refers
to the contextually unique member of some set** A definite des¬
cription containing a restrictive relative clause refers to the
contextually unique member of a subset of a certain set* (12), for
example, refers to the contextually unique member of those men who
know the answer*
(12) the man who knew the answer
We can say, then, that a restrictive relative clause restricts the
extension of a noun* This suggests that the definite article
attaches to the combination of noun and relative clause, as in (13)
I* Obviously, this characterization only applies to definite
descriptions containing count nouns* A definite description con¬
taining a mass noun is used when there is just one portion of the
material denoted by the noun that the hearer will understand the
speaker as referring to* It refers to the contextually unique portion
of some material*
23
perhaps, and not the noun alone, as in (14). (See Quine, 1960,




(14), however, might be appropriate for non-restrictive relatives*
Chomsky*s suggestion depends crucially on structures like (14),
Specifically, it requires the lower NP to act as an antecedent. If
there is no such NP, his suggestion collapses*
Karttunen's response to the Bach-Peters paradox does not depend
on structures like (14)* It assumes, however, that the antecedents
of _it and him in (5) are the deleted subject of chased and who*
respectively* This assumption is completely counterintuitive* 1
think, then, that there is no viable alternative to Bach*s
assumption that the antecedents of jLt and him are the aig that chased
him and the pilot who shot at it* respectively. Thus, Bach-Peters
sentences provide crucial evidence against claim (b).
Bresnan (1970) suggests that sentences with indefinite ante¬
cedents provide evidence against claim (B). As she notes, the classi¬
cal theory assumes that (15) derives from (16).
(15) Some students think that they are running the show*
(16) Borne students think that some students are running the
show*
2* 1 will return to this matter in 3*6*
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Given such an analysis, it will be possible for cyclic thcre-
insertion to apply in the embedded sentence, yielding (17)*
(17) Some students think that there are some students
running the show*
Pronominalization can then apply to yield the ungrammatical (13)*
(13) * Some students think that there are they running the
show*
it looks, then, as if sentences like (15) provide evidence against
claim (B). There is more to be said about such sentences, however*
Notice that (16) cannot have the same meaning as (15)* One might
suggest that the two indefinite N?*s in (16) differ in reference,
whereas the indefinite NF and the pronoun in (15) have the same
reference* There is a problem here, however. As Geach (1962)
points out, if a term in a proposition has reference, it must be
possible to specify its reference independently of the truth value
of the proposition* This is not possible with indefinite NPfs* One
might suggest that some students in (15) refers to the students
who think they are running the show* However, if (15) is false,
there will be no such students* It seems, then, that indefinite
NP's do not have reference* Therefore, we cannot say that the two
NP,s in (16) differ in reference. More importantly, we cannot say
that the Indefinite NP and the pronoun in (15) have the same reference*
Thus, sentences like (15) provide evidence against claim (A) as well*
Dougherty (1969) and others have suggested that sentences like
the following provide evidence against claim (B)«
(19) Every doctor thinks he is overworked*
(20) Noone voted for himself*
(21) Each of the boys gave his name.
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In the classical theory, these will derive from the following*
(22) Every doctor thinks every doctor is overworked*
(23) Noon® voted for noone.
(24) Each of the boys gave each of the boy*a name*
Clearly, such sources are sera&nfcicaliy quite inappropriate. It seems,
then, that sentences like (19) - (21) provide evidence against
claim (B)* What, then, o£ claim (A)? It might be argued that
NP*s like every doctor, noone* and each of the boys are not
referring expressions. I think, however, that they are a kind of
referring expression* I would suggest that every doctor in (19)
refers to some set of doctors* Support for this view is provided
by (25), in which the pronoun refers to the same set*
(25) Every doctor thinks they are overworked.
Similarly, I would suggest that noone in (20) refers to some set*
In (26), one has a pronoun referring to the same set*
(26) Noone was asleep* They were all singing songs*
Finally, 1 would suggest, perhaps less controversially, that each
of the boys in (21) refers to some set of boys. Support for this
view is provided by (27)*
(27) Each of the boys said they were ready,
1 think, then, that it is reasonable to regard these Nl?* s as
referring expressions* It seems clear, however, that the pronouns
do not have the same reference. He in (19) does not refer to a set
of doctors, himself in (20) does not refer to any set, and his in
(21) does not refer to a set of boys* 1 think, then, that sentences
like (19) - (21) provide evidence against both the classical
theory's claims.
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It is clear that the classical theory is not an adequate theory
of pronouns* Neither of its claims is generally valid* However,
claim (A), at least, 3eeme to be true of many pronouns. This
fact must be accommodated in any alternative theory*
2*2* The hound Variable Theory
1 can now consider what X am calling after Wasow (1975) the
bound variable theory. Vuriante of this theory have been advanced
by various linguists. 1 take it to involve the following features*
(A) In underlying structure, NP positions are filled by
variables, with identical variables for NP*s which are
anaphoricaliy related.
(B) Each variable is bound to a specification of certain
logical or semantic material.
(C) A transformation inserts the binding material into the
position of one of the variables which it binds.
(D) The remaining variables are realized as appropriate
pronouns.
(E) An NP can only bind a variable which is in its scope,
3
i.e. which it asymmetrically commands.
X will call the transformation mentioned in (C) *NP»lowering*.
Wasow includes only the first four features in his characterization
of the theory. It seems appropriate, however, to include the
fifth feature as well. ■
3. A asymmetrically commands B if the first S node above A also
dominates B but the first S node above B does not dominate A.
The earliest cxapple of something like the bound variable
theory is the theory sketched in McCawley <1970a). Wasow takes
this to be an example of the bound variable theory. Strictly
speaking, however, if is not. McCawley assumes that NP positions
are filled not by variables but by referential indices, which are
constants* The rationale for this assumption is far from clear.
If it is dropped, the theory becomes a straightforward example of
the bound variable theory. Clear examples of the theory are
provided by Harraan (1970), Keenan (1972), and Bonney (1976). We
can interpret the theory developed in Montague (1973) as a further
example. Montague has a rule combining a term and an open sentence
by substituting the term for a variable in the sentence and con¬
verting any other variable into a pronoun of the appropriate form.
That this is a notational variant of the bound variable theory is
made clear in Cooper and Parsons (1976). Wasow takes the theory of
Fauconnier (1971) to be a further example of the bound variable
theory* In fact, however, Fauconnier*s theory differs from the
bound variable theory in a number of ways. Like McCawley, Fauconnier
has N? positions filled by referential indices, lie also, however,
has many full NP*s originating in their surface positions. In
addition, his theory does not involve assumption (£)• I conclude,
then, that it is not an example of the bound variable theory.
The bound variable theory can be illustrated briefly. Within
the theory, (1) and (2) will derive from something like (3).
•
i ■
(1) Before John went to bed, he cleaned his teeth.




x cleaned x*s teeth before John
x went to bed
In the derivation of both sentences* adverb proposing will apply on
substituted for the subject of the adverbial clause. In (2), it is
substituted for the main clause subject* Appropriate constraints on
lowering will prevent the derivation of (4)*
(4) * Before he went to bed* he cleaned John** teeth*
Alternatively* such sentences can be rejected by an output condition*
The problems which refute the classical theory appear to find
a natural solution within the bound variable theory* The theory does
not claim that pronouns are preferential with their antecedents*
An unbound variable is clearly not a referring expression* and there
is no need to assume that It becomes one when it is bound* Thus*
sentences like (5) represent no problem for the theory*
(5) Every doctor thinks he is overworked*
Nor* of course* does the theory claim that anaphoric pronouns have
the same underlying form as their antecedents* Thus* Bach-Peters
sentences do not present any problems for the theory* The standard
Bach-Peters sentence (6) can be derived from something like (7)*
(6) The pilot who shot at it hit the aift that chased him.
m $
x hit y the pilot who the mig that
shot at y chased x
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The theory appears* then* to be an advance on the standard theory*
The major published critique of the standard theory is that
of Wasow (1975). Wasow's critique centres on the fact that the
theory* as normally formulated* allows cyclic rules to apply before
NP-lowering, and hence before pronouns and antecedents are
distinguished* NP-lowering applies in structures like (3)*
(8) S1
»**x*|*
If it is a cyclic rule* as McCawley and Herman at least assume*
2 1
cyclic rules will apply on S before NPx is lowered on S • They
will thus apply before pronouns and antecedents are distinguished.
Wasow seeks to show that pronouns and antecedents must be distinguished
during the cycle* His arguments are* 1 think* not that strong* 1
will discuss them in chapter 5* For the time being* we can note
that* even if Wasow*s position is accepted* it does not necessitate
the abandonment of the bound variable theory* only its revision*
We can simply propose that HP-lowering is a precyclie rule* Wasow*
in effect* proposes a precyclic rule himself* He writes thati
If we wish to have the semantic representation of pronouns
look like variables in logic* we can introduce a semantic
rule R which will represent a set of anaphorieally related
HP's as variables bound by a common operator* (1975s381)
1 think the obvious interpretation of such a rule is as a paracyclic
transformation* We can* then, accept Wasow*s position without
abandoning the bound variable theory*
Although Wasow* s arguments do not refute the bound variable
theory* other arguments do* An obvious problem is posed by
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pronouns with antecedents in earlier sentences, as Jackendoff
(1972t283) points out. Consider, for example, the following
dialogue.
(9) At Sam interviewed Miss World.
Bt Did she say much?
The antecedent of she is Miss World, but she cannot be represented
as a variable bound by Miss World, since it is outside the scope
of that NP. One might suggest that the scope of the MP should be
extended to include B*s question as well as A*s statement. Bonney
(1976) argues for such an approach. Clearly, however, this would
involve a major departure from traditional notions of scope.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear how it could be done. A
different response is to assume that pronouns with antecedents in
the same sentence derive from bound variables, but that other pro¬
nouns have a different source. This is essentially the position of
Cresswell (1973, Ch. 11.) (though he also talks about the possibility
of a *paragraph semantics* that would allow pronouns like she in
(9) to be derived from bound variables). 1 will argue, against this
position, that there are pronouns with antecedents in the same
sentence that cannot be derived from bound variables.
Notice firstly that the bound variable theory makes the following
prediction.
(10) If, for any reason, a particular NP cannot asymmetrically
command the variable underlying some pronoun in under¬
lying structure, it cannot be the antecedent of that
pronoun.
If this prediction were borne out, the theory would receive
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significant support. Unfortunately, it is not borne out.
Consider firstly (11).
(11) Leon wants to catch a fish, and I want to cook it.
The first clause on its own is ambiguous, having the specific
reading (12), and the non-specific reading (13).
(12) There is a fish that Leon wants to catch.
(13) Leon wants there to be a fish that he catches.
On the first reading, it can be derived from a structure in which
a fish is located outside the complement of want. On the second, it
can be derived from one in which a.Jish is inside the complement.
(14) and (15) illustrate.
(14) , S (15) S
x catch y
x catch y
Notice now that, as Jackendoff (1972) notes, the complete
sentence is unambiguous, if a fish is understood as antecedent of
it. In this ease, a fish must be specific. This is what the bound
variable theory predicts. The obvious analysis for (11) within the
bound variable theory is something like (16).
(16)
y catch x z cook x
As the theory requires, a fish here asymmetrically commands the second
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occurrence of the variable x» which is realised as it. It is outside
the complement of the first want, where it appears on the surface*
Therefore, it is understood as specific. If a fish originated inside
the complement of the first want, it could not asymmetrically command
the variable which is realized as it, and, therefore, it could not
be antecedent of it. Sentences like (11) seem, then, to provide some
support for the bound variable theory.
Unfortunately, problems arise with sentences like (17).
(17) John will bring a girl to the party and she will be
beautiful.
The first clause of (17) is ambiguous in much the same way as the
first clause of (11). There may or may not be a specific girl that
the speaker has in mind. As Jackendoff notes, this ambiguity remains
when a girl is understood as antecedent of she, This is contrary to
the predictions of the bound variable theory. Within the theory,
if one assumes that will is a verb taking a subject complement and
triggering raising, the obvious analysis for (17) within the bound
variable theory is something like (18).
(13) S
y bring x to John
the party
a girl here asymmetrically commands the second occurrence of the
variable x, as the theory requires. Since it is not inside any
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coiapleaent, it must be understood as specific. Hie problem is that
the theory provides no analysis ior the interpretation oi (17) in
which a ^irl is nonspecific* If a «.irl is nonspecific9 it must
originate inside the complement of the first will* But, if it
originates in this position, it cannot asymmetrically command the
variable that is realised as she* The theory, then, falsely predicts
that a girl cannot be antecedent of she* if it is nonspecific*
Much the same problem arises with (19), discussed by Geach (1972)*
(19) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Eob*e mare, and Nob
wonders whether she hilled Cob'a sow*
a witch here can be specific or nonspecific* in the former ease, it
will originate outside the complement* In the latter, it will originate
inside* In both cases, it can be antecedent of she* but only in the
former can it asymmetrically command the variable underlying she*
A further problem arises with sentences like (20), to which Cress-
well (1973) draws attention*
(20) If someone works, he sleeps*
On the most obvious reading of (20), someone is nonspecific* On this
reading, someone will have to originate inside the conditional
clause* But, if it originates inside the conditional clause, it
cannot asymmetrically command the variable that is realised as he*
Again, then, we have a reading that the theory predicts should be
impossible* It seems, then, that we have significant exceptions to
(10)* Given such exceptions, the theory appears rather dubious*
A second prediction, which is essentially a special case of
(10), is (21)*
(21) No NF inside an island may be the antecedent of a pronoun
outside that island.
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I assume that lowering rules are subject to island constraints in the
sense of Ross <1967} and much subsequent work* Ross did not discuss
the relation of island constraints to lowering rules, but various
linguists, e.g. Lakoff (1970b) and Postal (1974b), have argued that
lowering rules are as much subject to island constraints as extraction
rules. Lakoff and Postal both seek to show that various scope
phenomena are naturally explained as the result of the interaction
of lowering rules and island constraints. The facts are not always
as clear as they might be (Liddell, 1975), but their proposals are
broadly attractive. In the bound variable theory, every HP asymmetric
cally commands all the variables it binds in underlying structure.
But no HP inside an island asymmetrically commands any element out¬
side that island. Therefore, any HP inside an island that is
antecedent of a pronoun outside that island must have been lowered
into the island. But, if lowering rules are subject to island
constraints, this is impossible. Hence (21).
There are various sentences which appear to provide support
for (21). Consider, for example, the following from Postal (1970,
fn* 14.}*
(22) * The fact that every gorilla has a tail amuses him.
(23) * The girl who visited each state hated it.
In the bound variable theory, these would derive from something like
(24) and (25), respectively.
(24) [g the fact [g that x has a tail]g amuses x]g [every
gorilla x]
(25) [g the girl [g who visited x]g hated x]g [each state x]
In the derivation of (22) and (23), HP-lowering will violate the
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complex HP constraint. Consider also the following.
<26) * That every candidate was interviewed surprised him.
(27) * That John saw a girl annoyed her.
(28) * That some demonstrators were arrested worried them.
In the bound variable theory, these would derive from (29) - (31),
respectively.
(29) [s£g that one interviewed x],. surprised x]£ [every
candidate x]
<30> [sCc that John »aw *]£ worried x]g [a girl x]
(31) [g[c that one arrested x]c worried x]g [some demonstrators
*3
In each case here, KP-lowering will violate the sentential subject
constraint. There appears, then, to be seme support for (21).
Unfortunately, exceptions to (21) are numerous. Firstly, there
are exceptions involving definite HP's. A definite HP inside an
island can quite generally serve as antecedent of a pronoun outside
that island. Contrasting with the examples above, we have the
following.
(32) The fact that the gorilla has a tell anuses him.
(33) The girl who visited the 49th state hated it.
(34) That the first candidate was interviewed surprised him,
(35) That John saw the girl annoyed her.
(36) That the demonstrators were arrested worried them.
There are also examples with indefinite HP's. Consider (37) (an
example of Wasow*s) and (38).
(37) A ©an who discovered that some burglars were in his house
was shot by them.
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(33) The man who caught a unicorn sold it to the zoo.
Notice also (39).
(39) That some demonstrators were arrested doesn't mean they
will be charged.
The only difference between (39) and (28) is that the pronoun does not
command its antecedent in the former whereas it does in the latter*
Vet the former, unlike the latter, seems perfectly acceptable. It
seems, then, that the second prediction that follows from the
bound variable theory is not generally valid.
I want now to return briefly to sentences like (20). Cresswell
suggests that the dilemma they pose can be resolved by taking someone
in such sentences to represent a universal quantifier. Following this
suggestion, we might propose to derive (20) from something like (40).
(40), S
if x works, x sleeps everyone
This means something like (41).
(41) Everyone is such that if he works he sleeps.
This is equivalent to (20). Semantically, then, the suggestion seems
to work. It does, of course, involve taking someone as representing
both an existential and a universal quantifier. Other things being
equal, this is an undesirable position. But other things might not
be equal. I will suggest below, in chapter 5, that any represents
both an existential and a universal quantifier. It appears, then,
that sentences like (20) might not provide evidence against the bound
variable theory after all* There is, however, a serious problem
with Cresswell's suggestion. Conditional clauses are Islands, as
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the ungramraafcicality of (42) shows*
(42) * Who if Sam sees will he let me know*
Thus, the suggestion involves lowering into an island* It must,
therefore, be rejected. Thus, sentences like (20) do indeed provide
evidence against the bound variable theory.
It is clear that the bound variable theory, like the classical
theory, is not an adequate theory of pronouns. It cannot handle
pronouns with antecedents in earlier sentences* Nor can it handle
various pronouns with antecedents in the sane sentence. Nonetheless,
the theory does have certain virtues. In particular, it can handle
sentences which provide evidence against the classical theory. This
must be borne in mind in the search for a more viable theory.
2.3. A Note on bon-anaphoric Pronouns
I have said nothing so far about non-anaphoric pronouns. This
is quite natural, since, insofar as such pronouns are considered
at ail by proponents of the two theories, they are considered as
an afterthought. Clearly, however, non-anaphoric pronouns are
important. It is necessary, then, to say something about them.
It seems likely that many proponents of the two theories have
seen them as theories of anaphoric pronouns. In any event, it is
fairly clear that non-anaphoric pronouns pose problems for them.
• i ■ I •' | i i >'
By definition, non-anaphoric pronouns lack antecedents* Clearly,
then, they cannot be the result of pronominalisation. It seems
equally clear that they cannot be bound variables* Bonney (1976)
suggests, however, that they can be* We have seen that he
proposes to allow a variable to be bound by an NP in an earlier
sentence. He also proposes to allow a variable to be bound by an
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HP that is somehow implicit in the context. 1 suggested that the
former proposal involves a major departure from traditional notions
of scope, Tliis is even more true of the latter proposal# It
effectively deprives the notion of a bound variable of any content#
t think, then, that, if the notion means anything, non-anaphoric
pronouns cannot be bound variables*
1 think we can conclude that, in addition to their other
inadequacies, neither the classical theory nor the bound variable
theory can provide an adequate account of non-anaphoric pronouns#
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CHAPTER 3
TOWARDS A MIXED THEORY OP PRONOUNS
It is clear that neither the classical theory nor the bound
variable theory is an adequate theory of pronouns. Both, however,
contain valid insights. Clearly, we need a theory that incorporates
their insights, but avoids their failings. 1 want to suggest that
the central fact that such a theory must recognize is that there
is more than one kind of pronoun. In other words, an adequate
theory of pronouns will be a 'mixed theory*In this chapter, I
will present various kinds of data that indicate the need for such
a theory. I will also develop some preliminary ideas about the
form it should take.
3.1. Preliminary Remarks
The view that a mixed theory of pronouns is necessary has been
advanced by a number of writers. Best known perhaps is Geach. He
has in a number of places drawn a distinction between pronouns
analyseable as bound variables and what he terms 'pronouns of lazi¬
ness* « In Geach <1962), he defines pronouns of laziness as pronouns
which 'may be eliminated from a proposition, by simply repeating the
antecedent' (p.124). In Geach (1972), he defines pronouns of lazi¬
ness more broadly as 'any pronoun used in lieu of a repetitious
expression, even when that expression would not be just the same
1. The term mixed theory is taken from Hankamer and Sag (1976).
They argue for a mixed theory of anaphora.
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as the pronoun's antecedent* (p*93)* The difference between the
two definitions can be illustrated by (1) and (2)*
(1) Max explored the Amazon, and he caught typhoid*
(2) A man explored the Amazon, and he caught typhoid*
In (1), he can be eliminated by substituting for it its antecedent
Max* he cannot be eliminated in the same way in (2)* Thus, only
in (1) is he a pronoun of laziness on the first definition* Notice,
however, that he in (2) can be regarded as used in lieu of the
repetitious expression the man who explored the Amazon* Thus, it
seems to be a pronoun of laziness on the second definition* In both
definitions, pronouns of laziness are seen as alternatives to
certain definite NP*s* It would seem, then, that pronouns of lazi¬
ness, like definite NP's, are referring expressions* Geach*s
approach has been developed by Partee (1970, 1975a}* A similar ap¬
proach is developed by Witten (1972)# 1 will refer to their work
quite often in what follows*
The necessity for a mixed theory of pronouns would be estab¬
lished, if one could find ambiguous sentences whose ambiguity can
be attributed to the fact that some pronoun has more than one source*
Such sentences have been discussed at length by Partee (1975a) and
Witten (1972).
We can consider firstly sentence® like the following*
(3) Max loves his wife, and so does Alaric*
(4) Marsha said she was angry, and so did Jan*
As many linguists have noted, such sentences are ambiguous* In (3),
Alaric may love Max's wife, or he may love his own wife. In (4), Jan
may have said that Marsha was angry, or she may have said that she
herself was angry* Ross (1967) proposes to account for such
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ambiguities by allowing VP-deletion to apply either When the VP's
involved are identical in all respects, or when they differ only in
the reference of pronouns commanded by their antecedents* The former
situation he terms * strict identity*, the latter *sloppy identity**
Boss's approach is subject to a number of problems* Firstly, it
seems counterintuitive to claim that one reading of (3) and (4)
involves strict identity, while the other involves a departure from
strict identity. Intuitively, the identity seems equally strict in
both cases* Secondly, a problem arises with sentences like (5)»
(5) John washed his car, and Sam did, and Steve did*
On Ross* s proposal, (3) should be six ways ambiguous. The second
clause should mean either that Sam washed Joha*s car, or that he
washed his own, and the third clause should mean that Steve washed
John*s car, or Sam*s, or his own* In fact, however, (5) is only two
ways ambiguous* It can mean that all three men washed John's car,
or that each of them washed his own* Clearly, this is a problem for
Boss's proposal*
A more promising approach to sentences like (3) and (4) is that
sketched in McCawley (1967)* Roughly, HcCawley's suggestion is that
sloppy Identity is identity of constituents containing variables* In
HcCawley's approach, the first reading of (3) would involve two VP's
of the form loves x^'s wife* where is a constant or a pronoun of
laziness referring to Hex* The second reading would involve two
VP's of the form loves x's wife* where x it i variable, and each
variable is bound by the subject of the sentence in which it appears*
What I will call the 'command constraint* ensures that each variable
can only be bound by the subject of its sentence. This constraint,
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which X will discuss in greater detail in chapter 5, requires bound
variables to be commanded by their antecedents. Obviously, in the
present case, each variable is commanded only by the subject of its
sentence. If bound variables are not referring expressions, VP-
deletion will not ignore any differences of reference in the second
reading of (3). On both readings of (3), then, the VP*s will be
strictly identical. This, 1 think, is an intuitively more satisfactory
position than Ross's. This approach also permits a fairly simple
account of sentences like (5). If his in (5) is a pronoun of lazi¬
ness, the missing VP's must have contained pronouns of laziness with
the same reference. Otherwise, VP-deletion would not have applied.
This accounts for the reading of (5) in which all three men washed
John's car. If his represents a bound variable, the missing VP's must
also have contained bound variables. If we assume that each variable
must have been bound by the subject of its own sentence, this explains
why the only other reading is that in which each man washed his
own car. Here, then, we have significant support for this approach.
Clearly, if this approach is motivated, sentences like (3) - (5) will
indicate the necessity of a mixed theory of pronouns.
Further evidence for the necessity of a mixed theory of pronouns
is provided by sentences like (6) and (7).
(6) Only Max washed his car.
(7) Only Marsha said she was angry.
2
Again, such sentences are ambiguous. (6) may mean either (3) or (9).
m m m «» «# m m
2. For some speakers, only the second reading of (6) is fully natural
unless the pronoun is stressed. The same applies to (7). Stressed
pronouns seem to be quite generally understood as pronouns of laziness.
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(8) The only one who washed Max*® car was Max,
(9) The only one who washed his car was Max#
Similarly, (7) may mean either (10) or (11)#
(10) The only one who said Marsha was angry was Marsha#
(11) The only one who said she was angry was Marsha.
Intuitively, this is a similar ambiguity to that found in sentences
like (3) and (4). Obviously, it has nothing to do with different
kinds of identity# As the paraphrases indicate, it is a matter of
what property is ascribed to Max. As with sentences like (3) and (4),
sentences li' s (6) and (7) may be understood as involving two
different VP's. It is easy to show that these VP's should be dis¬
tinguished by the nature of their pronouns in the same way as the
VP's in (3) and (4), Consider the following sentence.
(12) Only Max washed his car. Sam didn't.
If this is understood as meaning that Sam didn't wash Max's car, the
first clause must be understood as (8)# If the sentence is under¬
stood as meaning that Sam washed his own car, the first clause
must be understood as (9). Thus, when the pronoun in (6) is a
pronoun of laziness, (6) is understood as (8), when it is a bound
variable, it is understood as (9)# Again, then, a mixed theory
seems necessary.
Sentences like (3) and (4) and (6) and (7) seem, then, to
indicate the need for a mixed theory of pronouns of the kind en¬
visaged by Geach, To get a clearer idea of the form this theory
should take, it will be useful to look at some further data.
3.2. Further Data
In the last section, 1 considered ordinary pronouns in sentences
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involving VP-deletion and only* Such sentences involve ambiguities
which can be attributed to the possibility of two different sources
for pronouns* In this section, X want to investigate the distri¬
bution of these ambiguities*
Firstly, we can consider the behaviour of reflexives in VP-
deletion and only sentences* Taking VP-deletion sentences first, we
notice, as Kecnan (1970) observes, that sentences like (1) are
unambiguous*"*
(1) Marsha scratched herself, and so did dan*
(1) cart only mean that Jan scratched herself, not that Jan scratched
Marsha, In Kobb*b terms, it has only a sloppy Identity inter¬
pretation. In a framework like McGawley* s, we can assume that re¬
flexives can only represent bound variables* As before, the command
constraint ensures that each variable is bound by the subject of its
sentence. This, then, explains the absence of a strict Identity
reading* Turning now to only sentences, we notice that sentences
like (2), discussed in Gcach (1962), are"unambiguous.
(2) Only Satan pities himself*
This implies that no one else pities himself, not that no one else
pities Satan* This is exactly what we expect if reflexives can only
represent bound variables.
We can now consider the behaviour in VP-deletion and only sen¬
tences of the null anaphor that arises through equi-NP-deletion.
3* Dahi (1973) claims that sentences like (1) and (2) are ambiguous*
His seems to be very much a minority dialect*
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Consider firstly (3).
(3) Erica wants to see Max* and so does Eve.
Like (I), this ir, unambiguous. Again, in Ross's terras, it has only a
sloppy identity reading. We can suggest, then, that null anaphors,
like reflexives, can only represent bound variables. Consider now
<4>.
(4) Only Erica wants to see Max.
Like (2), this is unambiguous. It implies that no one else wants to
sen Max, not that no one else wants Erica to see Max. Again, this is
exactly what we expect, if null anaphors can only represent bound
variables.
The foregoing suggests that, while ordinary pronouns can repre¬
sent pronouns of laziness and bound variables, reflexives and null
anaphors can only represent bound variables. In fact, however, the
situation is rather more complex. There are various contexts in
which ordinary pronouns can only represent bound variables.
We can consider firstly the following sentences.
(5) A Rumanian washed his car, and so did a Bulgarian.
(6) A Rumanian said he was angry, and so did a Bulgarian,
Here, we have pronouns commanded by indefinite antecedents. If we
ignore the readings in which the pronouns are non-anaphoric, these
sentences, unlike similar sentences in the last section, are
unambiguous. (5) can only mean that a Bulgarian washed his own
car, not that a Bulgarian washed the Rumanian*s car. (6) is inter¬
preted similarly. In Ross's terms, both sentences have sloppy
identity readings only. We can assume, then, that the pronouns
can only represent bound variables. Consider now the following
sentences.
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(7) Only one man washed his car*
(8) Only one mm said he was angry.
Again, unlike similar sentences in the last section, these sentences
are unambiguous* This, of course, is exactly what we expect, if
pronouns coaaaanded by indefinite antecedents can only represent
bound variables.
We can consider next the following sentences*
(9) Every Rumanian washed his car, and so did every Bulgarian*
(10) Every Rumanian said he was angry, and so did every
Bulgarian*
(11) No Rumanian washed his car, and no Bulgarian did either.
(12) No Rumanian said he was angry, and no Bulgarian did
either*
(13) Each Rumanian washed his car, and so did each Bulgarian*
(14) Each Rumanian said lie was angry, and so did each
Bulgarian*
Here, we have singular pronouns with antecedents containing every* no*
and each. Again, like (5) and (6), these sentences are unambiguous*
Again, in Ross* s terms, they have sloppy identity readings only*
Again, then, we can assume that the pronouns can only represent
bound variables. This, of course, is exactly what we suggested
earlier*
A further environment which only permits bound variables is
illustrated in sentences like the following*
(15) The Rumanian who beat his wife was criticised, but the
Bulgarian who did was admired.
(16) The Rumanian who said he was Napoleon was arrested, but
the Bulgarian who did was ignored.
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In both sentences* we. have a pronoun inside a relative clause with
4
the complex NP as its antecedent* Both sentences are unambiguous*
having sloppy identity readings only* Again* then* the pronouns
must represent bound variables*
A final environment that permits bound variables only is
illustrated in the following discourse*
(17) A* Who beat his wife?
Bt John beat his wife* and so did Bill*
In A*s question* we have a pronoun with the question word as its
antecedent* In isolation* B*s answer is ambiguous* having both a
strict identity and a sloppy identity reading* In this context*
however* it is unambiguous* having only a sloppy Identity reading*
This means that hia in B*s answer must represent a bound variable.
The obvious explanation for this is his in A*s question must repre¬
sent a bound variable*
I have argued* then* on the basis of the distribution of certain
ambiguities* that various anaphors can only represent bound variables*
In the next section* 1 will present some independent evidence for
these conclusions*
3*3* Pronouns and Reference
However else pronouns of laziness are characterized* it is
reasonably clear that they are referring expressions* X assume that
4* In fact* it is not the complex HP but the head noun that is
antecedent* as we will see in 3*6*
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bound variables are not referring expressions* I want now to look
further at this difference.
If bound variables are not referring expressions! any evidence
that some pronoun is not a referring expression is evidence that it
is a bound variable. There is a fair amount of evidence of this
kind. If one has a sentence containing a referring expression in a
non-opaque environment! it is possible to replace that expression
by any other expression with the same reference without changing the
truth conditions of the sentence. Clearly! this principle has Impli¬
cations for pronouns. If a pronoun and its antecedent are both
referring expressions with the same reference! it should be possiblet
other things being equal, to substitute the latter for the former.
What then of cases where this is not possible? We can, 1 think,
exclude the possibility that a pronoun and its antecedent can be
referring expressions with different referents* There are, therefore,
two possible conclusions in this situation! either the antecedent
is not a referring expression, or the pronoun is not* Here, then,
we have a possible way of identifying anaphoric pronouns which are
not referring expressions, and which must, therefore, be analyzed as
bound variables.
We can look first at reflexives* X£ reflexives were referring
expressions, it would be possible to substitute Satan for himself
in (1) without changing the truth conditions of the sentence.
(1) Only Satan pities himself*
This is not possible, however* As Geach (1962) points out, (1)
and (2) have quite different truth conditions*
(2) Only Satan pities Satan.
49
(i) implies that no one else pities himself# (2) implies that no
one else pities Satan. Clearly, Satan is a referring expression.
We must assume, then, that himself is not. Here, then, we have
independent evidence that reflexives represent bound variables.
Next, we can consider the null anaphor that results from
equi-NP-deletion. If the null anaphor were a referring expression,
(3) and (4) would have the seme truth conditions.
(3) Only Steve wants to visit Bordeaux.
(4) Only Steve wants Steve to visit Bordeaux.
Clearly, they do not. (3) implies that no one else wants to visit
Bordeaux. (4) implies that no oxie else wants Steve to visit
Bordeaux. We can assume, then, that null anaphors are not referring
expressions, and, therefore, that they represent bound variables.
We can also consider ordinary pronouns. We have already, in
effect, etaployec the argument developed here in connection with
sentences like (5)*
(5) Every doctor thinks he is overworked.
It seems reasonable to regard every doctor as a referring expression
referring to a set of doctors* Therefore, the fact that (5) has
different truth conditions from (6) suggests that the pronoun is not
a referring expression.
(6) Every doctor thinks every doctor is overworked.
We can assume, then, that the pronoun represents a bound variable.
We can also employ the argument in connection with sentences
like <7).
(7) The man who thought he was Trotsky was arrested.
One might think that he is a referring expression with the same
reference as the complex NP of which it is a constituent* Substi¬
tuting this NP for he gives an unacceptable sentence. Suppose,
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however, that the referent of the HP is called Sam* Me should then
be able to substitute San for he* giving (8)*
(8) The man who thought Sam wag Trotsky was arrested*
It is quite easy* however* to show that (7) and (8) have different
truth conditions* Among the truth conditions of (7) is the requirement
that there is in the context only one man who thought he was Trotsky*
Among those of (8) is the requirement that there is in the context
only one man who thought Sam was Trotsky* In a context where there
is only one man* namely Sam* who thought he was Trotsky* but where
there is another man who thought Sam was Trotsky* the first require¬
ment will be met* but the second will not* This suggests* then*
that he is not a referring expression* Me can assume* therefore*
that it represents a bound variable*
Unfortunately, the argument cannot be invoked in connection
with sentences like (9) and (10)*
<9} An Italian thought he was Trotsky*
(10) Who thought he was Trotsky?
Clearly* (9) has different truth conditions from (11)*
(11) An Italian thought an Italian was Trotsky*
Here* however* the antecedent is not a referring expression* There¬
fore* the different truth conditions of (9) and (11) do not show
that die pronoun is not a referring expression* Me can think of
(10) as specifying a set of sentences* each with its own truth
conditions, which are possible answers to (10)* Clearly* (12)
specifies a different set of sentences with different truth
conditions*
(12) Who thought who was Trotsky?
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Again, however, Che antecedent Is not a referring expression* There*
fore, the contrast between <10) and (12) does not establish that the
pronoun is not a referring expression*
While the argument is not relevant to sentences like (9) and <10),
it is relevant to sentences where the pronoun can represent either
a bound variable or a pronoun of laziness* Consider firstly (13)*
(13) Max loves his wife, and so does Alaric*
As we have seen, (13) is ambiguous* Alaric may love either Max*s
wife or his own wife* Hotice, however, that (14) is unambiguous*
(14) Max loves Max*s wife, and so does Alaric*
This can only mean that Alaric loves Max*s wife* It is clear, then,
that, when (IS) has a sloppy identity reading, the pronoun is not e
referring expression* On this reading, then, it must represent a
bound variable* Consider also (IS)*
(15) Only Max washed his car*
This, again, is ambiguous, meaning either (16) or (17)*
(16) The only one who washed Max»s car was Max*
(17) The only one who washed his car was Max*
(13), however, is unambiguous*
(IS) Only Max washed Max*s car*
It can only mean (16)* Clearly, then, the pronoun is not e referring
expression, when (15) means (17)* Therefore, when (15) has this
reading, the pronoun must represent a bound variable*
X originally argued for a conception of sloppy identity like




that it permits a straightforward account of sentences like (19).
(19) John washed his car, and Sam did, and Steve did*
Then, on the basis of this conception, X argued that reflexives,
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null aivapliors, and various ordinary pronouns can only represent
bound variables. I can now argue in the opposite direction. I have
given independent evidence that various anaphors can only represent
bound variables. On the basis of this evidence, X can argue for a
conception of sloppy identity like McCawiey's. Consider, for
example, (20).
(20) Alaric scratched himself, and so did Steve.
Given evidence that reflexives represent bound variables, the fact
that (20) has only a sloppy identity reading suggests that sloppy
Identity is identity of constituents containing variables.
3.A. A Note on Fodor
One writer who has noticed some of the facts considered in this
chapter is Fodor (1975). He notes, in particular, that (1) and (2)
are synonymous, and that they differ in truth conditions from (3).
(1) Only Churchill remembers giving the speech about blood,
sweat, toil, and tears.
(2) Only Churchill remembers himself giving the speech about
blood, sweat, toil, and tears.
(3) Only Churchill remembers ChurchillO s) giving the speech
about blood, sweat, toil, and tears*
Fodor takes this difference as evidence that null anaphors, and
reflexives do not derive from copies of their antecedents. He
considers the possibility that they derive from bound variables, but
rejects it, and suggests instead that they are represented in
underlying structure by the element self. HeIke (1971, 1973) adopts
a similar view. Fodor seems not to notice that ordinary pronouns
commanded by their antecedents can be interpreted in the same way as
51
null anephors and reflexives# Given this fact, he would have to
assume that they elso can be represented In underlying structure by
JsiiLwJi*
How does Jodor's approach compare with the approach adopted
here? In effect, Fodor's approach treats reflexives as 'basic*,
and null anaphors and certain ordinary pronouns as 'derived*. The
approach adopted here involves no such contrast# is there any evidence
for such a contrast? It seems to me that there is not. I think,
then, that the approach adopted here is preferable# Formal con¬
siderations point to the same conclusion# If one assumes that null
anaphors, reflexives, and certain ordinary pronouns derive from
the element fell', one has to specify when it is deleted# If, on
the other hand, one assumes that they derive from bound variables,
one has to specify when variables are realized as reflexives. In
the first case, one must say that J££i! is deleted, unless it is a
clause mate of its antecedent# In the second case, one can say that
a bound variable assumes a reflexive form, whenever it is a clause
mate of its antecedent. It seems to me that ceteris paribus a
positive condition is preferable to a negative condition# Again,
then, 1 think that the approach adopted here is preferable.
I suspect that two factors contributed to Fodor's adoption
of his approach# Firstly, I think he may well think that the distri¬
bution of null anaphors is Included in the distribution of reflexives.
If it were, it would be plausible to regard null anaphors as a kind
of reflexive. If one assumes, like Chomsky (1973), that there is
no rule of subject to object raising, one will regard himself in
(2) as a complement subject# If such reflexives were complement
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subjects, the distribution of null anaphors would be included in
that of reflexives* 1 think, however, that Postal (1974a) demon¬
strates quite conclusively that there is a rule of subject to
object raisins* X assume, then, that himself in (2) is not a
complement subject, and, therefore, that the distribution of null
anaphora is not included in that of reflexives*
Secondly, 1 suspect that the examples Fodor uses may have
misled him about the extent to which ordinary pronouns can be under¬
stood in the same way as null anaphors and reflexives* (1) and
(2) imply that noone el«* remembers giving the speech about blood,
sweat, toll, and tears* They are odd sentences, since, given that
fact that only Churchill gave the speech, noone else could remember
giving it* It is this, 1 think, that leads Fodor to think that (4)
can only mean (3)*
(4) Only Churchill remembers his giving the speech about blood,
sweat, toil, and tears*
Certainly, given the facts, this is the only fully natural meaning*
It appears, then, that his cannot be understood in the same way as
a null anaphor or a reflexive* 1 think, however, that a little
reflection suggests that (4) can also have the odd meaning of (1)
and (2)* Thus, the pronoun can be understood in the same way as a
null anaphor or a reflexive*
Whatever the exact factors leading Fodor to adopt hi# approach,
X think the approach adopted here is preferable* 1 will return to
Fodor briefly in chapter 3*
3*5* First and Second Person Pronouns
So far 1 have only considered third person pronouns* 1 want now
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to take a brief look at first and second person pronouns* 1 will
show that they too can represent both pronouns of laziness and
bound variables*
We can begin with sentences involving VP-deletion. Consider,
for example, the following*
(1) I washed my car, and so did Sam.
(2) You washed your car, end so did Sam.
Beth are ambiguous* (I) can mean that Sam washed my car or that he
washed hie own* (2) can mean that Sam washed your car or that he
washed his own* This suggests quite strongly, then, that mjr and
your eon represent both pronouns of laziness and bound variables.
Notice now that (3) and (4) are ambiguous in fust the same way as
(1) and (2).
(3) 1 said I was intelligent, and so did Sam.
(4) You said you were intelligent, and so did Sara,
It seems, then, that 2 and you can also represent both pronouns of
laziness and bound variables.
These conclusions are reinforced by sentences involving only*
As Dahl <1973) points out, (5) is ambiguous between (6) and (7)*
(5) Only 1 love my wife.
(6) Ro one but me loves my wife.
(7) No one but me loves his wife.
On the first reeding, we can analyze mg as a pronoun of laziness* On
the second, we can analyze it as a bound variable* (8) is ambiguous
in just the same way between (9) and (10).
(8) Only you love your wife.
(9) No one but you loves your wife.
(10) No one but you loves hiw wife.
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On the first reading, your will represent a pronoun of laziness# On
the second, it will represent a bound variable. We have further
evidence, then, that raj£ and your can represent both pronouns of
laziness and bound variables. Notice now that (11) and (12) are
ambiguous in just the same way as (5) and (8).
(11) Only I said 1 was intelligent.
(12) Only you said you were intelligent.
Thus, we have further evidence that I and you can represent both
pronouns of laziness and bound variables.
1 will conclude this section with a few words about. (6) and (9).
Both are unambiguous. The pronouns can only be pronouns of laziness#
Why is this? One possibility is that it is due to an extension of a
constraint noted by Witten (1972)# He notes that what he calls
•deep structure pronouns*, which are effectively bound variables,
cannot have an antecedent inside a coordinate structure# Hie
constraint accounts for the unacceptability of (13)#
(13) * Jim and Mary scratched herself#
It also explains why (14) cannot mean that Jim and Mary wanted Sim
to leave or that they wanted Mary to leave.
(14) Jim and Mary wanted to leave.
Finally, it explains why the pronouns in (15) and (16) must be
non-anaphoric *
(15) A man and a woman said he was angry*
(16) Every man and every woman said he was angry.
There is evidence that this constraint is a reflection of something
more general* HeIke (1973) points out that a possessive determiner
cannot be antecedent of a reflexive. (17) illustrates#
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(17) * The girl's father hurt herself.
It is clear also that a possessive determiner cannot be antecedent
of a null anaphor. (13) cannot mean that the girl's father wanted
the girl to leave.
(18) The girl's father wanted to leave.
Notice also that non-anaphoric interpretations are most natural for
the pronouns in (19) and (20).
(19) A girl's father said she was angry.
(20) Svery girl's father said she was angry.
We might suggest that no anaphor that represents a bound variable
can hove an antecedent inside an NP. This would account for all the
facts we have considered, including the fact that the pronouns in
(6) and (9) can only represent pronouns of laziness. It looks, then,
as if the unambiguous character of (6) and (9) may stem from a quite
general constraint. I will return to this constraint in chapter 5.
3.6. Relative Pronouns
I want to conclude this chapter by taking a look at relative
pronouns. I suggested earlier that MP's containing restrictive
relative pronouns have the structure in (i), not the structure in (2).
(1) NP (2) NP
Det^ ^N NP S
<7
N S Det S (■' '
1 have said nothing, however, about the structure of restrictive
relative clauses themselves. I will argue here that they originate
as open sentences, and that the pronouns derive from bound variables.
A number of writers have analyzed restrictive relatives as open
53
sentences. Keenan (1972), for example, generates complex noun
piureses like (3).
This is realized as girl who screamed. Such an NP combines with a
determiner and an open sentence to form a sentence. Montague (1973),
similarly, has a rule (S3.) combining a consaon noun and an open
sentence to form a complex common noun. Hie rule only generates
somewhat artificial such that clauses. His approach can easily be
extended to generate ordinary restrictive relatives, however.
(See Rodman, 1976.)
The main motivation for an analysis of restrictive relatives as
open sentences is that it permits a simple account of their semantics*
Consider the following definite description.
(4) the nan who loves Marsha
This refers to the contextually unique member of the set of men who
love Marsha. Tims, the complex noun denotes the set of men who love
Marsha. If restrictive relatives originate as open sentences, it
will involve the following open sentence.
(5) x love Marsha
It will denote those men who satisfy the prepositional function
expressed by this open sentence. We can say, then, that the role
of restrictive relatives is to restrict the extension of the
associated noun to those members of its extension that satisfy a
certain propositional function.
A further motivation for this approach to restrictive relatives
(3)
Fro
8 Pro Prec! Pro
i1 I II
girl x screamed x y
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is that it allows a straightforward account of the presuppositions
associated with NP*s containing restrictive relatives* Consider
firstly (6)*
(6) the man who left early
(6) refers to the coatextually unique member of the set of men who
left early. It thus involves the presupposition that there is a man
who left early* Thus* it presupposes (IS)*
<15) A man left early*
Consider next (16) and (17)*
(16) all the men who left early
(17) every man who left early
Both presuppose that there is a set of men who left early* Thus# both
presuppose (13).
(13) Some men left early*
Somewhat more complex are HP*b like (19).
(19) no man who left early
In subject position, (19) presupposes that there is a set of men who
left early* Thus, in this position, it presupposes (13)* In non-
subject position, however, (19) seems to lack such presuppositions*
More complex also are NP*e like (20)*
(20) a man who left early
In many positions, (20) implies that there is a man who left early*
In certain environments, however, N?*s like (20) can have non-specific
interpretations* In this situation, no existential implications
are involved. Consider, for example, (21)*
(21) Jim is looking for a men who left early*
On one reading, this implies that there is a man who left early* On
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Che other* there are no such implications# Thus* on one reading*
(21) implies (15)* On the other* it does not*
1 assume9 then* that an HP like (22) derives from something
like (23)*
(22) the man who shot Harry
(23) HP
The subscript on the lowest N indicates that it binds the variable
in the open sentence* In (22)* the variable is realised as who*
An alternative will be to introduce the complementizer that and
delete the variable* giving* instead of (22)* (24)*
(24) the man that shot Harry
(For arguments that that is a complementizer and not a relative
pronoun* see Emonds* 1970* end Bresnan* 1972*)
It is worth noting that this approach provides in a straight¬
forward way for so-called 'stacking** the situation where a relative
clause modifies a combination of noun and relative clause. Implicit
in this approach is a rule of the following forms
(25) N «+ N~S
There is nothing to stop this rule applying to its own output*
generating structures like the following*
As Stockwell* Schachter* and Partee (1973) note* stacking is exempli¬
fied for many speakers in a sentence like (27)*
(27) The horse that started late that finished fast won the race*





For those speakers, (27) has the rough paraphrase (28),
(28) Of the horses that started late, the one that finished
fast won the race*
In the present framework, the HP in (27) can be represented as (29),
(29)
horse y started late
Stacking, then, is handled quite naturally*
Evidence that restrictive relatives originate as open sentences
is evidence that the relative pronouns originate as bound variables*
Such evidence does not show, however, that all pronouns in restrictive
relatives with the complex HP as their antecedent can only represent
bound variables* On the face of It, the HP in (30) ought to derive
both from (31) and (32), in which he is a pronoun of laziness with
the complex NF as its antecedent*
(30) the Rumanian who said he was Hapoleon.
(31) HP (32) NP
Det N Det H
tli® the
Rumanian x say S Rumanian x say S
x be Napoleon he be Hapoleon
Both relative clauses are open sentences, as our account requires* It
is not immediately obvious, then, why only (31) is a possible source
for the HP in (30)* A little reflection suggests, however, that the
problem with (32£ is that it involves a vicious circle* In (32), an




intersection of two sets# but one of the sets is identified by
reference to the individual. Thus, the identification is essentially
circular. Clearly, (31) does not involve this problem. The second
set in (31} is identified quite independently of the individual
that (31) is used to refer to. Thus* (31) is a perfectly acceptable
referring expression. These observations show* incidentally* that
it is incorrect to speak, as I have done, of pronouns in restrictive
relatives with the complex NP as their antecedent. Such pronouns,
in fact* have the head noun as their antecedent.
So far* I have only considered restrictive relatives. 1 want
now to consider non-restrlctives. 1 suggested earlier that struc¬
tures like (33)* while inappropriate for NP*s containing restrictive





This is essentially the view of Rodman (1976). If we adopt this view,
we might suggest that* whereas (22) derives from (23)* (34) derives
from (35).
(34) the man* who shot Harry
(35) NP
;px ^ S
Det N x shot Harry
I I
1 the man *j : < :: ,
It has been widely assumed* however, that non-restrictive relatives
originate as conjoined clauses* so that (36) has the same source
as (37).
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(36) Th< man, who shot Harry, will be here tonight.
(37) The man will be here tonight, and he shot Harry.
Ross (1967) gives two arguments for such an analysis. Firstly, he
notes that non-restrictive relatives can often be replaced by clauses
beginning with and. (38) illustrates.
(38) Enrico, and he is the smartest of us all, got the answer
in seven seconds.
Secondly, he points out that, when sentences containing non-restrictive
relatives are ungrsnntatical, the corresponding sentences with
conjoined clauses are ungraroraatical also* The following illustrate.
[Any }
(39) *)Ho [student, who wears socks, is a swinger.[Every)
[Any ]
(40) *|No [student is a swinger, and he wears socks.[Every]
One objection to this analysis is that pairs of sentences like (36)
and (37) differ in their pragmatic significance. X assume, however,
that sentences that differ in their pragmatic significance can have
the ran>e underlying structure, if they have the sane truth conditions.
Thus, whatever difference there is between (36) and (37) does not
mean that they cannot have the same underlying structure. I think,
then, that this analysis is preferable to ray first proposal.
This analysis has important Implications for relative pronouns.
X alluded earlier to the command constraint which requires bound
variables to be commanded by their antecedents. Given this cons¬
traint, the pronoun In (37) cannot be a bound variable. Xt is
natural, then, to assume that it is a pronoun of laziness. But,
if the pronoun in (37) is a pronoun of laziness, the relative pro¬
noun in (36) must be also. It 6eeras, then, that whether a relative
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pronoun is a bound variable or a pronoun of laziness depends on
Che character of the relative clause In which it appears* If the
relative clause is restrictive, the pronoun is a bound variable*




BOUND VARIABLES! STRUCTURES AND DERIVATIONS
In this chapter, 1 want to investigate the character of bound
variables and the structures and derivations in which they appear.
I will suggest that bound variables have very largely the character
that the bound variable theory takes them to have* I assume that
variables appear in N? positions, and that every variable must be
bound by a binding element that asymmetrically commands it* I also
assume that any variable that is not replaced by a binding element
or deleted is realised as an appropriate pronoun. I reject,
however, the view that one of a set of identical variables is
always replaced by the element that binds them. I will suggest
that this replacement is often optional, and sometimes impossible.
I also reject the kinds of underlying structure assumed by
advocates of the bound variable theory. 1 will suggest that there
is evidence for underlying structures that are more natural in the
sense of being more like surface structures. Here, I take as a
working principle the first of Keenan*s (1972) naturalness con¬
ditions, which states that 1Logical structures should look as much
like the NL [natural language] structures they represent as
possible** My proposals will haply that simple unambiguous sen¬
tences have a number of different sources* This might be thought
to be undesirable* However, quite standard arguments lead to this
position. Furthermore, it is not unprecedented, as I noted in
chapter I. It is not at all clear, then, that this is undesirable.
Z will touch on a number of questions in this chapter. My proposals
are quite tentative. X think, however, that the lines of thought
66
I develop are of some importance*
4*1* Existential Structures
1 argued in the last chapter that a pronoun commanded by an
indefinite antecedent can only represent a bound variable* This
means, for example, that the pronoun in (1) can only represent a
bound variable*
(1) A Rumanian sold his soul.
We might propose that this derives from something like (2)*
(2) S
x sell x<s soul A Rumanian
This, however, is an unnatural structure in the sense that it does
not resemble any English surface structure* It is natural, then,
to look for an alternative source. It has often been noted that
sentences containing indefinite NP*s have paraphrases Involving
there is or there are. (3), for example, is a paraphrase of (1)*
0) There was a Rumanian who sold his soul*





Rumanian x sell x*s soul
Given the equivalence of (3) and (1), (4) is at least semantically
appropriate as a source for (1)* It is also preferable to (2) on
grounds of naturalness* 1 want, then, to suggest that (1) can
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derive from (4)* More generally, 1 want to suggest that indefinite
HP*s can originate in existential structures* Somewhat similar
proposals are advanced by Hogg (1975) and Anderson (1974a). 1 will
discuss their proposals in same detail below*
Before I go any further, 1 must explain (4). 1 assume here
the conception of relative clauses argued for in the last chapter*
Given this conception, the subject of (4) is fairly straightforward*
The predicate requires rather more explanation* there here is not
the ordinary locative there* It might be called existential there*
1 will, however, term it ambient there* 1 regard it as the locative
equivalent of Bolinger*8 (1973) ambient it* Bolinger argues against
the widespread assumption that jLt in sentences like the following is
a semantically empty element introduced transformationally*
(5) It's scary in the dark*
(6) It's pleasant in California*
(7) It's hard to do a job like that*
He argues that it is a perfectly meaningful element referring to the
general situation* In (5), it is the general situation that is
scary in the absence of light* In (6), it is the general situation
that is pleasant in California* 1 will provide some arguments Jor
this position in chapter 9* If one accepts the position, it is
natural to regard there in existential sentences as a locative
equivalent of this it, and to interpret a sentence like (3) as saying
that the general situation includes a Rumanian who sold his soul*
One further point about my proposal should be clarified* I said
earlier that indefinite HP's can originate in existential structures*
1 did not say that they always do* Unlike Hogg and Anderson, 1
will not make this assumption* In (3), unlike in (1), there is no
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need for the subject to originate in a higher sentence.
(8) A Rumanian knew the answer*
There is no reason why it should not originate in an existential struc¬
ture* but, unless special restrictions are imposed, it will also be
possible for it to originete in its surface position. In the absence
of good evidence for such restrictions, I think it is reasonable
to derive a sentence like (8) both from a structure like (4) and from
one in which the subject originates in its surface position.*
Having clarified this point, I can note some independent evidence
for this proposal. I noted earlier in a discussion of Geach*s
definitions of pronouns of laziness, that it is natural to substitute
the man who explored the Amazon for he in (9).
(9) A man explored the Amazon, and he caught typhoid.
In contrast, this substitution is not at all natural in (10), where
the antecedent is definite*
(10) The man explored the Amazon, and he caught typhoid*
On the present proposal, the first clause of (9) can derive from
something like (11)*
(11) S
mm x explored the Amazon
1. My approach here can be compared with Montague*s. For Montague,
& Rumanian will be either substituted for a variable or introduced
directly in (8), whereas in (1) it can only be substituted for a
]" 1 , ,. • , ' , V-,7- ...... . .; ' " i, / ' . ' -v ' 5 ' ' '
variable.
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The expression the man who explored the Amazon is simply the subject
of (11) with the in place of a. It is not surprising, then, that
it is a natural substitute for he in (9). The first clause of (10)
cannot derive from a structure like (11). It is not surprising,
then, that the man who explored the Amazon is not a natural substitute
for he in (10),
Proposals like the present one are criticized in Thome (1973),
He argues that a pair of sentences like the following should not have
the same underlying structure because they are not strictly
synonymous.
(12) There was a spider that frightened Higa Muffet,
(13) A spider frightened Miss Muffet.
He claims that, while (12) asserts the existence of a spider, (13)
only presupposes it. He cites in this connection Strawson'e dis¬
cussion of presupposition (Strawson, 1950; 1952, pp. 173-194} 1954).
Strawson is primarily concerned in these references with definite
descriptions, which, he argues against Russell, involve a pre¬
supposition not an assertion of existence. His discussion of
indefinite HP's is brief and none too clear. In Strawson (1950), he
does seem to assume that indefinite HP's involve a presupposition
of existence. In Strawson (1952»137), however, he appears to deny
this. It is surely right to deny it. The existence of a spider
is not a precondition for the truth or falsity of (13), as it is for
the truth or falsity of (14).
(14) The spider frightened Miss Muffet,
If there are no spiders in the area, a natural response to (13) would
be (15), which says that (13) is false, not that it lacks a truth
value*
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(15) No it wesu*t a spider* There aren't any spiders around
here.
The point is mad# more forcefully by (16),
(16) Miss Muffet saw a unicorn,
One need not accept the existence of unicorns to discuss the truth
or falsity of (16). The fact that unicorns are assumed not to exist
is, in fact, the obvious reason for saying that (16) is false. 1
conclude, then, that Thorne does not succeed in demonstrating any
basic semantic difference between (12) and (13), and, therefore,
that he does not succeed in showing that they should not have the
same underlying structure*
Thome also seeks support for his position from the following
sentences.
(17) There was a book that Alex was looking for.
(18) Alex was looking for a book.
He assumes that, if (12) and (13) have the same source, (17) and (18)
should also. But someone uttering (13) need not be asserting the
existence of a book, as must someone uttering (17). This suggests,
then, that they should not have the same source. There is more to
be said about (17) and (13), however. X would suggest that (18) is,
in fact, ambiguous, being disambiguated in contexts like the following,
(19) Alex was looking for a book, but he couldn't find it.
(20) Alex was looking for a book, but he couldn't find one.
i " •
On the first reading, (18) is synonymous with (17). On the second
reading, it is not. We can give a straightforward account of this
ambiguity, if we assume, following Bach (1968), that look for
derives from something like try to find. It will be possible, then,
to have an existential assertion either above try or above find.
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(17) will involve the former configuration* (18) will involve either
the former or the latter* try is a verb that requires the operation
of equi-NP-deletion, For this reason, it is impossible for an
existential assertion immediately above find to show up either with
try to find or with look for* It is this fact which makes it look
as if (17) and (18) provide an argument against the kind of analysis
that Thome is criticising* A more regular pattern than that in
(17) and (18) is that in the following*
(21) I believe a man saw a unicorn*
(22) There is a man that 1 believe saw a unicorn.
(23) I believe there is a man that saw a unicorn*
(21) is ambiguous, being synonymous with either (22) or (23)* Clearly
these sentences provide no argument against the kind of analysis that
Thome is criticising* But then nor do (17) and (13), when seen
in the proper light* Again, then, Thome does not succeed in showing
that sentences like (12) and (13) should not have the sane under¬
lying structure*
Thome (personal communication) has contrasted (12) and (13) in
somewhat different terms* He suggests that, whereas (12) asserts the
existence of a spider, (13) simply establishes it in non-assertive
fashion* Such a characterisation seems quite reasonable* It makes
it fairly clear that the contrast between (12) and (13) is pragmatic
rather than semantic* 1 assume that sentences which differ prag¬
matically can have the same underlying structure, if they have the same
truth conditions* Thus, if (12) and (13) do differ in this way, it
does not mean that they cannot have the same underlying structure.
Some kind of constraint will be necessary to ensure that there is or
there are appears on the surface when the speaker is asserting the
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existence of something rather than simply establishing it* Such a
constraint seems to me quite reasonable* I think, then, that whatever
contrast there is between <12) and <13) dees not necessitate differ¬
ent underlying structures, as Thome assumes*
1 can turn now to the proposals of Hogg and Anderson* For Hogg,
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a spider frighten Miss Huffefc















a spider frighten Miss Muffet
Hogg's derivations are fairly simple* In the derivation of (12) from
(24), the embedded subject is copied into the sain clause, and EXIST
is realised as there was* In the derivation of (13), the main
operation is the deletion of the main clause. Anderson's derivations
are somewhat more complex. The derivation of (13) from (25) involves
three main operations. Firstly, V-abjunction moves the lower V






a spider a spider frighten Miss Muffet 'existence*
Then the higher subject N is superimposed onto the lower. Finally,
the existential locative is deleted by E-deletion. In the derivation
2
of (12) from (26), relative clause formation takes place on the V
cycle* Then, on the V* cycle, V-abjunction applies to give (28)*
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(28)
a spider that frightened Hiss Muffet
The lower N's are then copied onto the empty upper N's in accordance
with the X principle* (See Anderson, 1973a*) Such copying reverses
the original sequence of the N's, placing the lower locative into
subject position and the lower nominative into object position*
After copying, the lower subject is deleted and the upper subject
pronominalired as there* Finally, E-deletion removes the lower
locative* The central feature of this analysis is its treatment of
there as a pronominalized locative* In (12), it is an existential
locative that is pronominalized* In other sentences, there will
derive from an ordinary locative. The following illustrate.
(29) There is a spider in the bath*
(30) There was a unicorn in the forest*
This approach to there is based on the analyses of Fillmore (1963)
and Lyons (1967)*
1 will criticize Hogg's analysis first, since it is rattier more
open to criticism than Anderson's. Firstly, notice that the analysis
offers no explanation for the fact that existential sentences involve
there and some form of the verb be. It simply lias an ad hoc rule
lextcalizing the predicate EXIST in this way. Implicitly, it suggests
that English could just as well form existential sentences with here
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and become or any other combination of morphemes. Notice also that
Hogg*s lex ical i?,at ion rule is of an unprecedented kind# There are
many precedents for rules lexicalizing complex semantic structures
as a single verb. As far as I know, however, there are no precedents
for rules realizing a single semantic predicate as a complex lexical
structure.
Secondly, notice the existence of sentences like the following.
(31) Into the room, there came a tall dark man.
(32) At that moment, there arose a terrible cry.
(33) There emerged a story of deceit and double dealing.
£
Here, one has there associated not with be. but with various other
verbs. Roughly speaking, whereas be has to do with existence, these
verbs have to do with coming into existence. (See Kimball, 1973a.)
Clearly, we are dealing with a unified phenomenon here. There is
no way Hogg can treat it as such, however. He can only introduce
additional lexical rules. Such rules will not explain why there
appears in sentences like (31) - (33) any mora than hia rule for
EXIST explains why there appears in simple existential sentences.
Hogg, then, can only treat the distribution of there as an arbitrary
matter.
Finally, notice that Hogg assumes that relative pronouns derive
from full NP* s« I argued in the last chapter that relative pronouns
derive from bound variables. Z think, then, that this assumption,
which is also made by Anderson, is untenable.
I turn now to Anderson*s analysis. Apart from the last criticism,
his analysis escapes the criticisms made of Hogg*s. Firstly, notice
that it does offer an explanantlon for the appearance of there in
existential sentences. It simply treats it as a pronominalized locative.
Secondly, although Anderson does not discuss sentences like (31) - (33),
his analysis can be extended to such sentences in a quite natural
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way* One can simply assume that the dilative locatives associated
with come* arise* and emerge can be copied and pronominaliaed just
like ordinary locatives*
Although Anderson*s analysis is preferable to Hogg's* it is
still subject to certain criticisms* Firstly* X think that the kind
of substitution rule that Anderson invokes is quite dubious* In the
following chapters* X will argue in a number of places against such
rules* Secondly* notice that Anderson's analysis involves a violation
of a generally valid constraint on anaphors. In general* an anaphor
may not both precede and command its antecedent* Thus, Brian can be
antecedent of he in (34), but not in (33)*
(34) Brian thinks he is clever*
(33) He thinks Brian is clever*
In Anderson*s analysis* there both precedes and commands its putative
antecedent* This* then* casts considerable doubt on the analysis*
Xt should be clear that the analysis X em advancing escapes the
criticisms I have made of Hogg*a and Anderson's* I think* then*
that it is preferable to these analyses* We can note one further
point in its favour. Allan (1971) points out that existential there
differs from ordinary locative there in not permitting paraiinguistic
indication of intended reference or stress* Xt is fairly clear that
ambient it is subject to these restrictions* Thus* on the present
analysis, it is quite natural that they are found with existential
there*
It is not immediately obvious how sentences like (29) and (30)
should be handled in this framework. X would suggest* however, that
they involve two locatives in apposition* ambient there end a more
specific expression* (29), then* will derive from something like (36)*
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(36)
a spider be there in the bath
In a similar way* 1 think it is plausible to assume that the under¬
lying structure of (37) has jit and the complement together in
subject position*
(37) It's strange that Jim believes in ghosts*
This* of course* is the view of Rosenbaura (1967)* In recent years*
it has been largely abandoned* Bolinger*s discussion suggests*
however* that it might be revived* I will discuss this further in
chapter 9*
Notice finally* that sentences like (31) - (33) can be handled
quite naturally in this framework* We simply need to assume that
there is an allative equivalent of ambient jit as well as a locative
equivalent* In (31)* one will have two allative expressions in
apposition* In (32) and (33)* one will have there only*
1 must now say something about the derivational processes 1 an
assuming* The derivation of (3) from (4) is quite straightforward.
Relative clause formation will apply quite normally* there will be
preposed, and this will trigger subject-verb inversion in just the
same way as the preposed locative in (33)*
(38) In the attic was a portrait of Napoleon*
The derivation of (1) from (4) is a less straightforward matter*
Clearly* the predicate of (4) must be deleted* and a Rumanian
substituted for the first variable in the relative clause. The
problem is that a Rumanian is not a constituent in (4)* It is
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generally assumed that; only constituents can be moved. (See e.g.
Schwartz, 1972.) It seems, then, that we need some way of making
a Rumanian a constituent. One possibility is to assume a rule
raising the relative clause into the main clause, rather like




Rumanian x sell x*s soul
A second possibility is to assume a rule Chomsky-adjoining the







a Rumanian x sell x*s soul
In both these structures, a Rumanian is a constituent. It is not at
all clear, then, which approach la to be preferred.
While the exact character of the derivational processes involved
in the present analysis remains open, it is fairly clear that
certain constraints are required, Lakoff (1971) proposes a constraint
requiring that a quantifier that asymmetrically commands another
quantifier in underlying structure must precede it in surface
structure, if it ceases to asymmetrically command it as a result
of lowering. I assume that KP*s, not quantifiers, are lowered. I
propose, then, to reformulate Lakoff* g constraint as follows.
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(41) If «. HP, *Pi( Mn-.trlc.il, coMMd, another NP, NPJ(
in underlying structure, but does not do so in surface
2
structure, must precede NP^.
This means that, while (42) can derive from (43), (44) cannot.
(42) Some men saw a unicorn.
(43) S
•"* max I* th*™
x see a unicorn
(44) A unicorn was seen by some men*
(44), however, can derive from (45), which (42) cannot.
(45) S
a unicorn, lb. thar.
some men saw x
1 will suggest in chapter 5 that structures like (43) and (45) have
the same truth conditions. For most speakers, (42) and (44) can have
2. Obviously, this constraint is only as adequate as i*ako£f*s, on
which it is based. There is evidence that Lakoff's constraint is not
entirely adequate. Ioup (1975) notes, among other things, that a
quantifier in an indirect object is normally understood as having a
wider scope than a quantifier in a direct object, whatever their
order. For example, every is generally understood as having a wider
scope than a in both the following.
(1) I told every child a story.
(ii) 1 told a story to every child.
See also Kroch (1974).
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the seme meaning* They can both mean that there was one unicorn that
some men saw* This, then, is not unreasonable* Notice, however,
that (42) can also mean that each of a group of men saw a unicorn.
In this meaning, some men is understood distributively. 1 will
suggest in chapter 5 that, when a plural HP is understood distributively,
it involves additional structure* (44) does not have this
additional meaning* Thus, it is when NP^ is distributive that (41)
is particularly important*
Lakoff (1971) proposes a second constraint throwing out any
derivation in which an asymmetrical command relationship between
quantifiers is not simply lost, but reversed* We might reformulate
this also as a constraint on NP*s* There is some evidence, however,
that such a constraint would be redundant* (46) is a structure to
which it might, on the face of it, be relevant*
(46) S
a unicorn S be there
fa
x see y
(42) will derive from (46). So, too, will (47)*
(47) There were some men who saw a unicorn*
The proposed constraint will prevent the derivation of (48) from (46).
(43) There was a unicorn that some men saw*
Notice, however, that this derivation is blocked quite independently
by the complex NP constraint. The constraint prevents the lowering of
some men onto the variable x, if the lower existential is not reduced*
It appears, then, that there is no need for a reformulation of
Lakoff*o second constraint. This conclusion may be premature,
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however* 1 will return to it in the next section* The complex NP
constraint not only prevents lowering* if the lower existential is
not reduced* it also prevents relative clause formation in this
situation* It* thus* prevents the derivation of <49) from (46)*
<49) * There were some men that there was a unicorn that saw*
This means that there is no need for a special statement to ensure
that the lower existential in a structure like (46) is reduced*
The complex NP constraint ensures that any derivation from such a
structure blocks* if the lower existential structure is not reduced*
Postal (1974as223) cites the following constraint* proposed
by Baker*
(30) A quantifier cannot have as its scope a clause which
does not contain it in surface structure*
Support for this constraint is provided by the contrast which many
people find between (51) and (52)*
(51) 1 believe that someone insulted Arthur*
(52) I believe someone to have insulted Arthur*
(51) is ambiguous* with someone have both a specific and a non-specific
reading* (52) is unambiguous* with someone having only a specific
3
reading* In the present framework* it is natural to reformulate
this constraint as (53)*
(53) An NP cannot have as its scope a clause which does not
contain it in surface structure*
3* As James Thome has pointed out to me* many speakers accept
raising with believe only when evaluative considerations are
involved* For such people* a sentence like (52) is rather dubious*
32
This constraint will allow (51) to derive from both (54) and (55),
but will only allow (52) to derive from (54),
(54) Sl (55) Sl
x insult Arthur x insult Arthur
Notice, however, that (53) will block the derivation of (36) from
(54),
(56) There is someone that I believe insulted Arthur,
2
I assume that S is the scope of someone in (54), In both (51) and
2(52) someone is contained in S , but, in (56), it is not. Similarly,
(53) will block the derivation of (57) from (55),
(57) I believe there is someone that insulted Arthur,
3
S is the scope of someone in (55), In (57), someone is not con-
3
tained in S ,
A more promising constraint is the following.
(58) An K? cannot command an S in surface structure which it
does not cosmand in underlying structure.
This will permit the derivation of (51), (52), and (56) from (54),
and also the derivation of (51) and (57), but not (52), from (55),
Clearly, then, it is an advance on (53),
(53) is still Inadequate, however,, Consider the derivation of
(52) from (54), If raising and lowering are both cyclic rules, as
2 I
I assume, raising will apply on S , and lowering on S . At the
2
end of the S cycle, there will be an NP, namely the variable x,
which commands an S which it does not command in underlying
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structure. This variable does not appear on the surface, because it
is replaced by someone. (58), therefore, will not block this
derivation. There are, however, sentences where a raised variable
does show up on the surface. Consider (59).
(59) Sem believed hinself to be a genius*
The obvious source for (59) is something like (60). (I will allow
in the next section for KP*s as well as H*s to bind variables.)
(60) S
Sara believe S
x be a genius
Here, then, we have an HP on the surface which commands an S which
it does not command in underlying structure. (53), then, will
block this derivation.
A further problem for (58) arises from sentences like (61).
(61) Sam believes there to be a dragon in the forest.
It is hardly likely that there here is a substitute for a raised




a dragon be there in the forest
It seems, then, that there in (61) is another HP that violates (58).
If ambient there in (61) is raised out of the compleraent, it may
well be that ambient jit in (63) is also.
(63) Sam believes it to be hot in the kitchen.
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I£ so, it also violates (58)*
The obvious move is to restrict (58) to a subset of NP*s, I
propose to introduce the term 'full NP». Tentatively, 1 will say
that full NP»s are all NP#s except variables, ambient there, and
possibly ambient jit. (58), then, can be replaced by (64)*
(64) A full NP cannot command an S in surface structure which
it does not conroand in underlying structure.
This will give us ail the right results*
1 will conclude this discussion of constraints by considering a
constraint which looks like a simple reformulation of (64), but which
turns out not to be. The function of (64) is to block derivations
like that of (52) from (55)* In this derivation, a full NP commands
an S In surface structure which it does not command in underlying
structure. It does so as a result of raising. We could, then,
block this derivation with the following constraint*
(65) A full NP cannot be raised*
On the basis of data like that considered by Postal, Partee (1973b,
1975b) proposes to restrict raising to variables* (65) could be
seen as a revision of her proposal* While both (64) and (65) block
derivations like that of (52) and (55), they are not equivalent.
There are derivations which (65) blocks, but which (64) does not
Mock* Consider (66).
(66) Who did Sam say insulted Arthur?
1 would derive this from something like (67), embedded in a per¬
formative structure* (For arguments in favour of a performative
analysis of questions and against an analysis based on an abstract




If lowering is cyclic, it will apply on £?*, substituting Wh + someone
for the variable x. Then, on the performative cycle, Wh-moveraent
2
will left-Chonsky-adjoin Wh + someone to S , in effect returning it
4
to its original position* The surface structure realization of
Wh + someone* who* does not command any S which it did not command
in underlying structure. Thus, the derivation is quite compatible
with (64). Notice, however, that Wh-movement raises a full NP.
(65), therefore, will block the derivation. Cleerly, this derivation
should not be blocked. (64), then, is to be preferred to (65).
Notice, finally, that (65) only permits the derivation of (52)
from (54), as long as raising applies before lowering. If lowering
applied first, as it would if it were a precyclic rule, (70) would
block this derivation. It is possible that lowering may be precyclic.
If it is, we will have a further reason for preferring (64) to (65).
The constraints considered here are of some importance. It
should be noted, however, that their strength varies considerably
from speaker to speaker. For some speakers, they are very weak, or
even non-existent. For this reason, I will sometimes ignore them
in the following chapters.
4. (66) will thus involve what Pullum (1976) calls a 'Puke of York
derivation*.
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1 will conclude this section by considering an argument that
appears to suggest that existential sources should be obligatory
for indefinites, not optional, as X have assumed. The argument
turns out to be invalid.
The hypothesis that existential sources are obligatory for
indefinite NP*s appears to permit a simple explanation for the
fact that a pronoun commanded by an indefinite antecedent cannot
be a pronoun of laziness* 1 have suggested that a sentence like
(68) can derive from something like (69).





Italian x shot x*s wife
We have seen that a pronoun in e relative clause with the complex NP
as its antecedent cannot be a pronoun of laziness. It follows that
we cannot replace the second variable in (69) by a pronoun of lazi¬
ness* It looks, then, as if the fact that the pronoun in (63) cannot
be a pronoun of laziness is a result of the fact that a pronoun in a
relative clause with the complex NP as its antecedent cannot be.
As things stand, however, this is not the case. We need a separate
constraint to prevent the derivation of (63) from something like








Suppose, however, that we require all indefinite NP* s to originate
in existential structures. (70) then will not be a possible under¬
lying structure, and we will need no additional constraint. It
looks, then, as if the hypothesis permits a simple explanation for
the fact that the pronoun in (63) cannot be a pronoun of laziness#
There are other sentences, however, where such an explanation
remains impossible.
The problem is that there ere pronouns com&nded by indefinite
NP*s in surface structure that cannot originate in relative clauses.
I have argued that a sentence like (71) derives from a structure
containing two locatives in apposition.
(71) There wag a man in the garden.
Clearly, the second locative can contain a pronoun. It seems, however,
that such a pronoun cannot have the indefinite NP as its antecedent#
Consider here (72)#
(72) There was a man in his garden.
If a man here is understood as antecedent of his# In bis garden must
be understood as a reduced relative, not as a main clause locative.
Notice that, if a man is understood as antecedent of his# one can
ask the question where?# just as one can with a sentence like (73),
where the abstract locative in tears is clearly a reduced relative.
(73) There was a man in tears.
It seems, however, that if in his garden in (72) is understood as a
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main clause locative, hie cannot have a man as its antecedent.
When in his Rarden is a main clause locative, (72) will derive from
something like (74).
(74) S
a man be there in his garden
Clearly, there must be some constraint preventing his here from having
a man as its antecedent. But this constraint will also prevent his
in (70) from having an Italian as its antecedent. Thus, there is
nothing to be gained by making existential sources obligatory for
indefinite HP's.
4.2. lion-existential structures
In the last section, 1 suggested a source for sentences involving
variables bound by indefinite HP's. Variables can also, of course,
be bound by definite NP*s. We know that the pronoun in a sentence
like (1) can represent a bound variable.
(1) The captain sold his soul.
In this section, 1 want to consider the source of such sentences.
The kind of structure assumed by advocates of the bound variable
theory is no more natural here than with indefinite NF*s« Again,
then, we need to look for alternatives. (1) does not have a para-
—'
phrase with there is. We cannot suggest, then, that the captain
originates in an existential structure. Notice, however, that (2)
is a paraphrase of (1).
(2) It is true of the captain that he sold his soul.
39





be true of the captain^
x sell x*s soul
1 want to suggest that (1) can also derive from (3). More generally,
1 want to suggest that any HP, definite or indefinite, can originate
as an argument of be true.
The main independent evidence for this proposal is provided by
sentences like the following.
(4) Brian likes Shakespeare, and that is true of Eon too.
(5) Brian likes Shakespeare, which isn*t true of Eon.
Intuitively, that and which are anaphoric expressions, but they lack
antecedents on the surface. On the face of it, this is a problem.
On the present proposal, however, the initial clauses of (4) and (5)
can derive from (6).
Here, we have an antecedent for that and which, namely the subject
coraplemenfc. On the present proposal, then, that and which do have
antecedents in underlying structure. Many linguists would derive
* sentential pronouns* like that and which from copies of their




one assumes, as I do, that such pronouns are present in underlying
structured Unless the initial clauses of (4) and (5) derive from
something like (6), there will be no clear antecedents for that and
which. If these pronouns lack clear antecedents, their interpretation
will be a problematic matter. 1 think, then, that sentences like
(4) and (5) provide important evidence for the proposal.
The derivations involved in this proposal are quite simple. All
we need is a lowering rule, lowering the binding HP onto one of the
variables it binds, and a deletion rule, deleting the rest of the
upper sentence. Lowering is optional, as (2) indicates, 1 assume
that deletion also is optional, so that (7) is a possible
realization of (3),
(7) It is true that the captain sold his soul,
(7) will also derive from a structure in which the captain appears in
its surface position.
Evidence similar to that adduced for structures involving be
true supports the postulation of other higher predicates. One such
predicate is do. Anderson (1976) and Ross (1972) argue that all action
verbs originate inside complements of do. For Anderson, a sentence
like (3) would derive from something like (9), Ross would asswn© a
similar source, but with VSO ordering,
. (3) Megan attacked the Rector,
(9) S
Megan attack the Rector
5, 1 will discuss this question in 3,1,
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As evidence for this proposal, we have sentences like the following*
<10) Megan attacked the Rector, and John did it too#
(11) Megan attacked the Rector, which John didn't do#
Clearly, these support the postulation of a higher do in just the same
way as sentences like (4) and (5) support the postulation of a higher
be true* Further support is provided by question-answer pairs like
the following."
(12) What did Megan do? She attacked the Rector*
Structures like (9) seem quite well motivated. 1 want, however, to
make one modification. Anderson and Roes assume that the derivation
of a sentence like (8) involves equi and a rule of do deletion* 1
have argued that equi deletes a bound variable* 1 assume that it









* attack the Rector
X tints assume that do like be true takes an NP and an open sentence
as its arguments#
Anderson and Ross assume that a higher do is obligatory with
every action verb# 1 assume that a higher be true is optional. On
the face of it, we might assume that do is optional also# Unlike
6# For important discussions of the question-answer relation, see
Rats (1972) and Hull (1975).
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be true, however, jdo has a fairly precise semantic function. It
expresses the notion of agency. This is suggested tentatively by
Ross and argued forcefully by Langacker (1975). For this reason, 1
am inclined to assume, with Anderson and Boss, that do appears above
every action verb. Given this assumption, we could define an agent
as any HP that originates either as a subject of jto or as the binder
of a variable that is a subject of do. The second clause of this
definition is necessitated by structures like (14), which is an
expanded version of (3).
Here, we have one variable binding other variables. I know of no
precedents for this, but it seems quite reasonable to allow it.
A second higher predicate which we can postulate is happen. There
is evidence that a sentence like (15) with a patient as subject can
derive from something like (16).
(15) Jim caught pneumonia.
(14) S
y sell y*s soul
(16) S
x catch pneumonia
Such a source Is motivated by sentences like the following.
(17) Jim caught pneumonia, and it happened to Sam too.
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(13) Jim caught pneumonia, which didn't happen to Sara#
(19) What happened to Jim? He caught pneumonia.
Similarly, we might derive & passive sentence like (20) from something
like (21),




This will account for sentences like the following,
(22) Erica was arrested by the police, and it happened to Eve too,
(23) Erica was arrested by the police, which didn't happen to
Eve.
(24) What happened to Erica? Che was arrested by the police.
The derivation of (13) frosa (16) will simply involve the lowering of
Jim onto the variable x, and the deletion of the rest of the upper
sentence. The derivation of (20) from (21) will presumably involve
2
equi and do-deletion, followed by passive on S , and lowering and
deletion on S*V I assume that both lowering and deletion are ob¬
ligatory with happen. That lowering is obligatory is indicated by
the ungraniEUuticality of (25),
(25) * It happened to Jim that he caught pneumonia.
The graasaaticality of sentences like (26) might suggest that deletion
is optional.




(26) It happened that Jim caught pneumonia,
Kotica, however, that happen here carries the implication that the
event was unexpected. For this reason, I assume, following Eliot
(1969), that this Is a separate verb happen.
In (16) and (21), happen, like do, seems to have a fairly precise
semantic function. Specifically, it seems to express the patient
relation. It seems plausible, then, to suggest that it is obligatory
in any sentence that contains a patient* A patient, then, will be
any NF that originates either as a to argument of happen, or as the
binder of a variable that is such an argument, this allows both for
structures like (16) and (21), and for structures like (27), which
is -.-a alternative source of (15),
<27) 8
the polieez do 8
s arrest y
Again, we have here a variable binding another variable* If happen
. ' ' •
it obligatory in any sentence that contains a patient, it will appear
in the underlying structure of actives as well as in that of passives,
(13), then, should be expanded as (23)*
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(23)
happen to the rector^
x attack y
2
The derivation of (3) will now involve lowering and deletion on S »
followed by equi and do-deletion on S^»
Two points cast doubts on this view of happen* Firstly, there
is evidence for structures in which happen does not express the patient
relation. Consider (29)*
<29) Alaric scored a century, but it won't happen with Jim*
The obvious source for the first clause is something like (30)«
Alaric here binds a variable that is subject of do# It is, thus, an
agent* Clearly, then, happen here does not express the patient
relation* Sentences like <29) are discussed by Chomsky <1971) and
Lakoff <1970a). I will consider their discussion shortly* Secondly,
there is evidence for structures where the patient is an argument of
do* Consider (31)*
<31) Steve punched San on the nose, but he won't do it to lion.
<30) S
y score m century
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The obvious source for the first clause is sor e thing like (32).
(32)
Steve
* punch y on the nose
8
Seta here is a patient, but it is not an argument of happcp.
These points suggest quite strongly that happen does not express
the patient relation in the aam way as do expresses agency. X think,
then, that happen should not be obligatory in sentences containing
patients. Instead, X will asstsae that any K# can originate as an
argument of happen, and that such an N? is preceded by to, if it is
a patient, and with, if it is not. This means, of course, that there
can be no simple definition of a patient.
8. hike happen, do can take a with arguaent as well as a to argument.
He have sentences like the following.
(!) Sam hit the leg spinner for six, but he couldn't do it
with the off spinner.
Here, the first clause will derive from something like (ii).
(ii) *
Sam
with the leg spinner
x hit y for six
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1 have argued that various sentences derive from structures of
















In ail the sentences I have considered* the binding HP ends up in
subject position* I want now to show that this is not the result of
an arbitrary selection of data*
Consider firstly the following sentences*
<36) Mary admires Helen* end it's true of dene too*
<37) Helen is admired by Mary* end ifc*s too®
these are most naturally understood as implying <33) and <39)*
respectively*
<33) Jane admires Helen.
(39) Jane is admired by Mary*
This suggests that the initial clauses of <36) and <37) must derive
from something like <40) and <4l)* respectively* (I ignore inessential
detail*)




x adaires Helen Mary admires k
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In both cases, the binding HP ends up in subject position# It
looks, then, as if the binding HP in a structure like (33) imsst end
up in subject position# Consider now a typical sentence involving do#
(42) Steve criticized the general, and Tony did it too#
This implies, of course, that Tony criticised the general# The first
clause, then, msfc derive from seewthing like (43)#
(43) S
x criticise the general
Again, the binding HP ends up in subject position# hotice now that
(44) is touch lees natural than (42)#
(44) ? The general was criticized by Steve, and Tony did it too#
The reason is quite simple, if we assume that the binding HP in a
structure like (34) oust end up in subject position. The character
of the second clause suggests that the first clause must derive
from (43), but, given the putative constraint, it cannot# It is not
surprising, then, that (44) is unnatural# This suggests quite
strongly, then, that the binding HP in a structure like (34) must
end up in subject position# The situation is similar with happen#
Consider firstly (43)#
(45) Seta was attacked by ores, and it happened to Jim too#
T!iis implies that Jim was attacked by ores# The first clause, then,





Again* the binding KP ends up as subject# As we might expect (47)
is Latch less natural titan (45)*
(47) ! Ores attacked Sam* and it happened to Jim too*
This suggests* then* that the binding MP in a structure like (35) must
end up in subject position*
In the light of the foregoing* one might conclude that the binding
KP in structures like (33) * (35) must end up in subject position*
litis wouici be a miutake* however* Consider (43)*
(43) Lobster* John adores* and it's true of crab too*
Ibis implies that John adores crab* The first clause* then* must
c
derive from something like (49)*
The derivation may involve lowering and a traditional topicsIisation
followed by deletion of the variable x* The important point is that
the binding HP does not end up in subject position* It does end up
in sentence-initial position* however. It looks, then* as if we can
suggest that the binding HP in structures like (33) - (35) must end
up in sentence-initial position* Normally* but not always* this





X went now to relate our three structures to certain aspects of
information structure. Notice firstly that a simple sentence like
(50) can be understood as a comment about a topic*
(50) John kissed Mary*
As Kuno (1972b) puts it, it can be understood as 'Speaking of John,
he kissed Mary'* Kuno suggests three other interpretations! contrast -
'John kissed Mary, but Bill did not*, exhaustive listing • 'John
(and only John) kissed Mary, among those under discussion, it was
John who kissed Mary*, and neutral description - 'What happened next,!
John kissed Mary'* In the present context, these other interpretations
are not important* What is important is that John can be understood
as a topic, and the rest of the sentence as a comment* John is
subject ©I (50)* lypically, it is the subject of a sentence that
is a potential topic* Notice, however, that, in (51), Mary is a
potential topic*
(51) Mary, John Kissed.
It looks, then, as if we can say that a definite HP in sentence-
initial position is a potential topic* I have just suggested that
the binding HP in structures like (33) - (35) mist end up in
sentence-initial position* It follows, then, that the ba&Sing
HP in such structures is a potential topic, and the open sentence
a potential comment* Xt has often been assumed that whether an HP
is a potential topic can only be determined in surface structure*
Xt now seems that for many sentences this can be determined In
underlying structure.
We must now consider how our informal constraint should be
- ' ■ I f >. ; H;
formalised* X went to suggest that we already have an adequate
formalization. In the last section, X proposed the following
constraint*
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<52) If an MP, NP^, asymmetrically commands another MP, NPy
in underlying structure, but does not do so in surface
structure, NP^ must precede
Notice that, in structures like (33) - (35), the binding N?
asymmetrically commands any MP in the embedded sentence* It follows
from (52), then, that it must precede such an NP in surface structure,
if it does not asymmetrically command it* Thus, (52) allows the
first clause of (36) to derive from (40), but not from (41), and the
first clause of (37) to derive from (41), but not from (40)* It
allows the first clause of (42), but not the first clause of (44).
to derive from (43). it allows the first clause of (45), but not
the first clause of (47), to derive from (46). Finally, it allows
the first clause oi (48), but not john adores lobster, to derive
from (49). It looks, then, as if (52) provides a natural account
of the facts considered here. (52), however, does not require the
binding NP in structures like (33) - (35) to end up in sentence-
initial position. Firstly, it permits (53) and (54) as realisations
of (40), and (55) and (56) as realisations of (4i).
(53) That she admires Helen is true of Mary.
(54) It is true of Mary that she admirer Helen.
(55) That Mary admires her is true of Helen.
(56) It is true of Helen that Mary admires her.
This seems quite reasonable. Secondly, there is evidence that (52)
will permit (57), as well as (53), to derive from something like (59).
(57) It is certain that Tony will win.
(53) Tony is certain to win.
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<39)
be true of Tonyx
be certain
x win
One might suggest that (52) will block this derivation, since it will
be the realisation of an NP asymmetrically commanded by Tony in
9
underlying structure. There is a problem with this line of argument,
however. Notice that (60) is ambiguous.
(60) It is certain that a Norwegian will win.
a Norwegian here has both a specific and a non-specific reading.
Where it is specific, (60) will derive from something like (61).
(61) S
np vp
a Norwegian S be there
be certain
x win
a Norwegian in (61) asymmetrically commands the NP that is realized
as it. The derivation o£ (60) from (61) must not be blocked. It
seems, then, that it in sentences like (57) and (60) should not
9. In the present context, it does not matter whether jL| is intro¬
duced transformationally or present in underlying structure. 1
think that it may well be present in underlying structure. See 9,1.
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count as an HP for the purposes of (52). If this _it does not count
as an HP, (52) will not block the derivation of (57) from (59).
Does this mean that (52) is inadequate? Notice that the following
seems quite acceptable*
(62) It is certain that Tony will win, and that is true of
Fritz too*
Given the second clause, the first clause must derive from something
like (59)* Tims, it seems quite reasonable to allow the derivation
of (57) from <59)« It looks, then, as if (52) iy quite adequate*
In the last section, 1 considered the possibility of reformulating
h
tha second of Lakoff's constraints on quantifiers as a constraint
on NP*s. I considered, that is, the possibility of a constraint
throwing out any derivation in which an asymmetrical command
relationship between NP's is reversed. I noted cases where such a
constraint is redundant* It may not be completely redundant,
however* Consider the following structure.
(63) Sl
x saw y
It seems reasonable that both (64) and (65) should derive from (63)*
(64) Sam saw the king*
(65) It is true of Sam that he saw the king*
It is questionable, however, whether (66) should derive from (63)*
(66) It is true of the king that Sam saw him*
The proposed constraint will block this derivation. The question is
whether it is blocked independently* Let us consider how (66) would
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be derived* Clearly, the two main processes are the extraposition of
3
8 and the lowering of Sam* Notice that Sam cannot be lowered until
3
S has been extraposed, because of the sentential subject constraint*
It follows, then, that the derivation of (66) from (63) will be
blocked, if, for some reason, extraposition cannot apply before
lowering* Recall now that Ross (1967) argues that extraposition is
a postcyclic rule* If he is right, it will be impossible for extra¬
position to apply before lowering, assuming that the latter is not
postcyclic also* It is possible, then, that this derivation may be
blocked without the proposed constraint* Recently, however, Jacobson
and Neubauer (1976) have argued that extraposition is cyclic* If
they are right, the derivation will not be blocked* Thus, the
constraint may be necessary after all* Whether or not this constraint
is necessary, some constraint seems necessary to rule out (67) as a
realization of (63)*
(67) * It is true of Sam that it is true of the king that he
sew him*
As far as I can see, this is not ruled out by any independent constraint*
la the last section, I also proposed the following constraint*
(63) A full HP cannot command an 8 in surface structure which
it. does not command in underlying structure*
The constraint is motived by facts about indefinite HP's* 1 assume,
however, that it applies to all full HP's* Given the constraint,





Similsrlyj while (70) vill derive from (72) and (73), (71) will only
derive from (72)«
(70) It Is easy to please Tony*
(71) Tony is easy to please.
(72) S (73) S
one please x one please x
These seem quite reasonable restrictions.
I want now to consider Chomsky and Lako££*s discussion of sen¬
tences li'-a (29). Chomsky discusses such sentences (1971, fn. 24.)
to argue against Lakoff's assumption that sentences like (74) motivate
an analysis in which adverbs originate in higher sentences.
(74) Goldwater won in the west* but it could never happen here.
He argues that, by the sane reasoning, sentences like (75) motivate
an analysis in which objects originate in higher sentences.
(73) Fred turned the hotdog down flat, but it wouldn't have
happened with filet taignon.
Equally, he suggests, sentences like (76) will motivate an analysis
in which subjects originate in higher sentences.
(76) Fred turned the hotdog down flat, but it wouldn't have
happened with Sally*
Chomsky seems to regard this as a redactio ad absurdam of Lakoff's
approach* Why he regards it as such, however, is none too clear*
Presumably, his view is that a sentence should not derive from more
than one underlying structure, unless it is ambiguous* As I have
said, 1 reject this view* 1 would suggest that the first clause of
(75) should derive from (77), and the first clause of (76) from (78).
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(77)
happen with the hotdog.
happen with *****
x turn the hotdog down flat
The two structures will have the same truth conditions* Xt seems to
me, then, that sentences like (75) and (76) do not provide any
evidence against Lakoff*s analysis* Notice, however, that sentences
like (75) present a problem for the present framework* In (75)
the hotdoa follows Fred* yet the former asymmetrically commands the
latter in underlying structure* Given (52), this should be impossible*
Clearly, then, (32) is not entirely adequate after all* Xt is not
at all clear, however, how it should be revised* X will, therefore,
leave it as it is*
Chomsky* s discussion of sentences like (75) and (76) Is entirely
negative* He does not offer any suggestion as to how such sentences
should be analysed* Jaekendoff (1972), however, outlines a proposal
by Akmajian which takes Chomsky's discussion as its starting point*
According to this proposal, the second clause in sentences like (75)
and (76) associates the presupposition of the first clause with a
lew focus* Xt assumes, then, that (75) and (76) presuppose (79) and
(80), respectively*
(79) Fred turned something down flat*
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<80) Someone turned the hotdog (town: Hat*
It is easy to show that this account is inadequate* Consider the
following dialogues
(81) A» What happened to Brian?
Bs He was arrested in Italy*
As It wouldn't have happened with lion.
A*s second statement means that Bon wouldn't have been arrested in
Italy* On Akasajian's account, then, B*s statement should presuppose
that someone was arrested in Italy* In the content, however, it
clearly presupposes not this, but that something happened to Brian*
It seems, then, that Aktnajian's proposal is untenable*
In his response to Chomsky, Lakoff (1970, fn*7) seems equally
reluctant to derive subjects and objects from higher sentences* He
seeks to show that his assumptions do not necessitate such
derivations, given Boss's notion of sloppy identity* He considers
the following sentence, which is, of course, similar to (75)*
(32) Irving refused the peanut butter sandwich, but it
wouldn't have happened with a bagel*
He assumes that the first clause has a simple single clause underlying
structure, and that the second clause derives from something like (33)*
(83) [K? it [s Irving refuse it^XJ would never happen with a
bagel^
He suggests then that the embedded clause in (83) is sloppily identical
to the first clause, and, therefore, that it can be deleted* If this
analysis were viable, we could account for the anaphoric phenomena
considered earlier along similar lines, thus eliminating the need
for structures of the kind I have proposed. As it stands, however,
the analysis is not viable* The problem is that it misrepresents
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Boss's notion of sloppy identity* Ross's position is that rules
involving an identity condition can ignore the reference of pronouns
commanded by their antecedents* Thus, for him, (84), on its most
obvious reading, will derive from (85).
(34) Jim stood on his head, and so did Tony*
(85) Jfct^ stood on hisi head, and Tony^ stood on his^ head
In <85), the tw VP*a are not strictly identical, since the pronouns
differ in reference* VP-deletion, however, will ignore this dif¬
ference, and reduce (35) to (84)* Lakoff*s analysis of <32) involves
a rather different situation* The rule that deletes the embedded
clause in <33) has to ignore the difference between the NP» the peanut
butter sandwich* and the pronoun it. Thus, as it stands, Ross's
notion of sloppy identity does not provide any support for Lakoff* s
analysis* In the last chapter 1 argued that sloppy identity should
be understood as identity of constituents containing variables* This
view of sloppy identity provides no more support for Lakoff*s
analysis than does Ross's* One might interpret it in <33) as a
variable, but, on Lakoff*s analysis, the parallel position in the
antecedent will be filled by a full NP. I conclude, then, that
...... t <
Lakoff does not succeed in avoiding the derivation of subjects and
objects from higher sentences*
Z will conclude this section with some further remarks about
passives* So far, I hfcve assumed that the only underlying differences
between actives and passives are those which follow from <52)*
Given (52), only actives can derive from a structure like (86), and





Both actives and passives, however, can derive from a structure like
(88),
(83) 8
NPx do S to NPy
*.x..y.«
it is possible that we should recognize other differences.
R. Lakoff (1971) suggests that passive Jbe is present in under¬
lying structure* Specifically, she suggests that passives derive
from structures in which the underlying structure of the related
active is embedded as subject of be. For her, then, (39) will derive
from something like (90)*






In the derivation of (89), wolves and Jim will be interchanged, and
subject raising will make Jim subject of be. Langacker and Monro
(1975) argue for a further difference between actives and passives.
They suggest that passive agents originate in conjoined clauses.











Xn the derivation of (89), the second clause will be reduced and in¬
corporated into the first clause.
Both these proposals seem quite plausible. It is quite easy to
incorporate then into the present framework. We could suggest that
5
(89) derives from something like (92), where S is antecedent of it.
(92) -l
<c-2
S happen to Jim
a attack x it by wolves
If passives do derive from such a source, ray assumption that do appears
above every action verb will have to be revised. So, obviously,
in
< ' : '> ' . v s»-■ ' '<§•
will my characterization of an agent NP.
It is worth noting one possible argument for such an analysis*
Notice that, in the derivation of passives from structures like (37)
and <33), passive can only apply after equi and do-deletion have made
the subject of do subject of the embedded verb* Passive is a cyclic
rule* Thus, equi and do-deletion must also be cyclic* It is possible
however, that equi is post-cyclic* This is, in effect, the con¬
clusion of Postal (1970). If it is, it i6 hard to see how to derive
passives from structures like (37) and (33)* Obviously, no such
problem arises with a structure like (92)* It is possible, then,
*
that passives should derive from such structures* There is, however,
one way to maintain structures like (37) and (83), if equi is post-
cyclic* This is to assume that do governs not equi but lowering*
There is no reason to assume that lowering is post-cyclic* Thus,
if do governs lowering, there will be no problem about deriving
passives from structures like (87) and (33)* Therefore, the post-
cyclic ordering of equi does not necessarily preclude the
derivation of passives from such structures. Other considerations,






BOUND VARIABLESl "FURTHER QUESTIONS
In the last chapter, I considered some general questions about
the underlying structures in which bound variables appear and the
derivations with which they are associated* In this chapter, I
will take up some more specific questions* Firstly, 1 will say
something about plurality. Then, I will consider a number of
aspects of the derivational processes which 1 am assuming* Finally,
1 will take a brief look at Bach-Peters sentences*
5.1 A Note on Plurality
I have argued that many sentences have underlying structures of
one of the following forms*
(I) S (2) S
S be true of NP^
# #ASSf
<3) <4)
S happen to NP Det N S be there
•*«x**» *««x***
The NP*s in (I) - (3) and the N in (4) may be either singular or plural
Where they are plural, an important problem arises* In this section,
I will say something about this problem.











x lift the rock
Influenced by the practice of logicians* we might suppose that this
is equivalent to the logical formula (6)*
(6) (Vx e the boys)(llft (x, the rock))
We might* that is* interpret (5) as meaning that each boy lifted the
rock* It is natural* however* to regard (5) as the underlying
structure of (7)*
(7) The boys lifted the rock*
(7) is certainly appropriate where each boy lifted the rock* but it is
also appropriate where the boys lifted the rock together* A. natural
suggestion is that sentences like (7) are ambiguous between a distri¬
butive and a collective reading*
This is not necessarily the case* however* An alternative poss¬
ibility is that such sentences are simply vague* Lakoff (1970c)
notes that VP-deletion provides a way of deciding between these alter¬
natives* He points out that* if two sentences with identical VP*s
are ambiguous* VP-deletion can only apply if they are understood in
the same way* (8) is a simple example of an ambiguous sentence*
(8) Sam hates boring students*
One might expect* then* that (9) would be four ways ambiguous* In
fact* however* it is only two ways ambiguous*
(9) Sam hates boring students* and so does Steve*
In accordance with Lakoff*s observation* both conjuncts must be
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understood in the same way. Contrasting with (8) is (10), which no
one would regard as ambiguous.
(1C) Sam broke his leg.
Suppose, however, that someone claimed that (10) is ambiguous between
a reading on which Sam broke his left leg and one on which he broke
his right leg. This claim can be immediately refuted by (11).
(11) Sam broke his leg, and so did Steve.
If the claimed ambiguity were real, (10) would be impossible in a
situation where Sam broke his left leg and Steve his right leg or
vice versa. Clearly, however, this is not the case. Therefore,
the claimed ambiguity is not real. (10) is simply vague as to which
leg Sam broke. We can now consider whether sentences like (7) are in
fact ambiguous. The crucial question is the interpretation of
sentences like (12).
(12) The boys lifted the rock and so did the girls*
The judgement is fairly fine, but it seems to me that (12) is not
appropriate where each boy lifted the rock but the girls lifted it
together, or vice versa. This suggests, then, that sentences like
(7) ere in fact ambiguous. It is necessary, then, to consider how
this ambiguity can be accommodated in the present framework.
We can begin with an approach to the distributive/collective
distinction developed by Kroch (1974). Kroch uses an extension of
standard logical notation for semantic representation# Standard
logical notation handles distributive readings most naturally.
Within standard logic, the obvious representation for (7) is (6),
which is a natural representation for the distributive reading
of (7). To handle collective readings, Kroch allows set
representations as well as variables to appear as arguments of
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predicates* The collective reading of (7) he would represent as
something like (13)*
(13) lift (the boys, the rock)
A somewhat similar approach is adopted in Fauconnier (1971)* Xt is
natural, then, to consider whether such an approach can be incor¬
porated in the present framework* The obvious way to do so is to
regard (5) as the source for (7) on its distributive reading, and
to derive it from the simpler structure (14) on its collective
reading*
(14) S
Unfortunately, there are two good arguments against this approach.
The first argument returns to some of the main evidence for
structures like (5)* Evidence for such structures is provided by
sentences like (15)*
(15) The boys lifted the rock, and the girls did it too.
The interpretation of the second clause here is handled quite
naturally if the first clause derives from something like (5),
Notice now that (15) can be understood either distributively or
collectively* Thus, (15) provides evidence that both the distri¬
butive and the collective readings of (7) involve structures
like (5),
The second argument involves sentences like (16),
(16) The Americans criticised themselves.
(16) has both a distributive and a collective reading* Xt can mean
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that each of the Americans in question criticized himself, or that the
group criticized the group as a whole* 1 argued earlier that
reflexive pronouns can only represent bound variables* In the





We might regard this as the source of (16) on its distributive





Notice, however, that the NF the Americans does not asymmetrically
command the variable x. The variable, therefore, is not in the
scope of the NP, and cannot be bound by it. Thus, the approach
under consideration is incompatible with the conception of variable
binding assumed here*
A second approach which naturally suggests itself to anyone
influenced by standard logical notation interprets the distributive/
collective distinction as a matter of quantifier scope* This
approach is adopted in McCawley (1969). He represents the distri¬
butive and collective readings of (19) as (20) end (21)
respectively.
1X7
(19) Those men went to Cleveland.
(20) V 3 *go to Cleveland* (x, y )
xeM yx
(21) 3 V *go to Cleveland* (x, y)
y XeH
He does not explain the exact meaning of his symbolism, but the
intended interpretation is fairly clear* (20) signifies that for
each of the men there is a going to Cleveland* (21) signifies that
there is a single going to Cleveland that all the men are involved
in* Essentially the same approach is developed in somewhat more
detail in Bartsch (1973)* She represents the distributive and
collective readings of (22) as (23) and (24), respectively*1
(22) Three men are entering*
(23) (3X)(X c man* l» f?(X) - 3 & (V*)(x e X -* ( r)(I(x,r) &
enter* - V(r))))
(24) (3X)(X c man* & f?(X) « 3 & (3r)(Vx)(x e X l(x,r) &
enter* * V(*))))
X here is a set variable* £? is a function which takes a set as its
argument and gives as its value the number of members in the set*
l(x,r) means *x is involved in r*« enter* - V can be translated as
*an entering process** The two representations might, then, be
translated into * logicians* English* as follows*
1* Bartsch terms her framework *natural generative graezaar*, but she
seems not to be concerned about the naturalness of her logical
structures*
lis
(25) There are three men each of whom is involved in an
entering process*
(26) There is an entering process that each of three men is
involved in*
This is hardly natural Snglish( but it does capture the intended inter¬
pretation of (23) and (24)*
The notational systems employed by McCawley and Bartsch are
very different from the underlying structures assumed here* It is
not too difficult, however, to incorporate their approach in the
present framework* For the two readings of (22), we might suggest
the following structures*
(27) S
three menx S be there
x be involved in an entering process
(28) S
an entering process., S be there
three men be involved in x
For the two readings of (7), we might try the following*
(29) S
S be true of the boy»x
x be involved in a process of lifting the rock
(30) S
a process of lifting the rock„ S be there
the boys be involved in x
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(X* (30), the index following rock is to be understood as attached
to the complex noun process of lifting, the rock*) Xn one respect,
however, these structures are clearly inadequate* On its distri¬
butive reading, (7) does not mean that each boy was involved in a
process of lifting the rock, but that each boy actually lifted the
rock himself* Similarly, on its collective reading, (7) does not
mean that there was a process of lifting the rock that the boys were
involved in, but that the boys lifted the rock between them. We
might make this clear by replacing be involved in by accomplish or do*
With this modification, the structures in (29) and (30) seem
semantically appropriate*
The main problem with this approach is that, while it might
work semantically, there is no real independent evidence for it* The
crucial existential assertions never appear in surface structure,
except in logicians* English* Suck appearances hardly count as
evidence for the assertions* The absence of independent evidence
for these assertions does not necessarily tnean that this approach
should be rejected, but it does suggest that one should look for
alternatives*
One alternative is that developed in Ores:swell (1973)* In
Cresswell*s system, a simple plural HP is interpreted distributively*
To account for the collective interpretation of plural BUP*s he
postulates a collective operator* This converts a nominal into a
logically proper name* Semantieally, this approach seems quite
reasonable* Like the approach of McCawley and Bartsch, however, it
lacks clear independent support* There seems to be no lexical item
in English that can be regarded as the realisation of a collective
operator* One might perhaps suggest that together is the
120
realization of such an operator. It's general behaviour suggests,
however, that it is some kind of adverb.
The obvious alternative to Cressweil's approach is one in which
a simple plural NP is interpreted collectively, and in which the
distributive interpretation of plural NP's is accounted for by some
kind of distributive operator. This is essentially the approach
adopted in Anderson (1974b). There is fairly clear independent
support for such an approach. Notice that (31), unlike (7), has
only a distributive reading.
(31) Each of the boys lifted the rock.
This suggests, then, that each is the surface realization of a
distributive operator. (32) also has only a distributive reading.
(32) Every boy lifted the rock.
every, then, might be the realization of another distributive
operator. All we need in this approach is a rule deleting a
distributive operator.
To show how this approach might work, I will consider the
following sentences.
(33) Six policemen arrested twenty demonstrators.
(34) Twenty demonstrators were arrested by six policemen.
Both sentences have a distributive and a collective reading. (33)
means that the policemen arrested twenty demonstrators each, or that
they arrested twenty demonstrators between them. (34) means that
each of the demonstrators was arrested by six policemen, or that
the demonstrators as a group were arrested by six policemen. Notice
that the collective readings of the two sentences are effectively
the same. The two readings of (33) can be derived from (35) and (36).
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(35)
each of six policeman^ do S
x arrest twenty demonstrators
(36)
six policemen do S
x arrest twenty demonstrators
Similarly, the two readings of (34) can be derived from (37) and
(38).
(37) S
S happen to each of twenty demonstrators
six policemen arrest x
(38) S
S happen to twenty demonstrators,
six policemen arrest x
Although they have the same truth conditions, (36) and (38) differ
quite radically* Notice, in particular, that the positions of the
two quantifiers is reversed, in the present approach, such differ¬
ences do not necessarily involve different truth conditions. This
is an important difference between this approach and standard
logical notations. <
X would not claim to h&Ve established the clear superiority of
the present approach, only to have given reasons for thinking that
it is more promising than the obvious alternatives. It seems clear
that the distributive/collective distinction can be incorporated in




In this section, 1 want to say something more about the NP-lowering
rules that 1 assumed in the last chapter* 1 will consider, in par¬
ticular, what independent evidence there is for these rules and their
ordering* Before 1 do so, however, X want to say something about
the basic form of the rules*
Assuming the first version of relative clause raising, the first
NP-lowering rule will apply to a structure like (1), lowering the
subject NP onto the variable in the following open sentence*
•**x**« be there
The second NP-lowering rule applies to structures like (2), lowering
the indexed NP onto the variable in the sentential subject*
Clearly, these two rules are quite similar. Both substitute an NP
for a variable* One might think, then, that they should be collapsed
in some way* One obvious difference between them is that the first
moves an NP to the right, while the second moves an NP to the left*
In the present framework, this prevents the collapsing of the two
rules* One might suggest, however, that linear order is not intro¬
duced until late in the derivation, perhaps at shallow structure*




necessarily mean that the rules cannot be collapsed. There le9
however9 a further problem. In the first rule, the variable onto
which the UP'is lowered is bound by the H within the NP, whereas,
in the second rule, the variable onto which the NP is lowered is
bound by the HP itself. Given this difference, 1 can see no obvious
way of collapsing the two rules. Tentatively, then, X conclude that
there are two distinct rules of HP-lowering.
Unlike a number of linguists, notably Keenan (1972) and McCawley
(1970a), I assume that HP-lowering is unconstrained in tins sense
that an HP can be lowered onto any variable which it or its N binds.
This means, for example, that Brian in (3) can be lowered onto either
of the variables in the sentential subject.
<3) S
S be true of Brian
x loves x*s wife
Of course, the only possible realization of (3) is (4).
(4) Brian loves his wife*
(3) is not a possible realization of (3).
(5) He loves Brian*s wife.
But it is not necessary to restrict NP-lowering to prevent the
derivation of (5) from (3). It is more plausible, 1 think, to assume
that such derivations are thrown out by output conditions.
The main independent evidence for lowering rules is provided by
their interaction with island constraints. This interaction was
apparently first noted by McCawley. The earliest published dis¬
cussion is in Lakoff 41970b),
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As Lakoff notes, the interaction of lowering and the complex NP
constraint is illustrated by pairs of sentences like the following*
(6) Jim believes that Sam insulted raany Italians*
(7) Jiut believes the claim that Sam insulted Many Italians*
(6) is ambiguous, having the specific reading (8), and the non-specific
reading (9),
(3) There axe many Italians that Jim believes that Sara insulted*
(9) Jiii believes that there are fanny Italians that Sara insulted*
(7), however, has only the non-specific reading (10)*
(1C) Jim believes the claim that there are raany Italians that
Sam insulted*
(6) will derive frora (11) and (12)*
Jim believe S raany Italiansx S be there
Sam insult x Sam insult x
(7) will derive from a structure like (12), but with the claim intro¬
duced after believe. It will not, however, derive from a structure
like (11) with the same modification* The reason, of course, is that
the derivation of (7) frora such a structure would involve the lowering
of the HP many Italians into a complex NP* Such derivations are
blocked by the complex NP constraint*
NP*s containing relative clauses are a second kind of complex
NP* One would expect lowering into such NP*s to be impossible*
This is indeed the case* Rodman (1976) points out that no NP inside
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a relative clause can heve a scope extending outside the clause*^
He illustrates with sentences like the following.
(13) Erica interviewed every man who sav « unicorn,
every here must have a wider scope than _a. (13), chen, will derive
from something like (14),
(14) S
Erica interview every aan^, S
x saw a unicorn
it cannot derive from (15).
(15) S
y saw x
The reason, of course, is that the derivation of (13) from (15) is
blocked by the complex MP constraint.
Lowering also interacts with the coordinate structure constraint.
This is illustrated by sentences like the following, discussed by
Rodman.
(16) A soldier shot every woman and every child.
As Rodman points out, (16) is only two ways ambiguous. The quantifiers
«* «*«*«» ee m m
2. Rodman suggests that facts like these are accommodated particularly
naturally in a Montague framework. They are accommodated just as
naturally, however, in the present framework.
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In Che conjoined structure function as a single unit, and may be
either inside or outside the scope of a. (16), then, will derive
from either (17) or (18).
(17) S
x shot every woman and every child
(18) S
S be true of every woman and every childx
a soldier shot x
(The index following child is to be understood as attached to the
conjoined structure.) Any structure in which the conjoined structure
is not e single unit will be prevented from surfacing by the
coordinate structure constraint. Consider, for example, (19).
(19) S
S be true of every woman^
e soldier shot x and every child
Here, the coordinate structure constraint blocks the lowering of
every woman onto the variable x. A structure like (19) but with the
positions of every woman and every child reversed will be prevented
from surfacing in just the same way.
The sentential subject constraint also provides support for
lowering. Consider the following pair of sentences.
(20) It*s likely that Sam insulted many Italians.
(21) That Sam insulted many Italians is likely.
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(20) Is ambiguous» having the specific reading (22), and the non¬
specific reading (23).
(22) There ere many Italians that it's likely that Sam insulted.
(23) It's likely that there are many Italians that Sam insulted.
(21) is unambiguous, having only a non-specific reading. We can
assume that the specific reading of (20) derives from something like
(24),
(24) Sl
many ltaliansx S be there
S3 be likely
Sam insult x
Zf extraposition is a cyclic rulea as Jacobson and Heubauer (1976)
2 1
argue, it will apply on S • Then, on S , many Italians will be
lowered onto the variable x. If extraposition does not apply, the
sentential subject constraint will block lowering. Thus, (21) will
not be derived from (24),
Zt seams, then, that we can explain a number of observations
in terms of the interaction of lowering and island constraints. We
should note, however, that lowering is not always blocked by island
constraints. Consider (25), to which kodraan draws attention.
(25) A soldier found every student and shot him.
Here, every student is inside a coordinate structure. Zt must,
however, have originated outside this structure, since it must have
asymmetrically commanded the variable underlying him. Here, then,
an HP has been lowered into an island. It is not at all clear, then,
why (25) is acceptable.
Before Z look more closely at the ordering of HP-lowering, a
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further remark is necessary about island constraints. X have argued
that many sentences derive from structures of the following form*
(hi the face of it, the lowering that this analysis involves should
be blocked by the sentential subject constraint. There is, however,
a fairly straightforward way out of this dilemma. Postal (1974b)
suggests that the movement of elements across island boundaries is
not blocked if the boundary is destroyed in the process. Given this
conception of islands, we need only assume that the predicates be true
and happen are deleted either before or at the same time as KP-
lowering and the sentential subject constraint will no longer be a
problem for our analysis.
X can now turn to the ordering of NP-lowering. In my discussion
of the bound variable theory, 1 noted that Wasow*e critique of the
theory amounts to an argument for the precyclic nature of HP-lowering.
X assumed in my discussion of (20) and (21), however, that UP-lowering
is cyclic. Clearly, if Wasow*s argument is sound, this discussion
will require some revision. Before X discuss this question, however,
X want to consider some other implications of Wasow* s argument.
X suggested in chapter 1 that surface structure interpretation
rules are in effect precyclic transformations with associated global
constraints. As an example, X suggested that a rule which says
that the scope of quantifiers corresponds to their surface order is
equivalent to a precyclic lowering rule plus a constraint on
(26) S
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surface structure* It follows that any evidence that NP-lowering
is precyclic will be evidence for the essential correctness of an
important aspect of interpretivist claims* It will thus be of
comparable importance to the evidence that predicate raising and
nominalisation are precyclic. X also suggested in chapter 1 that a
transformation changes meaning if sane aspect of the meaning of the
sentence in whose derivation it applies is predictable from its
output but not from its input* If HP-lowering is precyclic, movement
transformations will often change meaning. Passive, for example,
will change meaning in the derivation of (27).
(27) Two languages are known by everyone in the room.
The meaning of (27) will not be predictable from the input to passive,
because this will figure in the derivation of (23)*
(28) Everyone in the room speaks two languages*
Obviously, there will be similar examples with other movement rules*
It is clear, then, that whether HP-lowering is precyclic is of some
importance.
As I noted above, if HP-lowering is precyclic, my explanation
of the contrast between (20) and (21) will need some revision. If
HP-lowering is precyclic, the sentential subject constraint, as it
stands, will prevent (20) as well as (21) from being derived from
(24)* The constraint will also fail to block derivations which it
should block* Consider the following pair of sentences*
(29) The press reported that Earn insulted many Italians*
(30) That Sam insulted many Italians was reported by the press*
(29) is ambiguous, having both a specific and a non-specific reading*
(30) is unambiguous, having only a non-specific reading* The specific
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Since S is not in subject position* there is nothing to prevent the
lowering of many Italians onto the variable x. If MP-lowering is
cyclic* it will be blocked by the sentential subject constraint* if
2 3
passive applies on S * making S subject. If HP-lowering is preeyclic*
it will apply before passive, and there will be nothing to prevent
passive applying subsequently. Thus* if HP-lowering is precyclic*
it will be possible to derive both (29) and (30) from (31).
It is clear from the foregoing that a reformulation of the
sentential subject constraint will be necessary if NP-lowering is a
precyclic rule. The constraint will have to be formulated to throw
out any derivation in which a complement appears in surface subject
position* and in which either some element that was originally outside
the complement appears Inside or some element that was originally
inside appears outside. This formulation will permit the derivation
of (20) from (24)* where the complement is moved out of subject
position after lowering* It will also block the derivation of (30)
from (31), where the complement is moved into subject position after
lowering.
The nature of island constraints is currently far from clear.
Chomsky (1973) and Horn (1974* 1977) have proposed radical reanalyses
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3
of the constraints. Rodman (1975) suggests that they are mani¬
festations of more basic fussy constraints. Morgan (1975a) and
Fauconnier (1975) show that certain apparently pragmatic phenomena
are subject to them, in this situation, there is nothing obviously
unreasonable about the suggested reformulation. It is clear, however,
that the reformulation is more complex than the normal formulation.
Other things being equal then, it is preferable to retain the normal
formulation. We must ask, than, whether Wasow's arguments do
necessitate a precyclic rule of NP-lowering, and hence the reformu¬
lation of the sentential subject constraint.
Wasow*s arguments are based on the fact that, if NP-lowering
is cyclic, it will be possible for other transformations to apply
before it. Given this fact, problems will arise if there are
transformations that distinguish between pronouns and full NP*s.
Such transformations will encounter structures containing variables,
wad it will be impossible to say how they should apply to these
structures, since variables can be realised as pronouns or as full
NP* s. If NP-lowering is prscyclic, however, this problem will not
arise. The crucial transformations will not encounter structures
containing variables. There will, therefore, be no problem about
their application.
The two most plausible examples of transformations that dis¬
tinguish between pronouns wad full NP*s are particle movement and
dative movement. The following data suggest that particle movement
is obligatory with pronouns* while dative movement is blocked.
3. X will return to Chomsky's 'conditions on transformations* in 7.3.
132
(32)a. * Eve gave av/ay it.
b. Eve gave it away.
(33)a. Dick gave it to Brian,
b. * Dick gave Brian it.
Wasow, in fact* suggests, following Lasnik, that this data reflects
not conditions on the application of particle movement and dative
movement, but a cyclic rule encliticising pronominal direct objects.
Either account of the data will pose a problem for cyclic lowering.
There is. however, an alternative approach which does not have this
consequence. This will involve a surface structure constraint
rejecting sentences with pronominal direct objects which are not
adjacent to the verb. Such a constraint will obviously come into
play after lowering, however it is ordered. It is thus quite
compatible with a cyclic rule. Wasow considers this alternative,
and suggests that it is 'probably not the best mechanism for accounting
for the kinds of facts in question*» Unless the alternative can
be ruled out more firmly then this, the above data cannot be regarded
as providing firm evidence against cyclic lowering.
Wasow also seeks evidence against number agreement from the
operation of number agreement and there-insertion. X will say
something about number agreement later. For the moment, 1 will
simply note that X do not think that the facts of agreement necessi¬
tate precyclic lowering. As for there-insertion, in the present
framework, this can provide no evidence against cyclic lowering,
because there is no such rule. Xn connection with there-insertion.
Vlasow discusses the following sentence.
(34) A man who discovered that there were some burglars in his
house was shot by them.
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In the bound variable theory, thie will have to derive from something
like (35),
(35) £Xf sane burglars] X shot a man who discovered £g X were
in his house] ]
2 51
Its derivation will involve there-insertion, passive, and lowering.
The problem in this framework is to prevent the derivation of (36),
where there-insertion has applied, but not passive.
(36) * Some burglars shot a man who discovered that there were
they in his house.
In the present framework, (34) will have a rather different analysis,
some burglars can originate inside the complement of discover
associated with there, and them can be a pronoun of laziness. We
can restrict ambient there to indefinite NP*s, thus preventing the
generation of sentences like (36),
It is always possible that clear evidence will be found against
cyclic lowering, I do not think, however, that Wasow has provided
it. I conclude then that the case against such lowering is not
proven,
5.3. The Command Constraint
In chapter 3, I alluded to the command constraint, which requires
bound variables to be commanded by their antecedents. This constraint
is identified in Wittan (1972), Witten distinguishes a class of
deep structure pronouns which correspond closely to my bound variables,
end notes that, in general, they must be commanded by their
antecedents. In this section, I will say something about this
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constraint. 1 will say a little mora than Witten, but I will leave
a number of questions open.
It will be recalled that the command constraint is central to
my explanation of various facts about the interpretation of VP-
deletion sentences. It is perhaps worth reiterating this point. I
considered firstly (1).
(1) John washed his car, and Sam did, and Steve did.
This is two ways ambiguous, not six, as Rose's approach to sloppy
identity leads one to expect. It can mean that all three men washed
John's car, or that each of them washed his own. I argued that, on
the first reading, ell three VP's contain pronouns of laziness
referring to John, while, on the second, all three VP's contain
bound variables. In the letter case, the command constraint ensures
that each variable is bound by the subject of its own sentence.
Without the constraint, the variable in the second sentence could be
bound by John as well as by Sam, and the variable in the third
sentence could be bound by John or Sag, as well as by Steve. There
would be nothing, then, to prevent the additional readings that
Ross's approach predicts. I also considered sentences like (2) - (5).
(2) Marsha scratched herself, and so did Jan.
(3) Erica wants to see Max, and so does Eve.
(4) A Rumanian washed his car, and so did a Bulgarian.
(5) Every Rumanian washed his car, and so did every Bulgarian.
These are all unambiguous, having only sloppy identity readings.
To account for this, I assume that the anophors represent bound
variables. The command constraint then ensures that each variable
is bound by the subject of its sentence.
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Consider now the following sentences*
(6) One boy washed his car before Sam did*
(7) Every boy washed his car before San did.
Although the judgements are rather fine, it seems to me that these can
have both sloppy and strict identity readings* They, thus, contrast
with (4) and (5), where only sloppy identity readings are possible*
The reason for this contrast is fairly simple* Whereas in (4) and
(5) the variable in the deleted VP is not commanded by the HP that
commands the variable in the first clause, in (6) and (7), it is*
In (6) and (7), then, the variable in the deleted VP can be bound
by the NP that binds the variable in the first clause* Thus, strict
identity readings are possible. For the same reason, one would
expect (8) and (9) to have strict identity readings.
(8) Jim criticised himself before Sam did.
(9) Tony wants to leave before Steve does*
It seems to toe, however, that they do not* Presumably, some additional
factor is involved in such sentences.
It is not at all clear how Eoss*s approach could account for
facts like these. Nor is it clear how they could be accounted for
within the bound variable theory* Both Keenan (1970) and Bonney
<1976) discuss sloppy identity in connection with their versions of
the bound variable theory. Neither, however, provides any account
of these facts, in contrast, the present theory provides a quite
straightforward account. The command constraint is an integral part
of this account. Thus, these facts provide strong support for it.
There are various other kinds of evidence for the command
constraint. Notice that it explains why (10) cannot be reduced to
<ll).
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(1C) Sam washed his car, and the man who knew Mary washed her car*
(11) Sara washed his car, and so did the man who knew Mary,
her in the second clause is not commanded by its antecedent* Therefore,
it cannot represent & bound variable. Thus, whether his in the first
clause is a bound variable or a pronoun of laziness, the identity
required ior VP-deletion is lacking. The constraint also explains why
(12) cannot be reduced to (13)*
(12) The man who knew Mary washed her car, and Sam washed his
car*
(13) The man who knew Mary washed her car, and so did Sam,
Again, her cannot represent a bound variable. Again, then, whether
his is a bound variable or a pronoun of laziness, VP-deletion Is
blocked. Ross noted that pronouns in sloppy identity must be com¬
manded by their antecedents. He did not, however, relate the dis¬
tinction to wider facts, as I ara doing here.
Reflexives and the null anaphors produced by equi provide par¬
ticularly clear evidence for the command constraint. I have argued
that both can only represent bound variables. It follows, then, that
they should be commanded by their antecedents, in general, this is
the case. Sentences like (14) are impossible, while (15) can only
mean that the man who knows Mary wants to end it all himself, not
that he wants Mary to end it all*
(14) * The man who knows Mary admires herself.
(15) The man who knows Mary wants to end it all*
This is exactly what we expect.
indefinite HJ?*s do not provide direct evidence for the command
constraint, because they can normally serve as antecedents for
pronouns of laziness, as long as they do not contaand them* Thus,
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sentences like (16) end (17) are quite acceptable*
(16) The men who sew a film hated it*
(17) Eve tried a drink, and she liked it*
in contrast, HP's containinr, every provide clear evidence for the
constraint, because they cannot serve as antecedents for singular
pronouns of laziness* Contrasting with (16) and (17), then, we
have (13) and (19)#
(13) * The man who saw every film hated it.
(19) * Eve tried every drink, and she liked it.
HP*s containing every can serve as antecedents for plural pronouns of
laziness. Thus, contrasting with (13) and (19), we have the
following.
(20) The man who saw every film hated them.
(21) Eve tried every drink, end she liked then.
Like HP's containing every in not serving as antecedents for singular
pronouns of laziness are HP*c containing each and no. Like (18) and
(19), then, are the following.
(22) * The man who saw each filia hated it.
(23) * Eve tried each drink, and she liked it.
(24) * The man who saw no film hated it.
(25) •* Eve tried no drink, and she liked it.
Those HP's can also serve, to varying extents, as antecedents for
plural pronouns of laziness.
1 suggested another constraint in chapter 3. 1 suggested that
no anaphor that represents a bound variable can have on antecedent
insicte an IIP. This constraint accounts for the ungrairanaticality of
sentences like (26) end (27), and certain other phenomena.
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(26) * Jim and Mary scratched herself*
(27) * The girl's father hurt herself.
It is possible that this constraint is simply a special case of the
command constraint* On the standard definition of command* A commands
B if the first S node above A also dominates 0* On this definition*
Mary commands herself in (26)* and The y.irl commands herself in (27)*
On this definition* then* the uagraramaticality of (26) and (27)
cannot be a consequence of the command constraint* It is not clear*
however* that this is the most appropriate definition of command,
dackendoff (1972*140) suggests a different definition. He suggests
that A commands £ if the first cyclic node above A also dominates B*
where a cyclic node is either s or MP* On this definition, Mary does
not command herself in (26)* and The girl does not command herself
in (27)* On this definition* then* the ungrammaticality of (26)
and (27) will be a consequence of the command constraint* It is
possible* then* that we will not need a separate constraint for such
sentences*
It is fairly clear that the command constraint explains a number
of facts* It is natural to ask whether the constraint itself can
be explained* In a brief remark on this subject* Witten suggests that
the constraint stems from facts about specificity* More precisely*
he suggests that an MP can only serve as antecedent of a pronoun
derived from a bound variable* If it can have a specific interpretation*
What he means here is far from clear* The distinction between specific
and non-specific readings is normally applied only to indefinite MP's*
yet all pronouns derived from bound variables must be commanded by
their antecedents* The antecedent of her in (10) and (12) does not
seem to be non-specific in any sense, yet the pronoun can only
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represent a pronoun of laziness* Nor do every film in (IS) and every
drink in (19) seem to be non-specific, yet the sentences are un-
grammaticai because of the command constraint* Witten* s suggestion
is thus not a very promising one* One might suggest instead that
the constraint is a result of the interaction of lowering and island
constraints* In (18), every film has been lowered into a complex
N?» Thus, the complex MP constraint will explain why (18) is un-
gransaatical. In (19), every drink has been lowered into the first
conjunct of a coordinate structure* Here, then, the coordinate
structure constraint will explain the ungrammaticality* Unfortunately,
there are examples which cannot be explained along these lines*
Consider, for example (28)*
(28) * Sam thinks every girl is beautiful, although he hasn't
seen her*
Here, every girl has not been lowered into an island* It seems, then,
that not all instances of the command constraint can be attributed
to island constraints* Thus, 1 have no real explanation for the
constraint*
Another unsatisfactory aspect of the command constraint is that
two classes of sentences provide exceptions to it* These classes are
exemplified by sentences like the following*
(29) What Sara painted was a picture of his father*
(30) The picture of his father that Sam painted was hung in the
attic*
That the pronouns can represent bound variables although they are not
commanded by their antecedents is shown by the fact that they can
figure In sloppy identity* The following illustrate*
(31) What Sam painted was a picture of his father, and what
Steve painted was one too*
140
<32) The picture of hie father that Sam painted was hung In the
attic, but the one that Steve painted was hung In the hall*
As one might expect, reflexives are acceptable in these sentences.
The following illustrate.
(33) What Sam painted was a picture of himself*
(34) The picture of himself that Sam painted was hung in the
attic*
Notice also that null anaphora produced by equi are acceptable.
(33) What Sam denied was the intention to defect*
(36) The will to win that Sam always shows is widely admired.
Finally, notice that the following are acceptable.
(37) What every man painted was a picture of his father.
(33) The picture of his father that every man painted was
hung in the attic*
It seems, then, that these two classes of sentences are exceptions
to the command constraint in a quite general way.
Not only are these sentences exceptions to the command constraint,
they also involve violations of the complex NP constraint. Consider






picture of x paint y
x»s father
Given such sources, Sam will be lowered into a complex N? In both
sentences. This is not a happy situation, but X can see no
alternative*
One linguist who has discussed these sentences is Schachter
(1973a)* His concern is with the traditional generalisations that no
pronoun may both precede and command its antecedent and that a
reflexive and its antecedent must be clause mates* Both generalizations
are violated in these sentences. He argues that pseudo clefts and
relatives involve extraction rules. For him, (29) and (30) will





Given such structures, the traditional generalizations hold prior to
extraction. Similar analyses of pseudo clefts are advanced by
Chomsky (1970), Grosu (1973), and Hurford (1973).
One might suggest that the analyses X have sketched should be
modified to incorporate extraction rules. One might suggest that
(29) should derive from something like (43), and (30) from something
like (44),
(43) S
x painted a picture of x*s father
With such analyses, (29) and (30) will still involve violations of the
complex NP constraint, but, if extraction is post-cyclic, they will
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conform to the command constraint in shallow structure*
I think9 however, that extraction rules are rather dubious* Pseudo
clefts might perhaps involve extraction, but semantic considerations
argue against an extracting analysis of relative clauses. Such an
analysis appears incompatible with any clear account of the semantics
of relative clauses. Certainly, Schachter offers no account. In
contrast the analysis of relative clauses developed earlier permits
a straightforward account of their semantics* 1 think, then, that
an extracting analysis of relative clauses is not at all plausible.
Why, then, arc. these sentence* grjrnmatic.nl? The best I can
suggest is that their gramnticality stems from some kind of analogy.
The crucial sentences all imply simple sentences in which the pronoun
is commanded by its antecedent* Notice that (33) and (34) Imply (45).
(45) Sara painted a picture of himself.
The unacceptable (14) does not Imply such a simple sentence. It is
possible, then, that (33) and (34) are acceptable by analogy with
(45), and that the other exceptions to the command constraint are
tf.
acceptable by analogy with simple sentences in the same way.
To conclude this section, 1 want to note the implications of the
coxanand constraint for the analysis of the quantifier any. A number
of writers, notably Quine (I960), Lsbov (1972), Cresswell (1973), and
LeGrand (1974), have argued that any always represents a universal
4. Haakaraer (1974) suggests an interesting argument for an analysis
of pseudo clefts involving post-cyclic extraction. His argument
depends, however, on the assumption that reflexives and their
antecedents are clause mates at the end of the cycle. This assump¬
tion is untenable unless relative clauses also involve post-cyclic
extraction, which I think is unlikely.
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quantifier. The coaasiead constraint provides evidence against this
proposal.
The proposal receives initial support from the similarity in
meaning between (46) and (47).
(46) Anyone can come.
(47) Everyone can come.
Cn the face of it, however, the quite different meanings of (43) and
(49) argue against it.
(43) I didn't see anyone.
(49) I didn't see everyone.
On® approach to sentences like (43), developed, for example, by Klima
(1964), assumes that any is the form taken by some in a negative
environment. On this analysis, then, (48) is the negation of (50),
(50) I sew someone.
One need not analyze sentences like (48) in this way, however, Quine's
suggestion is that *...every, by a simple and irreducible trait of
English usage, always calls for the shortest possible scope... any.
by a simple and irreducible trait of English usage, always calls for
the longer of two possible scopes' (1960s £.29,), Thus, he would
analyze (43) and (49) as (51) and (52), respectively.
(51) (Vx) -w(I sew x)
(52) ~(Vx)(I saw x)
Effectively, then, the proposal is that any is the form taken by every
in certain environments.
The proposal is an attractive one, holding out, as it does, the
prospect of a unified account of any. It faces at least one serious
problem, however, Notice that (53) is a perfectly acceptable
sentence•
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(53) If anyone, moves, 1*11 Mil him.
The pronoun here is not commanded by its antecedent. But, if any is
a form of every it should be. If any in a form of every, lilm iaust
represent a bound variable, and bound variables imi3t, in general, be
commanded by their antecedents. Notice that (54) is ungramraatical
for this reason.
(54) * If everyone moves, 1*11 kill hits.
In contrast, (55) is perfectly acceptable,
(5?) If someone moves, 1*11 kill him.
This is what we expect, since someone can serve as antecedent for a
singular pronoun of laziness. (53) is also very close in meaning to
(55). It seems natural, then, to suggest that any in (53) is a form
of some, and that the pronoun is f pronoun of laziness. If any in
(53) is a form of some, it seems likely that it is in (43) also*
I think, then, that sentences like (53) suggest strongly that
any is net always a universal quantifier. Tills does not mean,
however, that it iMver is, as some linguists, e.g. Fauconnler (1971),
have argued. It seems natural to regard any in (40) as a universal
quantifier. If it is, the command constraint will account for the
unacceptebility of (56).
(56) * Anyone can come, but he probably won* t.
It is not my aim, however, to develop a general account of any. I
simply want to note the problem that the command constraint poses
for one quite widely canvassed analysis.
5.4, The Realisation of Bound Variables
I want now to say something about the various forms that bound
variables can assume in surface structure. Many variables are
146
realized as full NP*s as a result of the operation of HP-lowering#
Other variables may have a null realization as a result of the
operation of equi# Finally# they may be realized as various kinds
of reflexive and non-reflexive pronouns* Clearly# we need sorae
mechanism to account for the possibilities*
Where a variable is not replaced by an HP# the form it assumes
on the surface depends on two questions* (l) its structural position#
(2) the nature of the binding HP# The role of both factors is
intuitively fairly clear# Taking (I) first# it is clear that for a
variable to be deleted by equi# it mist be in subject position#
Similarly# for a variable to be realized as a reflexive pronoun# the
binding HP must normally be a clause mate# Where a variable does not
meet the structural condition for equi or reflexivizattion# it will be
realised as an ordinary pronoun. Turning to (2), it is clear
that the number and gender that a bound variable assumes depends on
the binding HP# It is this aspect of the realization of variables
that I ara concerned with here#
The role of the binding HP in determining the form of a variable
can be Illustrated quite briefly# Consider the following sentences#
(1) The king shot himself*
(2) The queen shot herself*
(3) The men shot themselves#
(4) The women shot themselves.





In (1), the binding HP is £4- masculine] and £- plural]. The second
variable then must also be marked £4- masculine] and £- plural]. In
(2), the binding NP is £+ feminine] and £- plural]. The second
variable must be marked similarly. In (3) and (4), the binding NP*s
are £-f plural]. In both, then, the second variable must be marked
£d- plural]. Clearly, what we need is a rule copying certain
features from a binding HP onto the variables it binds.
A feature copying rule is proposed for French in Fauconnier
(1971). Part of the data that Fauconnier cites to support such a
rule is the following.
(6) Chacun d'eux aura son chauffeur*
(7) lis auront chacun son chauffeur.
(3) lis auront chacun leur chauffeur*
All three sentences can be translated as *each of them will have his
chauffeur*. Fauconnier derives them from (9).
<»>
Empty indexed HP*a in Fauconnier*s system are broadly similar to
variables in the present framework. In the derivation of all three
sentences, the quantifier phrase is lowered onto the empty subject
HP in S^* In the derivation of (6), the only other rule of importance
is feature copying, which marks the second empty HP i* ^sculine] and
£- plural]. In the derivation of (7), feature copying is followed
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by quantifier postposition* which moves the quantifier chacun into
the VP. In the derivation of (8)* quantifier postposition applies
first* Once it has applied, the subject NP is £+ plural]. It is
this feature, therefore, that is copied onto the second empty NP.
We have, then, the following derivations*
(6) lowering, feature copying.
(7) lowering, feature copying, quantifier postposition*
(3) lowering, quantifier postposition, feature copying.
It is clear, I think, that feature copying permits an illuminating
account of the data.
Returning to English, one finds that the situation is slightly
different. Consider the following sentences.
(10) Each of them will have his chauffeur.
(tl) They will each have his chauffeur.
(12) They will each have their chauffeur.
(10) and (12) are ambiguous, with the pronouns having anaphoric and
non-anaphoric interpretations. (11) is unambiguous, with the pronoun
having only a non-anaphoric interpretation. When the pronouns are
anaphoric, (10) and (12) will derive from something like (13)*
US) s1^ i
^2 ' * "-»
S be true of each of fchera^
x will have x* s chauffeur
In the derivation of (10), lowering applies on 8*, followed by feature
copying. In the derivation of (12), lowering is followed by
quantifier postposition, which is in turn followed by feature
copying. The fact that (11) cannot have an anaphoric interpretation
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suggests that quantifier postposition cannot follow feature copying
in English. It is Interesting to note here that there are dialects
of French in which (7) has no anaphoric interpretation* presumably
for the saw reason. (See Fauconnier* 1971* Chap. 1«* £n. 14.)
Fauconnier suggests that feature copying in French applies not
only to variables but also to adjectives. He considers the following
data.
(14) Chacun des hoor.es est collosal.
(15) Les hotaraes sont chacun collosal.
(16) Leu hotsmes sont chacun collosaux.
All these sentences can be translated as *each of the taen is colossal*.
Fauconnier derives them from (17).
collosal
In all three derivations, an adjective agreement rule applies on 5**
marking the adjective collosal with the index In all three
derivations, lowering applies on S°. In the derivation of (14)*
the only other transformation of importance is feature copying.
This copies the features £+ masculine] and [- plural] onto the
indexed adjective. In the derivation of (15), copying is followed
by quantifier-postposition. In the derivation of (16)* quantifier
postposition applies first* and then copying marks the indexed
adjective [+ masculine] and £+ plural]. Clearly* these derivations
are very similar to those of (6) - (8).
M • '
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In English* number agreement can be handled along similar lines.
He have data like the following.
(18) Each of the boys was intelligent.
(19) * The boys was each intelligent.
(20) The boys were each intelligent.
the only other transformation of consequence is feature copying,
which mark# the indexed verb £- pluralj. In the derivation of (20),
quantifier postposition applies first, and then feature copying
marks the indexed verb £+ pluralj. The fact that quantifier post¬
position cannot apply after feature copying accounts for the im¬
possibility of (19). There are also sentences in which feature
copying applies to both a variable and a verb. Tlx© following
illustrate*
(22) Each of the boys said he was intelligent.
(23) The boys each said they were intelligent.
These will have derivations exactly like those of (13) and (20).
One minor complication must now he considered. It can be
illustrated with (24).
(24) The boys play tennis, and the girls do it too.
I assume that the first clause here derives from something like (25).




In both derivations, the verb jjc is marked with the index x on S ,
and in both, lowering applies on S*. In the derivation of (18),
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(23)
the boyex do S4
:t play tennis
2 1
On S | the verb .3lay 'will be marked with the index sc. Then, on S §




the girls V HP
I I
do it
Here the subject is not a variable but a full NP. It might seem then
that & different account of number agreement is necessary here. In
fact, however, this is not the case. We need only assume that every
HP has an index, whether it binds any variables or not. Then, when
number agreement applies to (26), it will nark do with the index on
the i-iris. Feature copying will then mark it £+■ plural].
I suggested earlier that distributive plurals involve a distri¬
butive operator that is either deleted or realised as each. Notice
now that, while (27) is acceptable, (28) is not.
(27) Each of the boys admires himself.
(28) * The boys admire himself.
Hotice also that (29) is quite acceptable, and can have the same
meaning as (27).
(29) The boys admire themselves.
To account for these phenomena, we need only assume that deletion of
our distributive operator is blocked after feature copying, like
quantifier postposition. (27), then, will involve just feature
copying. (29) will involve deletion followed by feature copying.
And (28) will be ungrammatical because deletion has applied after
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feature copying.
The conception of feature copying developed here ig largely the
same as Fauconnier*®. 1 assume one important difference, however*
Unlike Faucounier, I assume that feature copying, lilce KP~ lowering,
is unconstrained, so that any variable, whatever its position,
receives features. For Fauconnisr, an empty indexed KP can only
receive features if it is either preceded or commanded by its
antecedent. This prevents the derivation of (31) from the structure
underlying (30).
(30) Steve loves his wife.
(31) Ke loves Steve*s wife.
Ac I noted in connection with KP-lowering, I assume that such
derivations are thrown out by output conditions. There is thus no
need to restrict the operation of feature copying*
5.5. Bach-Peters Sentences
In chapter 29 I argued that Bach-Peters sentences provide
crucial evidence against the classical theory's assumption that
anaphoric pronouns derive from copies of their antecedents. I also
suggested that the bound variable theory could handle such sentences
quite naturally. Does this mean that pronouns in Bach-Peters
sentences must represent bound variables, not pronouns of laziness?
Clearly, it need not mean this, since pronouns of laziness are not
derived from copies of their antecedents. I will argue, however,
that there are various reasons for deriving these pronouns from
bound variables.
There is evidence firstly, that these pronouns cannot represent
pronouns of laziness. 1 argued earlier that the pronoun in a sentence
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like (1) cannot be a pronoun of laziness with the definite descrip¬
tion that contains it as its antecedent*
(I) The Eum&nian who said he vste Napoleon *»» arrested*
The reason for this, X suggested, is that, if it were, the definite
description would involve a vicious circle. The description identifies
an individual a$ the conte? tually unique member of the intersection
of two sets* Suppose now that he is a pronoun of laainess referring
to the same individual as the description* In this cast, the des¬
cription will identify an individual by reference to a set which is
itself identified by reference to the individual* Clearly, this is
circular* For this reason, then, pronouns like jje in (1) must
either be non-anaphoric, or represent bound variables*
Consider now the standard Bach-Peters sentence, (2)*
(?) The pilot who shot at it hit the dig that chased him.
Here, we have the following definite descriptions.
(3)e. the pilot vrh© shot at it
b* the mig that chased him
Each refers to the contsxtually unique member of the intersection of
two sets. Suppose no v. that the pronouns are pronouns of laziness,
with ^it referring to the same thing as (3)b», and him referring to
the same individual as (3)a« In this case, (3)a* would identify an
individual by reference to a set identified by reference to (3)b«,
and (3)b« would identify a thing by reference to a set identified
by reference to (3)a. In effect, then, each description vrould
identify an individual or thing by reference to a set identified by
reference to himself or itself* In short, one would have the same
kind of circularity as is involved in (I), if the pronoun is taken
to be a pronoun of laziness with the description as its antecedent*
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This suggests quite strongly, then, that the pronouns in (2) cannot
be pronouns o£ laziness* if they are not pronouns of laziness,
they must be bound variables*
I have argued that pronouns deriving from bound variables must
- be commanded in surface structure by their antecedents* If the
pronouns In Bach-Peters sentences represent bound variables, such
sentences should be ungrammatical if one or other of the pronouns
is not commanded by its antecedent* As Witten (1972) notes, this
appears to be the case* Among the examples he eites are the
following*
(4) * Although the pilot who shot at it was swift, the plane
that chased him was even swifter.
(5) * People who know the man that threatened to kidnap her
admire the woman who laughed at his threat*
In both sentences, the second pronoun is not commanded by its
antecedent* Witten comments that they 'seem reasonable at first,
but make less sense the more you think about them*. I would agree
with him* These sentences seem, then, to support the view that the
that the pronouns in Bach-Peters sentences represent bound variables*
Assuming that the pronouns in Bach-Peters sentences represent
bound variables, we can consider what sort of underlying structure
they should derive from* In a discussion of Bach-Peters sentences,
Keenan (1972*458) points out that, if one NP originates inside
the scope of another, any variable Inside the latter cannot be
bound by the former* In my discussion of the bound variable theory,





Here, neither HP is inside the scope of the other* It is thus quite
possible for a variable inside either of the HP's to be bound by
the other* Given such structures, Bach-Peters sentences can be
handled quite straightforwardly* In many of the underlying struc¬
tures I have proposed the surface object is within the scope of
the surface subject* Clearly, such structures will not do for
Bach-Peters sentences* It seems likely, however, that suitable
underlying structures will always be available* We can look
firstly at (2>* Here, the two HP*s are agent and patient* 1 have
suggested that do can take both an agent and a patient as arguments*
We can, therefore, propose an underlying structure involving do.
Specifically, we can propose something like the following*
<7> S
VP P?









Here, neither HP is inside the scope of the other, and the variables
that are realized as _it and him are both within the scope of their
antecedents* This, then, is quite plausible source for (2)*
Consider now (8)*
(3) The man who was mixing it fell into the cement he was
making.
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Here9 the subject is a patient. 1 have rejected the viev that patients
should always originate as arguments of happen. Thus* the subject
of (3) can originate in its surface position. (3)* then* can derive
from something like (9).
<9) S
into the cement^ S
x make w
Obviously* this is a well formed structure. If we assumed that
patients always originate as arguments of happen. (3) would have to
derive from something like (10).
(10) S
y mix z
This* however* is ill-formed because the variable z is outside the
scope of the NP that is supposed to bind it. It seems* then, that
Bach-Peters sentences provide additional evidence against the view
that patients always originate as arguments of happen.
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1 want to conclude this section by considering the following
sentences, which are closely related to (2).
(11) The pilot who shot at the raig that chased him hit it.
(12) The raig that chased the pilot who shot at it was hit by
him.
McCawley (1970s) assumes that all three sentences derive from the
same underlying structure. Karttunen (1971) rejects this assumption
on semantic grounds. He suggests that (11) and (12) have different
truth conditions, and that (2) is ambiguous between (11) and (12).
Oik (1972) argues that all three sentences have different truth
conditions. In the present framework, the three sentences would
have to have different underlying structures even if their truth
conditions were the sarae. Notice that neither JU in (11) nor him
in (12) is commanded by its antecedent. Neither, then, can represent
a bound variable. They must, therefore, be pronouns of laziness.
The obvious sources for (11) and (12) in the present framework are







v shot at s
In (14), 1 assume my original conception of passives* As I have





Having discussed bound variables at some length, 1 can return
now to pronouns of laziness* I can also return (at last) to non-
anaphoric pronouns* 1 will argue that pronouns of laziness and non-
anaphoric pronouns are the same thing* More precisely, I will argue
that there is a class of pronouns, which X will call Referential
pronouns*, which are ordinary referring expressions, in fact, a kind
of definite description* Like ordinary definite descriptions, they
have an anaphoric and a non-anaphoric use* "in their anaphoric use,
they can be termed pronouns of laziness* My views here owe much to
Lasnik (1976)* Lasnik assumes that all pronouns are of the same
kind. He fails to recognize that many pronouns function as bound
variables. The account he develops, however, is quite similar to




We can begin by taking a look at definite descriptions* 1
suggested earlier that a definite description refers to the con¬
textual ly unique member of some set* A definite description of the
form the + K is used when there is just one member of the set denoted
1* Also somewhat similar to my account of referential pronouns is the
account of pronouns developed in Lyons (1975),
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by N that the hearer will understand the speaker as referring to.
We can include plural definite descriptions in this account* if we
assume with Bartsch (1973) that a plural noun denotes the set of all
subsets of the set denoted by the corresponding singular noun. The
contextually unique member of such a set will* of course* Itself be
a set. Contextual uniqueness may stem from various aspects of back¬
ground belief and communicative context* including preceding discourse.
Some examples will illustrate. If 1 utter (1) at the start of a
conversation* I will be understood as referring to the British Prime
Minister.
(1) The Prime Minister is calling for sacrifice.
If* however* I utter the same sentence in the following discourse* I
will be understood as referring to the Prime Minister of Portugal.
(2) The Portuguese are facing austerity. The Prime Minister
is calling for sacrifice.
Rather similar is the following discourse* where again the speaker
will be understood as referring to the Prime Minister of Portugal.
(3) Portugal has a President and a Prime Minister. The Prime
Minister is calling for sacrifice.
Some linguists would coil the Prime Minister in (3) an anaphoric
definite description and regard a Prime Minister as its antecedent.
Such a description is quite reasonable. It would be wrong, however,
to regard the Prime Minister in (3) as fundamentally different from
the same definite description in (2). In both eases* the referent
2. As in chapter 2* 1 am ignoring definite descriptions containing
mass nouns. 1 think* however* that the formulations of this chapter
could be extended quite naturally to include such definite descriptions.
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of the definite description is determined by the preceding discourse.
Both cases contrast with (1), where the referent of the definite
description is determined by background belief and communicative
context alone.
As a first approximation, we can characterize an anaphoric
definite description as follows.
(4) An anaphoric definite description is a definite description
which refers to an individual, thing, or set which is
either referred to or established as existing by some
other NP, and whose contextual uniqueness stems from
this other NP.
This characterization can be explained quite briefly. Consider
firstly (5).
(5) Mary interviewed the Russian poet. The poet complained
about the weather.
Here, the poet in the second sentence refers to an individual referred
to by another NP, namely the individual referred to by the Russian
poet in the first sentence.^ (5) contrasts with (6).
(6) Mary interviewed a poet. The poet complained about the
weather.
Here, the poet in the second sentence does not refer to an individual
referred to by another NP# a ppet in the first sentence does not
refer to a poet. It does, however, establish the existence of a poet.
3. Sentences like (5) show the inadequacy of the definition of
antecedent proposed in Lakoff (1976), which rules out the possibility
of definite descriptions with definite descriptions as antecedents.
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Here, then, the poet refers to an individual established as existing
by another HP* The final clause of this characterization implies
that the second occurrence of the poet in (7) is not an anaphoric
definite description.
(7) Mary interviewed the poet* The poet complained about the
weather*
Obviously, it refers to the same individual as the first occurrence
of the poet. However, the contextual uniqueness associated with the
former does not stem from the latter* For the latter to refer
successfully, there must already be a contextually unique poet*
Clearly, then, it does not establish a contextually unique poet*
To complement this characterization, we must specify when a
definite description can refer to an individual, thing, or set
referred to or established as existing by another HP, and when the
contextual uniqueness of a definite description can stem from
another NP* Here, we can suggest the following*
(8) Given two HP*s, HP^ and NPjt where RPj is a definite
description of the form Det 4- N^, NP^ can refer to the
individual, thing, or set referred to or established as
existing by NP^ just in case NP^ precedes NPj and refers
to a member of the extension of K.. The contextual
J
uniqueness of HP^ can stem from NP^ just in case KP^
differs in form from NP^»
In (5), NP^^ is the Russian poet and HP^ the poet* Clearly, then,
HPi refers to a member of the extension of Hj, which is the set of
poets* In (6), KP^ is a poet and NP^ the poet. Clearly, ,
NPi establishes the existence of a member of the extension of Hj,
which is again the set of poets* Notice now that the Russian poet
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in (9) cannot refer to the individual referred to by the poet*
(9) Mary interviewed the poet. The Russian poet complained
about the weather.
Here, NP^ is the poet and NP^ the Russian poet. Obviously, NP^ does
not refer to a member of the extension of K.» Clearly, then, RP^
cannot refer to the same individual as
What <3) makes clear is that the reference to a member of sane
set, or the establishment of the existence of a member of some set can
establish a contextually unique member of a larger set but not a
contextually unique member of a smaller set. In (5), the reference
to a contextually unique member of the set of Russian poets estab¬
lishes a contextually unique member of the set of poets. In (9),
however, the reference to a contextualiy unique member of the set
of poets cannot establish a contextually unique member of the set
of Russian poets*
In the examples I have considered so far the fact that NP^
refers to or establishes the existence of a member of the extension
of Rj is a purely linguistic fact. This is the case whenever RP^^
is a definite or indefinite NP of the form Det + N, and the extension
1
of is a subset of the extension of Rj. It is quite possible,
however, for NP.^ to refer to a member of the extension of R^ as a
result of non-linguistic fact. This is the case, for example, in
(10).
(10) Mary interviewed Yevtushenko. The poet complained about
the weather.
Here, NP^ is Yevtushenko and NP^ the poet. It is a matter of non-
linguistic fact that RPi refers to a member of the extension of Nj.
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Contrasting with (10), we have (11).
(11) Mary interviewed Brezhnev, The poet complained about the
weather.
Here, NP4 is Brezhnev and NP^. the poet. It is a matter of non-linguistic
fact that NPi does not refer to a member of the extension of N^»
Nothing in what I have said so far allows for sentences like
(12) from Stockwell, Schachter, and Pertee (1973),
(12) John, Bill, and Mary all set out at noon, but only the
boys got back by dinner time.
Here, the boys refers to the set to which John and Bill jointly refer*
Like (12) is (13).
(13) A Rumanian, a Bulgarian, and a Malayan set out at noon,
but only the Europeans got back by dinner time.
Here, the Europeans refers to the set which a Rumanian and a Bulgarian
jointly establish as existing. In the light of such sentences, it
is necessary to revise our characterization of anaphoric definite
descriptions. We can propose the following.
(14) An anaphoric definite description is a definite descrip¬
tion which refers to an individual, thing, or set which
is either referred to or established as existing by some
other MP or set of NP's, and whose contextual uniqueness
stems from this other NP or set of NPfs.
It is also necessary to revise (8)» We can replace it by (15).
(15) Given an NP, W or a set of NP«s» NPi , NPi , *..NPi ,1 2 n
and another NP, NP^, where NPj is a definite description
of the form Defc + N., NP. can refer to the Individual,
J J
thing, or set referred to or established as existing by
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NP^ or to the set referred to or established as existing
by NP. , NP. s •♦•NP. Just in case NPj or KP. , NP. , •••
H 2 n x h H
NP. precedes NP. and NP, or the conjunction of NP. ,
n J 1 H
NP. , »**NP. refers to or establishes as existing a
i2
member of the extension of R^» The contextual uniqueness
of NP, can stem from NPi or NP^ , NP^ , »*#NPi just in"• 1 2 n
case it differs in form from NP^ or the conjunction of
NP, , NP. , ,**NP. .
H x2 n
The complexity of this formulation emphasizes the varied character of
anaphoric definite, descriptions*
I noted in chapter I that the underlying structure of a sentence
represents its basic meaning and that this must be distinguished V
from the propositions it expresses* It is easy to show that the
anaphoric relations that we are concerned with here are a feature of
the propositions expressed by sentences in specific contexts and
thus that they should not be represented in underlying structure* The
reference of a definite description is a function of the context in
which it is used. It is only in a specific context that one can say
who or what a particular definite description refers to* It follows*
then, that It is only in a specific context that one can say whether
a definite description refers to the individual, thing, or set
referred to or established as existing by some other NP or set of
NP*s» It is possible, however, to specify necessary conditions for
these anaphoric relations independent of context* (15) is an attempt
to do this*
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Anaphoric definite descriptions differ from other definite
descriptions in the source of their contextual uniqueness. It is
fairly clear, however, that this difference is not a fundamental
one. If anaphoric definite descriptions ere not fundamentally
different from other definite descriptions, they should not have a
different source. Nor should a subset of anaphoric definite des¬
criptions have a different source. A number of linguists, e.g.
Kempson (1975), have suggested that an anaphoric definite descrip¬
tion with an indefinite antecedent, should derive from a copy of its
antecedent through a rule of definitisation. On this approach,
the boy in (16) would derive from a boy.
(16) Someone called a boy to the telephone, while the boy was
talking to a pretty girl.
Clearly, this approach treats a subset of definite descriptions as a
special category. Since this subset is not fundamentally different
from other definite descriptions, it should not be treated in this
way. For this reason, then, this approach must be rejected.
There are other reasons for rejecting this approach. Firstly,
definitiration is in a clear sense superfluous. Since definite
descriptions can be introduced in underlying structure, all the
sentences that involve the rule will still be generated without it.
If the rule can be dropped without loss, Occam's razor dictates
that it should be dropped. Secondly, this approach is unacceptable
for semantic reasons. In deriving definite NP*s from indefinite
)
\
NP*s, it derives referring expressions from non-referring expressions.
But, if underlying structure is logical structure, a referring
expression cannot be represented in underlying structure as a non-
referring expression. It is fairly clear, then, that there is no
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place for definitisation in the present framework.
6.2. Referential Pronouns
I can now turn to what I am calling referential pronouns* As I
have said, these are pronouns which are ordinary referring expressions#
in fact a kind of definite description.
The definiteness of ordinary pronouns is demonstrated quite
clearly in Postal (1966). We know# then, that he# she, it, and they
involve some sort of contextual uniqueness when they are not bound
variables. We know that he is a masculine pronoun. It seems plausible,
then, to suggest that he refers to the contextually unique male
when it is not a bound variable. Similarly, we can suggest that she
refers to the contextually unique female, JLt to the contextually
unique thing, and they to the contextually unique set when they are
not bound Variables. It seems plausible, then, to suggest that
referential pronouns are a special kind of definite description.
As with ordinary definite descriptions, the contextual unique¬
ness required by referential pronouns may stem from various aspects
of background belief and communicative context. However, the fact
that referential pronouns involve particularly large sets means that
the necessary contextual uniqueness is less easily established than
it is with typical definite descriptions. While X can assert that
the British Prime Minister is calling for sacrifice by uttering (I),
I cannot do so by uttering (2), unless certain special conditions
obtain.
(1) The Prime Minister is calling for sacrifice.
(2) He is calling for sacrifice.
Such contrasts, however, do not indicate any fundamental difference
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between referential pronouns and ordinary definite descriptions*
There are examples like (2), where special conditions are not
necessary* Laanik (1976) gives the following example*
As I sit here in my office in early January, 1974, 1 would
not regard it as unusual if someone I have never met were to
come in and announce, 'He resigned*# Here the knowledge
aasined by the speaker to be shared by me is so minimal
that the possible male human beings he could have in mind
form a very limited class* I would immediately assume
he meant Richard Nixon*
There are also examples like (1), where special conditions are
required* If 1 utter (3), for example, it will not be clear who
I am referring to unless special conditions obtain.
(3) The minister is calling for sacrifice.
Thus, referential pronouns are not fundamentally different from
ordinary definite descriptions*
There are, however, certain differences between referential
pronouns and ordinary definite descriptions* An obvious difference
is that referential pronouns consist of single morphemes, rather
than the definite article and a noun. A more important difference
is that they permit paralinguistic indication of intended reference.
Thus, a speaker of (4) can use a gesture to indicate who he is
referring to, but a speaker of (5) cannot do this*
(4) Re is a Pabloits.
<5) The man is a Pabloite.
Notice, however, that a gesture is possible with (6)*
(6) That man is a Pabloite*
Here, the definite description has a demonstrative instead of an
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ordinary definite article* The obvious conclusion, then, is that
referential pronouns are not simply definite, but demonstrative as
veil* Z will note some further differences between referential
pronouns and ordinary definite descriptions shortly*
If referential pronouns are a kind of definite description,
they will have an anaphoric use like ordinary definite descriptions*
It is natural, then, to suggest that pronouns of laziness are
referential pronouns used anaphorically* in other words, it is
natural to characterize a pronoun of laziness as follows*
(7) A pronoun of laziness is a referential pronoun which
refers to an individual, thing, or set which is either
referred to or established as existing by some other HP
or set of HP*s, and whose contextual uniqueness stems
from this other HP or set of HP's*
This, of course, is very similar to our characterization of anaphoric
definite descriptions* There are, however, certain differences
between pronouns of laziness and ordinary anaphoric definite
descriptions*
One difference is that pronouns of laziness can precede their
antecedents* It seems that referential pronouns can anticipate the
establishment of the necessary contextual uniqueness. Consider
the following*
(8) When he arrived, Sara was out of breath*
(9) In front of him, Jim saw a gorilla*
(10) Either he eats his supper or Sam goes to bed*
(11) Hot only did she insult me, but Ruth accused me of
insulting her*
In (8) and (9), the pronouns are commanded by their antecedents.
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Presumably, then, they can represent bound variables* In <10) and
(11), however, the pronouns arc not cosaaanded by their antecedents.
Xt is fairly clear, then, that they must represent pronouns of lazi¬
ness. Presumably, the pronouns in (8) and (9) can also.**
A second difference is that pronouns of laziness, unlike ordinary
anaphoric definite descriptions, can be comaanded by their
antecedents. (12) illustrates.
rhe 1
(12) The Russian poet said >was angry.
I* the poet J
Such contrasts show, incidentally, that (6.1.15) is not wholly
adequate.
In spite of these differences, pronouns of laziness and ordinary
anaphoric definite descriptions have broadly similar distributions.
Notice, for example, the following parallels.
• .... - . . ( i: ..... . i . \ • , • • • . • * • •' >•
The professor
(13) Sam met the professor ©f anthropology,
boring*
He
f The professor ~J
(1A) Sam met a professor. ~j [ was boring.
In (13), we could repeat the antecedent, while, In (1A), we could use
the more complex definite description the professor that Sam met.
Such facts provide the basis for Geach*8 definitions of pronouns of
laziness.
A. Wittea (1972) assumes that only deep structure pronouns, i.e.
bound variables, can precede their antecedents. He fails to notice
the existence of sentences like (10) and (11), which show this
position to be untenable.
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We must now specify when a referential pronoun can refer to an
individual, thing, or set referred to or established as existing
by some other NP or set of NP*s, and when the contextual uniqueness
of a referential pronoun can stem from another NP or set of N?*s«
We can suggest something like the following.
(15) Given an NP, NP,, or a set of NP»s» NP, , NP, , •••NP, ,1 h x2 n
and a referential pronoun, RP^, RP^ can refer to the
individual, thing, or set referred to or established
as existing by NP^ or to the set referred to or
established as existing by NP, , NP, , ...NP, just in
Xl 2 n
case RPj does not both precede and command NPi or
NP, , NP, , •••NP, and NP, or the conjunction of
X1 2 n 1
NP. , NP. , •••NP. refers to or establishes as existing
X1 2 n
a member of the set associated with RP^. The contextual
uniqueness of RP, can stem from NP, or NP, , NP, , •••NP,J ll *2 n
just in case it differs in form from NPt or the conjunction
of NP, , NP, , .•.NP, .
X1 2 n
Obviously, this is quite similar to (6.1*15)*^
Both Fartee (1975a) and Witten (1972) assume that certain
pronouns that 1 regard as pronouns of laziness are derived through
a rule of pronominalization. Witten does not actually use the term
5. (15) is Inadequate in a number of ways, as the kinds of data
discussed in Lakoff (1976) indicate. Nevertheless, it is adequate
for a wide range of cases*
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pronoun of laziness* However* he distinguishes a class of
•classical pronouns1* which correspond to pronouns of laziness
with definite antecedents* These result from pronominalization.
He also has a class of *definition deletion pronouns** which
correspond to pronouns of laziness with indefinite antecedents.
These have a different derivation which 1 will discuss later. Partee
does use the term pronoun of laziness. She apparently regards all
pronouns of laziness as the result of pronominalization. She assumes*
however* following a suggestion of Parsons** that only pronouns
with definite antecedents can represent pronouns of laziness.
Thus* her rule has essentially the same domain as Witten* s«
Partee has no real arguments for her position. Witten*s main
argument centres on the generalization that every environment that
excludes »non-pronorainalization* also excludes classical pronouns.
Xn my terns* this means that wherever the second occurrence of a
definite description is impossible* so* too* is a pronoun of
laziness. Witten*s suggestion is that this generalization is
explained if pronouns of la1 ncos with definite antecedents derive
from copies of their antecedents*
Witten*s generalization can be illustrated fairly briefly.
Consider firstly the contrast between (16) and (17).
(16) The Minister hates his portrait* and so does the Under
Secretary.
(17) The Minister hates the Minister's portrait* and so does
the Under Secretary.
(16) is ambiguous, meaning either that the Under Secretary hates
the Minister's portrait or that he hates his own. (17) is unambiguous*
having only the former reading. On the first reading of (16)*
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the pronoun is a pronoun of laziness. On the second, it represents
a bound variable. We can say, then, that a sloppy identity reading
is impossible in (16), if the pronoun is a pronoun of laziness,
while a sloppy identity reading is quite impossible in (17), where
we have not a pronoun but the second occurrence of a definite
description* Consider also the contrast between (13) and (19).
(18) Only the Minister hates his portrait.
(19) Only the Minister hates the Minister*s portrait#
(18) is ambiguous, meaning either that no one else hates the Minister**
portrait or that no one else hates his own portrait# (19) is
unambiguous, having only the former reading. On the first reading
of (18), the pronoun is a pronoun of laziness. On the second, it
represents a bound variable. Thus, the second reading of (18) is
impossible, if the pronoun is a pronoun of laziness, and this reading
is impossible in (19), where we have the second occurrence of a
definite description.
Do facts like these motivate a rule of pronominalization? I
think it should be clear that they do not# 1 have argued that sloppy
identity involves constituents containing bound variables# Naturally,
then, it is not possible, if, instead of a bound variable, one has
either a pronoun of laziness or an ordinary definite description.
Similarly, X have argued that the second reading of (18) stems from
the presence of a bound variable. Naturally, again, then, this
reading is not possible if one has a pronoun of laziness or an ordinary
definite description. There is, then, nothing in these facts to
motivate a rule of pronominalization.
There are a number of arguments against analyses like Partee*g
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and Witfcen's. Firstly, it is fairly clear that pronouns of laziness
are not fundamentally different fro® other referential pronouns.
If they are not fundamentally different, they should not have a
different source. Clearly, in these analyses, certain pronouns of
laziness do have a different source from other referential pronouns.
For this reason, then, the analyses must be rejected.
A second argument against these analyses is that pronorainalization
is superfluous. Since referential pronouns can be introduced in
underlying structure, sentences like (20) will still be generated
if the rule is dropped.
(20) Roberta spoke to the policeman, but he told her to go away*
If the rule can be dropped without loss, it should be dropped.
A third argument against these analyses is that they treat
pronouns of laziness quite differently from ordinary anaphoric
definite descriptions. But they are not fundamentally different
from ordinary anaphoric definite descriptions. Consider firstly
a simple discourse involving a pronoun of laziness.
(21) Jim read the article quickly. It didn't say anything new.
Here, the reference in the first sentence to a member of the set of
articles establishes a contextually unique member of the much larger
set of things in the second sentence. Exactly the same situation
arises in discourses involving ordinary anaphoric definite
descriptions. Consider the following.
(22) Sam was talking to the girl from Athens. The girl was
shouting.
Here, the reference in the first sentence to a member of the set of
girls from Athens establishes a contextually unique member of the
rather larger set of girls. Thus, the same anaphoric relation is
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involved in both (21) and (22). Given this, jit and the girl should
have the same kind of derivation. Thus, if _Lt derives through
pronominalization from a copy of its antecedent, so should the girl*
It is doubtful whether anyone would contemplate such an analysis.
6.3. Pronouns of Laziness with Indefinite Antecedents
I want now to say something more about pronouns of laziness with
indefinite antecedents. I have, assumed that pronouns in sentences
like (1) are pronouns of laziness.
(1) A man explored the Amazon, and he caught typhoid*
Such pronouns appear to be referential pronouns used anaphoricaliy*
Furthermore, given the corraand constraint, they cannot represent
bound variables. For the same reasons, I assume that pronouns in
sentences like (2) are pronouns of laziness.
(2) The woman who lost a diamond ring later found it.
Both these pronouns appear to be pronouns of laziness on Geach*s (1972)
definition. They can be regarded as used in lieu of repetitious
expressions. Geach, however, is generally cautious about analyzing
pronouns with indefinite antecedents as pronouns of laziness.
Furthermore, in a number of places, he explicitly denies that such
pronouns are pronouns of laziness. 1 want, then, to look at his
arguments.
Geach (1962 S.76) seeks to show that he in (3) cannot be a
referring expression, and hence that it cannot be a pronoun of
laziness*
(3) Just one man broke the bank at Monte Carlo, and he has
recently died a pauper*
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He bases his argument on the general principle that* if a tern in
a proposition has reference* there must be some way to specify
its reference regardless of the truth value of the proposition* If
we look at the first clause of (3)* if is clear that it is only if
this clause is true that there is a man who broke the bank at Monte
Carlo* the principle implies* then, that one man is not a referring
expression* In the second clause* the situation is different* he
here refers to the man who broke the bank at Monte Carlo regardless
of whether the clause is true or false* It seems* then* that he
is a referring expression. Of course* if the first clause of (3)
is false* he will lack a reference* Xt seems to be this that leads
Geach to deny that he is a referring expression. This fact does
not support Geach*s conclusion* however* The status of he in (3)
is just like that of the man who broke the bank at Monte Carlo in
(4).
(4) The man who broke the bank at Monte Carlo has recently died
a pauper*
If the first clause of (3) is false* the man who broke the bank at
Monte Carlo in (4) will have no reference* Surely* though* Geaeh would
not claim, that the term is not a referring expression in this
situation. This would involve making the question of whether or not
some term is a referring expression dependent on extralinguistic
fact. Geach would presumably not be prepared to do this* This*
however* is what his argument seems to imply* X conclude* then,
that this argument provides no reason for denying that pronouns in
sentences like (1) are pronouns of laziness.
Geach <1972$liO-lll) tries to show that he in (5) cannot be a
referring expression.
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(5) A Cambridge philosopher smoked a pipe and he drank a lot o£
whisky.
He considers a situation where two Cambridge philosophers, X and Y,
both smoked pipes, and X drank a lot of whisky, whereas Y drank
none at all* In this situation, he suggests, (5) is unambiguously
true, just as (6) is*
(6) A Cambridge philosopher smoked a pipe and drank a lot o£
whisky*
He suggests that this would not be the case, i£ (5) were a conjunctive
proposition, and he andordinary referring expression* In this
situation, he suggests, (5) would not be unambiguously true* It
would be true if he referred to X, and false if he referred to Y«
Therefore, he concludes, (5) is not a conjunctive proposition, and
he is not a referring expression* Is this argument sound? I think
it is not* I would dispute Geach's claim that (5) is unambiguously
true in the situation he describes* I would suggest that the first
clause of (5) is effectively false in this situation, since the
hearer is entitled, on the basis of Grice* s maxims, to assume that
only one Cambridge philosopher smoked a pipe* As in (3), if the
first clause is false, he will fail to refer* Again, though, this
does not mean that it Is not a referring expression* 1 think, then,
that the argument collapses.6
6* Witten (1972) recognizes the difference between sentences like (5)
and sentences like (6), when he points out that (ii) is not equivalent
to (i), since, unlike (1), it would be appropriate if many Spaniards
entered and exaetly one ordered coffee*
(i) A Spaniard entered and he ordered coffee*
(ii) There is a Spaniard with the property that he entered and
ordered coffee*
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Geach (1972*118-119) develops 6 similar argument in connection
with (7).
(7) Socrates owned a dog and it bit Socrates*
He wants to reject the view that this is a conjunctive proposition
with jx a referring expression* He suggests that, if it were* (3)
would be a contradictory of (7)*
(8) Socrates did not own a dog, or else* Socrates owned a dog
and it did not bite Socrates*
He claims that (3) is not, in fact, a contradictory of (7), since
both can be true. His view presumably is that the second disjunct
of (8) can be true at the same time as (7) is true* He must, then,
be thinking of a situation in which Socrates had two dogs, one of
which bit him and one of which did not* But, in this situation,
the first clause of (7) is effectively false, since the hearer is
entitled to assume that Socrates had only one dog* I think, then, that
(7) and (3) are contradictories, and, therefore, that the view that
(7) is a conjunctive proposition with Jx a referring expression is
a sound one*
Geach also tries to show (1972*99 - 101) that JX in (9) is not a
pronoun of laziness*
(9) The only man who ever stole a book from Snead made a lot
of money by selling it*
His argument is based on a comparison between (9) and (10).
(10) The woman whom every true Englishman most reveres is his
mother*
Here, the pronoun must represent a bound variable* The sentence is an
exception to the command constraint of the kind discussed earlier* It
can be paraphrased as (11)*
179
(11) It is true of every true Englishman that the woman he
most reveres is his mother.
What does this show about (9)? On the most obvious reading of (9)t
the scope of a book is limited to the relative clause. Does it have
a reading in which the pronoun represents a bound variable and the
scope of a book includes the whole clause? I would suggest that it
does not. Notice that (12) is ungranraatieal.
(12) * The man Who stole every book from Snead made a lot of
money by selling it.
This suggests that sentences like (9) cannot be exceptions to the
command constraint. But, even if they could, this would not alter
the fact that the scope of a book is limited to the relative clause
on the most obvious reading of (9). On this reading, then, the
pronoun cannot represent a bound variable. Therefore, it must be
a pronoun of laziness*
Having considered Geach*s arguments, I can now turn to Witten* s
account of pronouns of laziness with indefinite antecedents. As I
noted earlier, Witten distinguishes a class of definition deletion
pronouns which correspond to pronouns of laziness with indefinite
antecedents, such as the pronouns in (1) and (2)* Witten assumes
that such pronouns ere derived transformationally from repetitious
expressions. Specifically, he would derive jie in (1) from the one
who explored the Amazon. and it in (2) from the tiling that she lost.
To these structures, a rule of definition deletion applies, deleting
the relative clauses, the one and the thint; are then realized as
he and jLt. Witten suggests that this rule is also involved in the
derivation of anaphoric definite descriptions with indefinite
antecedents. Thus, he would derive the wolf in (14) from the wolf
that she spotted.
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(14) Mary spotted a wolf, and the wolf bit her*
The arguments developed earlier against pronominalization are
equally applicable here* Deriving pronouns of laziness with indefinite
antecedents through definition deletion involves treating their,
quite differently from other referential pronouns* Since they are
net fundamentally different, such an approach is untenable* Further¬
more, definition deletion, like pronominalization, is superfluous*
Since referential pronouns can be introduced in underlying structure,
sentences like (1) and (2) will still be generated, if the rule is
dropped.
A further argument against definition deletion is provided by
sentences in which the obvious source for the pronoun is unnatural*
Consider the following*
(15) Once upon a time, there was a young prince. He lived with
his aged aunt.
The source for he ought to be something like the one that there was.
Unlike the other sources assumed by Witten, however, this is an
extremely odd expression. There is no explanation for this oddness
in Wittenfs approach, In the present framework, however, it
receives a natural explanation* I suggested earlier that the
general naturalness of expressions involving relative clauses as
paraphrases for pronouns of laziness with indefinite antecedents
is a result of the kind of structure in which indefinite HP's
originate* the nap, who explored the Amazon is a natural paraphrase
for he in (1), because the first clause of (I) can derive from
(16),
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x explored the Amazon
Obviously* this establishes a contextually unique member of the set
of men who explored the Amazon* which is what is necessary for the
expression the man who explored the Amazon to be used. The first





This establishes a contextually unique member of the set of princes*
not a contextually unique member of the set of princes that there
was. Naturally* then* it is the prince» not the prince that there was,
that is the natural substitute for he in (15).
6.4. A Note on Existence
I have suggested that a definite description of the form the +
N refers to the contextually unique member of the set denoted by N.
It follows* of course* that it presupposes the existence of a member
of this set. 1 have also suggested that an indefinite NF of the form
a N establishes the existence of a member of the set denoted by N.
«■»
What I want to consider now is just what is meant by existence in
these formulations.
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What becomes clear as soon as one looks beyond the simplest
sentences is that existence need not be real world existence* Instead,
it can be various kinds of hypothetical and imaginary existence.
Consider, for example, (1).
(1) Sam wants to catch a fish and he wants to eat the fish for
supper.
This is ambiguous. On one reading, a fish establishes the existence
of a fish in the real world. On the other reading, it only establishes
the existence of a fish in the world of Sam*s wants. In each case,
the fish presupposes the same existence. Broadly similar are the
following.
(2) Sue must buy a car and she must drive the car to Naples.
(3) Tony will buy a picture and he will put the picture on
his wall.
Like (1), both are ambiguous, and can be understood as involving either
real world or hypothetical existence.
1 have argued that referential pronouns are a kind of definite
description. This suggests that they should be able to presuppose
various kinds of hypothetical and imaginary existence. This is, of
course, the case* (4) - (6) are ambiguous in Just the same way as
<1) - (3).
(4) Sam wants to catch a fish and he wants to eat it for supper.
(5) Sue must buy a car and she must drive it to Naples.
(6) Tony will buy a picture and he will put it on his wall.
Obviously, this supports the view that referential pronouns are a
kind of definite description.
Notice now that (7), unlike (1), is unambiguous.
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(7) Sam wants to catch a fish* You can see the fish from here*
This can only be understood as involving real world existence. The
reason is fairly simple* the fish is in a position where it can
only be understood as presupposing real world existence* a fish.
then, must be understood as establishing real world existence. As
we expect, (8) is unambiguous in just the same way*
(3) Sam wants to catch a fish. You can see it from here.
Again, this supports the view that referential pronouns are a kind
of definite description.
These phenomena have been discussed by a number of linguists,
most notably Karttunen (1976), Jackendoff (1972), and Wasow (1972).
Of these, only Karttunen notes that pronouns and definite descrip¬
tions behave in the same way here. Karttunen suggests that it is
possible to refer to an individual that does not exist as long as
the discourse continues in the proper mode. This, of course, raises
the question of what it is for the discourse to continue in the
proper mode. Considering this question, Jackendoff suggests that
the elements that produce ambiguities of specificity fall into two
categories. With one type, an indefinite NP in its scope can only
act as antecedent for a pronoun that is also in its scope. With the
other type, an indefinite HP in its scope can act as antecedent for a
pronoun in its scope and for a pronoun in the scope of another
element of the same kind. The former is said to involve a 1 strong
coreference condition* and the latter a *weak coreference condition*.
This distinction is motivated by contrasts like that between (9) and
(10), considered in chapter 2.
(9) Leon wants to catch a fish and I want to cook it.
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<10) John will bring a girl to the party and she will be
beautiful*
As we have seen, a fish in (9) must be specific, whereas a ftiri in
(10) can be specific or non-specific* In (9), then, a fish cannot be
within the scope of want* but, in (10), a airl can be within the
scope of will. Jackendoff concludes, then, that want is subject to
a strong coreference condition and will to a weak coreference
condition* Jackendoff*s proposal faces an obvious problem in
sentences like (4)* As we have seen, (4) is ambiguous* a fish can
be specific or non-specific* Clearly, then, want is not always
subject to a strong coreference condition* A more general weakness,
as Wasow notes, is that it provides no explanation for the distri¬
bution of the coreference conditions* Their distribution is simply
treated as a brute fact*
Wasow suggests that the key to these phenomena is what he calls
the 'Novelty Constraint*• He formulates this as follows*
(11) An anaphor may not introduce any presuppositions not
associated with its antecedent*
1 think that this points in the right direction* It is unclear in a
number of respects, however* Firstly, it does not make it clear that
pronouns and definite descriptions behave in the same way. Secondly,
it does not specify that it is presuppositions of existence that are
at issue* Finally, it does not make it clear that indefinite NP*s
do not presuppose existence but establish it* X want, then, to
reformulate the constraint as follows*
(12) The existence presupposed by an anaphoric definite
description must be of the same kind as that presupposed
or established by its antecedent*
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Anaphoric definite descriptions include pronouns of laziness, of
course. The constraint rectifies a major inadequacy in (6*1.15) and
(6*2*15)» which ignore the kinds of existence associated with HP's*
The way the constraint works can be illustrated fairly briefly.
Consider firstly (1). Here, if both a fish and the fish are outside
the scope of want, the former establishes existence in the real
world and the latter presupposes the same existence. Obviously,
then, the former can be antecedent of the latter. If, on the other
hand, both are inside the scope of want, both involve existence in
the world of Sam's wants. Again, then, a fish can be antecedent of
the fish. (2) - (6) and (10) are broadly similar. (7) - (9) are
rather different. In (7), as we have seen, the fish can only pre¬
suppose existence in the real world* a fish, therefore, must establish
existence in the real world, if it is to be understood as antecedent
°* the fish. (8), of course, is just like (7). In (9), if a fish
and the fish are in the scope of want, the former establishes existence
in the world of Leon's wants, while the latter presupposes existence
in the world of my wants. Obviously, then, the former cannot be
antecedent of the latter. It follows that both must be outside the
scope of want.
Some examples are rather more complex. Consider, for example,
the following from Karttunen.
(13) Mary wants to marry a rich man* He must be a banker.
This is ambiguous, with a rich man being specific or non-specific.
The first sentence refers to the world of Mary's wants* The second
sentence does not do this* On the face of it, then, it is rather
odd that a rich man can be antecedent of he when it is in the scope
of want* We can, however, understand the second sentence as
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referring to the world as it must be for Mary, This is equivalent to
the world of Mary's wants. Consider also Geach's example, (14).
(14) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Hob
wonders whether she killed Cob's sow.
As we have seen, a witch can be specific or non-specific. The first
sentence refers to the world of Hob's thoughts. The second sentence,
however, refers to the world of Nob's thoughts. It is odd, then,
that a witch can be antecedent of she when it is in the scope of
think. The crucial fact, 1 suspect, is that the interpretation of
(14) in which a witch is outside the scope of think is rather un¬
natural because witches are generally assumed not to exist. It is
natural, then, to prefer an interpretation in which a witch is inside
the scope of think. To understand (14) in this way, one must inter¬
pret a witch as establishing the existence of a witch in both Hob's
thoughts and Nob's thoughts. It seems, then, that this is what one
does.
Notice now that the constraint explains why an Italian cannot
be antecedent of him in (15).
(15) The suggestion that an Italian is a spy annoys him.
an Italian is inside a complex NP. Given the complex HP constraint,
it must have originated in this position. For this reason, it
cannot establish existence in the real world, he presupposes
existence in the real world. Obviously, then, an Italian cannot be
its antecedent. The constraint cannot, however, explain why
a Spaniard cannot be antecedent of him in (16).
(16) The fact that a Spaniard has pneumonia worries him.
a Spaniard must have originated inside the complement of the fact.
This complement is presupposed to be true. Clearly, then, the Spaniard
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must exist* It is not at all clear, then, why him cannot refer to
him. Presumably, some other constraint is involved here.7
I want now to consider when exactly an indefinite NP establishes
the existence of an individual in the real world* Notice firstly
that (17) establishes the existence of a fish in the real world*
(17) Jim caught a fish.
(17) is a simple positive declarative sentence. We can suggest, then,
that en indefinite NP in a simple positive declarative sentence
establishes the existence of an individual in the real world. Notice
next that (13) establishes the existence of a fish in the real
world*
(13) Jim managed to catch a fish.
(13) implies (17)* It seems, then, that an indefinite NP in a sentence
which implies a simple positive declarative containing that NP
establishes the existence of an individual in the real world.
Consider now (19)*
(19) Jim regretted that he caught a fish.
Clearly, we can go on to refer to the fish. It looks, then, as if
(19) establishes the existence of a fish. Notice, however, that
(19) presupposes rather than implies (17)* The fact that it pre¬
supposes (17) means that it can only be used when the t£*afch of
7* Rather like (16), are (i) and (ii) from chapter 2.
(i) That John saw a girl annoyed her.
(ii) That some demonstrators were arrested worried them.
Clearly, both the girl and the demonstrators must exist* It is not
clear, then, why the pronouns cannot refer to them.
188
(17) hes been established* This in turn means that it can only be
used when the existence of a fish has been established* Strictly
speaking^ then, (19) does not establish the existence of a fish* We
can conclude, then, that an indefinite NP establishes the existence
of an individual in the real world just in case it is either in a
simple positive declarative sentence or in a sentence which implies
a simple positive declarative sentence containing it*
1 noted earlier that an ordinary pronoun corraanded by an
indefinite antecedent can only represent a bound variable* 1 can now
suggest an explanation for this* 1 have said that (17) and (18)
establish the existence of a fish. It is, however, only when one of
them has been said and gone unchallenged that the existence of a
fish is established. Consider now (20).
(20) An Italian shot his wife*
(20) establishes the existence of an Italian. It is, however, only
when (20) has been said and gone unchallenged that the existence of
an Italian is established. It follows that, when his is used, the
existence of an Italian is not established. For this reason, then,
his cannot be a referential pronoun referring to the Italian. (21),
of course, is different.
(21) The Italian shot his wife*
Here, the existence of an Italian must have been established (or be
obvious from the context). Naturally, then, his can be a referential
pronoun referring to this Italian.
So far, I have said nothing about sentences like (22) and (23),
which contain a single ambiguity producing element.
(22) Jim x^ants to catch a fish and eat it for supper*
(23) Jim will cateh a fish and eat it for supper.
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In both sentences* the pronoun ic commanded by an indefinite antecedent*
This suggests* then* that it must be a bound variable. Both sentences
are ambiguous with a fish being either specific or non-specific.
For (22)* when a fish is specific* we can suggest something like (24)
as its source.
(24) S
a fish S be there
y catch x and eat
x for supper
When a fish is non-specific* we can suggest something like (25) as a
source.
(25) S
a fishy S be there
x catch y and eat
y for supper
So far things are simple enough. Notice* however* that we also get
sentences like (26) and (27).
(26) Jim wants to catch a fish and eat the fish for supper.
(27) Jim will catch a fish and eat the fish for supper.
Here* instead of the pronouns of (22) and (23)* we have anaphoric
definite descriptions. This suggests that the pronouns in (22) and
(23) can be pronouns of laziness* even though they are commanded by
indefinite antecedents. There is a way* however* of avoiding this




(26) and (27) are idiomatic realizations of bound variables and not
genuine definite descriptions. Support for this approach is provided
by sentences like the following from Geach (1972).
(28) One woman whom every tribesman ada ires is that tribesman* s
wife.
It is quite impossible to interpret that tribesman here as an ordinary
definite description. The obvious suggestion, then, is that it
represents a bound variable. If this represents a bound variable,
so, too, can the fish in (26) and (27). If it represents a bound
variable, there is no need to assume that jit in (22) and (23) can
represent a pronoun of laziness*
6.5. The Classical Theory Revisited
It is appropriate now to return briefly to the classical theory
of pronouns. 1 want to suggest that the conception of pronouns of
laziness developed here preserves what is valid in the classical
theory*
It will be recalled that I interpreted the classical theory as
making two distinct claims as follows#
(A) Pronouns are coreferential with their antecedents.
(3) Pronouns have the same underlying form as their antecedents.
My position is that claim (A) is true of a subset of pronouns of
8
laziness, but that claim (B) is not true of any pronouns.
8, I will qualify this statement somewhat in 8e2.
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We can consider claim (A) first* 1 assume that bound variables
are not referring expressions. Clearly, then, the claim is not true
of pronouns that represent bound variables. Hie claim is true,
however, of a subset of pronouns of laziness* 1 have argued that
pronouns of laziness are referential pronouns used anaphorically.
As such, of course, they are referring expressions* X have also
argued, however, that pronouns of laziness and ordinary anaphoric
definite descriptions are of two kinds. They can refer to an
individual, tiling, or set referred to by another NP, or they can
refer to an individual, thing, or set established as existing by
another NP. The former is the case where the antecedent is definite*
The latter is the case where the antecedent is indefinite. It is
clear, then, that claim (A) is true of pronouns of laziness with
definite antecedents, but not of pronouns of laziness with
indefinite antecedents.
VJhat now of claim (B)? Obvioucly, it is not true of pronouns
that represent bound variables. I have argued in this chapter against
the view that certain pronouns of laziness derive from copies of
their antecedents. It seems, then, that claim (£) is not true of
any pronouns.
It should be clear that the relation of the present theory to
the classical theory is rather different from its relation to the
bound variable theory. I have argued that a subset of pronouns
have very much the character that the bound variable theory takes
all pronouns to have* There is not in the same way a subset of
pronouns with the character that the classical theory takes pronouns
to have. Partee and Witten assume that there is a subset of pronouns
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with this character. X reject their view that claim (Hi) is true of
pronouns of which claim (A) is true. Thus* in the present theory,
there are no pronouns of this kind.
When X first discussed tlx classical theory, X argued that its
two claims are independent in the sense that it is possible to make
one without making the other. While this is true, there is an
interesting relation between the two claims. This is that, within
a framework in which underlying structure is logical structure,
claim (£) is plausible only if one assumes that claim (A) is true.
Lees and Klima (19C3) made claim (£) without making claim (A), but
they did not regard underlying structure as logical structure.
This point can be illustrated fairly briefly.
X noted in chapter 3 that, if one has a sentence containing a
referring expression in a non-opaque environment, it is normally
possible to replace the expression by any other expression with the
saute reference without changing the truth value of the sentence.
Claim (A) implies that a pronoun and its antecedent are referring
expressions with the same reference. If this is so, it should be
possible to replace a pronoun by its antecedent. This is possible
with pronouns of which claim (a) is true. In (1), for example,
although the result is awkward, he can be replaced by Steve.
(1) Steve said he was angry.
With such sentences, then, claim (B) has some plausibility. With
pronouns of which claim (A) is not true, the pronoun cannot be
replaced by the antecedent# Claim (A) is act true, if the antecedent
is not a referring expression. Thus, in (2), he cannot be replaced
by a humaninn.
(2) A Rumanian said he was angry.
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Claim (A) is not true either! if the pronoun is not a referring
expression. In (3), therefore, he cannot be replaced by every
Rumanian.
<3) Every Rumanian said he was angry.
With these sentences, then, because claim (A) is not true, claim (B)
is not at all plausible. In the light of these observations, it is
not surprising that Partee and Witten assume that claim (B) is true
of pronouns of which claim (A) is true.
X want now to suggest that the classical theory involves two
main mistakes. The first mistake is the assumption that claim (A)
is true. As we have seen, it is only if one assumes this that
claim (B) is at all plausible. A second mistake, X would suggest,
is a tacit assumption, perhaps shared by Partee and Witten, that
definite descriptions can have the same reference only if they have
the same meaning. Underlying this, X think, is a failure to recog¬
nize the importance of context for definite descriptions. A cursory
investigation of definite descriptions shows quite clearly that they
are context dependent, in particular that different descriptions can
have the same referent in different contexts. Context here includes
linguistic context. Xn (A), we have two different descriptions with
the same referent.
(4) Mary interviewed the King of Rumania. The King was handsome.
the King here has the same referent as the Kina of Rumania because of
its linguistic context, specifically because it directly follows
the King of Rumania. The same situation obtains in (5), except
that here we have a pronoun of laziness instead of an ordinary
anaphoric definite description.
(5) Mary interviewed the King of Rumania. He was handsome.
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If one does not appreciate the role of context, and particularly of
linguistic context, in the use of definite descriptions* one is
likely to assume that the anaphoric definite description in (4)
and the pronoun of laziness in (5) have not only the same reference
as their antecedents, but also the same meaning. If one assumes
this, one will assume that they have the same underlying structure,
and hence that their derivations involve pronominalization rules.
Summarizing, we can say that the classical theory is correct in
recognizing that many anaphoric pronouns are ordinary referring
expressions. It is wrong, however, in assuming that they ail are.
It is correct also in recognizing that many anaphoric pronouns which
are referring expressions refer to the individual, thing, or set
referred to by their antecedents. It is wrong, however, in thinking
that they all do. I think it is clear that what is correct in the





In this chapter* X will draw together the various elements in
the preceding discussion* and try to clarify the nature of the mixed
theory that 1 have been developing* I will also discuss a number of
additional issues that arise in connection with the theory*
7*1* Some Conclusions
The central contrast in the theory I am advancing is between
bound variables and referential pronouns* Bound variables here are
much like bound variables in standard logic* Referential pronouns
are essentially a specialized kind of definite description. Where
they are used anaphorically* they can be termed pronouns of laziness*
Their anaphoric use* however* is not fundamentally different from
their non-anaphoric use* Any pronoun that is commanded by its ante¬
cedent may represent a bound variable* In many cases* such pronouns
can only represent a bound variable. Pronouns with antecedents
that do not command them can only be pronouns of laziness. The
following examples illustrate the basic possibilities*
(1) Every Russian thinks he is clever*
(2) Sam thinks he is clever.
(3) The man who saw a unicorn chased it*
In (1>* the pronoun can only represent a bound variable* In (2)* it
can represent a bound variable or a pronoun of laziness* In (3)*
the pronoun can only represent a pronoun of laziness*
The fact that both bound variables and pronouns of laziness
are possible in certain environments leads to certain ambiguities*
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Sentences like the following illustrate*
(4) Harriet hates her father, and so does Mary*
(5) Only Harriet hates her father.
These ambiguities provide some of the most obvious evidence for a
mixed theory* They are by no means essential, however* If pronouns
commanded by their antecedents could only represent bound variables,
there would be no such ambiguities* Pronouns, however, would still
fall into two main classes, with one class having the properties of
bound variables, and the other having the properties of definite
descriptions. We can note here that, while Witten and Partee pay
considerable attention to these ambiguities, Geach proposed a mixed
theory without noting their existence.
1 have argued that the present theory preserves what is valid
in the bound variable theory and the classical theory* It might, then,
be seen as a synthesis of the two theories* It would be more accurate,
however, to see it as a synthesis of the bound variable theory and
the theory skfetehed in Lasnik (1976). As we have seen, the relation
of the present theory to the classical theory is different from its
relation to the bound variable theory. A subset of pronouns have the
character that the bound variable theory takes all pronouns to have,
but no pronouns have the character that the classical theory takes
pronouns to have* The present conception of pronouns of laziness
presence what is valid in the classical theory, but, as we have seen,
there is little that is valid. This conception of pronouns of
laziness, in fact, owes more to Lasnik* s theory. As I have remarked,
Lasnik*s account of pronouns is similar to my account of referential
pronouns* We can say, then, that a subset of pronouns have the
character that Lasnik takes all pronouns to have. Thus, the relation
197
of the present theory to Lasnik's theory is similar to its relation
to the bound variable theory* 1 think, then, that it is reasonable
to describe this theory as a synthesis of the bound variable theory
and Lasnik's theory.
X think we can also describe the present theory as a synthesis
of two ways of looking at language. In much twentieth century work
on language, we can discern a conflict between two basic perspectives#
One, which we might term the logician's perspective, concentrates
on sentences conceived as abstract objects with certain truth con¬
ditions and certain syntactic and phonetic properties. The other,
which we might term the perspective of the speech act theorist,
emphasizes situated discourse, and regards the speaker's intentions
and the hearer's expectations as central.* Looking at pronouns
from the logician's perspective, it is natural to assume that they
represent bound variables. From the perspective of the speech act
theorist, it's natural to assume that pronouns are a kind of
definite description. I have argued that some pronouns have the
properties of bound variables, and others the properties of definite
descriptions. We can say, then, that both perspectives are adequate
for certain pronouns, but that neither is adequate for all pronouns.
1# Much the same point is made in Strawson (1969)# He talks of a
conflict between theorists of formal semantics and theorists of
communication intention. Xn the former camp, he puts Chomsky, Frege
and the early Wittgenstein. Xn the latter, he puts Grice, Austin,
and the later Wittgenstein. Xn somewhat similar vein, Morgan (1975b)
contrasts the view of sentences as abstract formal objects existing
independently of speaker, time, and context with the view of sentences
as events carried out by individuals with intentions, purposes and
goals and occurring in time.
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7.2. Some Comparisons
As I have noted in earlier chapters, a number of people have
advocated mixed theories of pronouns. In this section, 1 want to
compare my theory with other mixed theories. X will consider the
work of Geaeh, Witten, Partee, and Cresswell.
When I first considered the possibility of a mixed theory of
pronouns, I did so by reference to the work of Geach <1962, 1972).
Geach does not develop any systematic theory of pronouns. He gives
reasons for making a distinction between bound variables and pronouns
of lasiness, but does not develop any precise characterisation of the
two kinds of pronoun, or specify clearly this distribution. The main
contrast between Geach*s position and my own is that he assumes that
bound variables have a wider distribution and pronouns of lasiness
a narrower distribution than 1 do. As I noted in the last chapter,
he assumes that pronouns like he in (1) and jit in (2) represent
bound variables.
(1) Just one man broke the bank at Monte Carlo, and he has
recently died a pauper.
(2) The only man who ever stole a book from Snead made a lot
of money by selling it,
X argued against this view in the last chapter. X think Geach*s
discussion of these pronouns shows the limitations of the logician's
vie*? of language.
Witten (1972) and Partee (1975a) both develop their views in a
more systematic way than Geach. As should be clear, my theory owes
a considerable amount to their work, especially Witten*s. The main
weakness of their theories is a failure to recognise that pronouns of
laziness and non-anaphoric pronouns are the same kind of pronoun.
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This is the import of the assumption they both make that pronouns of
laziness with definite antecedents are the result of pronominalization,
and of Witten's assumption that pronouns of laziness with indefinite
antecedents derive through a rule of definition deletion. A further
weakness of Partee's theory is her assumption that only pronouns
with definite antecedents can be pronouns of laziness. Presumably,
like Geaeh, she would regard the pronouns in (1) and (2) as bound
variables. We have seen that they roust be pronouns of laziness.
Unlike Geach, Witten, and Partes, Cresswell (1973) pay3 some
attention to non-anaphoric pronouns. As I noted in chapter 2, he
assumes that anaphoric pronouns with antecedents in the same sentence
derive from bound variables, while all other pronouns, anaphoric
and non-anaphoric, represent a kind of referring expression. His
account of non-variable pronouns is broadly similar to the account
of referential pronouns developed here. He does not explicitly
identify them as a kind of definite description, but this is implicit
in his remarks. He. suggests that he, as a non-variable pronoun,
means the person the utterer is talking about, or intends to refer to.
Similarly, he suggests that a definite description, the + N, is used
when there is only one member of the set denoted by N that the speaker
intends to refer to. Cresswell is wrong, I think, in defining
contextual uniqueness in terms of the speaker's intentions, and
not in terms of the hearer's expectations. He is right, however,
in recognizing that the same kind of contextual uniqueness is
involved in non-variable pronouns and definite descriptions,
The main difference between Cressweil's non-variable pronouns and
ray referential pronouns is in their distribution. For Gresswell,
pronouns with antecedents in the same sentence can only represent
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bound variables* They cannot represent non-variable pronouns* In
the present theory, in contrast, pronouns with antecedents in the
same sentence can often represent both bound variables and pronouns
of laziness, l#e* referential pronouns* Cresswell artificially
restricts the role of non-variable pronouns. In fact, he considers
limiting, their role further* As I noted in chapter 2, he talks
about the possibility of developing a paragraph semantics, which
will allow a variable to be bound by an element in an earlier
sentence* He seems to envisage a system in which only non-anaphoric
pronouns do not derive from variables* I think it is clear that
this is a mistaken approach*
7*3. A Bote on Chomsky
Another linguist who has advocated a mixed theory of pronouns is
Chomsky (1975, 1976). Developing the ideas of Laanik <1976), he
makes distinction between free and bound anaphora. The former falls
outside the domain of sentence grammar* The latter falls inside*
The main example of bound anaphora that Chomsky discusses is reciprocal
interpretation* That this is an aspect of sentence grammar is
suggested by the fact that reciprocal forms like each other require
an antecedent in the same sentence* Bote here the impossibility
of (I).
(1) * Some of trie nea left today* Each other will leave
tomorrow*
Contrasting with (1) is (2).
(2) Some of the men left today. The others will leave
tomorrow*
This suggests that the relation between others and its antecedent is
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an instance of free anaphora* Reflexive pronouns have a similar
distribution to reciprocals* They, toe, then, can be regarded as an
example of bound anaphora* Chomsky also suggests (1975s104) that pro¬
nouns which can only have an anaphoric interpretation, such as his
in (3) are examples of bound anaphora*
(3) John lost his way*
In contrast, his in (4) will be an instance of free anaphora, since
it can have either an anaphoric or a non-anaphoric interpretation*
(4) John found his book*
The distinction between free and bound anaphora is a rather vague
one. Clearly, however, it is desirable to establish the relation of
the distinction to the theory developed here* What 1 want to suggest
is that pronouns of laziness are an example of free anaphora, and
bound variables an example of bound anaphora*
Pronouns of laziness, 1 have argued, are simply referential pro¬
nouns used anaphorically* it is fairly clear, 1 think, that the
relation between such a pronoun and its antecedent falls outside the
domain of sentence grammar, on any reasonable interpretation of the
latter term* In contrast, a bound variable must be asymmetrically
commanded by its antecedent in underlying structure, and commanded
by it in surface structure* I can, therefore, see no basis for
regarding bound variables as anything but an integral part of
sentence grammar. 1 am suggesting, then, that, if the terms free
and bound anaphora are applied in anything like the way Chomsky
suggests, pronouns of laziness must be regarded as an example of the
former, and bound variables as an example of the latter* The
importance of this conclusion is that it presents problems for the
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conditions on rules advanced in Chomsky*s recent work#
Chomsky (1973) proposes the specified subject condition and the
tensed S conditions Both relate to structures of the following form#
(5) *»»X»»»[^Z — »«#Y«»#]
The specified subject condition states roughly that no rule nay relate
X and Y in such a structure, where oc lg a cyclic category, and Z is
its subject. The tensed S condition states that no rule may relate
X and Y in such a structure, where cx Is a tensed sentence. Support
for the constraints is provided by sentences like the following.
(6) The candidates expected to see each other on T.V.
(7) * Tie candidates expected Mary to like each other.
(3) The candidates expected each other to win.
(9) * The candidates expected that each other would win,
In (7), but not in (5), the reciprocal each other and its antecedent
are separated by a specified subject. In (9), but not in (3), they
are separated by the boundary of a tensed sentence. Whatever the
source of reciprocals, it appears that the conditions can account
for their distribution* One finds similar data with reflexives.
(10) The candidates expected to gee themselves on T.V#
(11) * The candidates expected Mary to like themselves#
(12) The candidates expected themselves to win.
(13) * The candidates expected that themselves would win.
With ordinary pronouns* however, the situation is rather different.
Consider the following*
(14) The candidates expected Mary to like them,
(15) The candidates expected that they would win.
In (14), the pronoun and its antecedent are separated by a specified
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subject* In (15), they are separated by a teased sentence boundary.
Both sentences, however, are perfectly acceptable. In Chomsky (1973),
this is seen as a problem. Chomsky (1976) suggests, however, that
the conditions are only relevant to bound anaphora. Sentences like
(14) and (15), he assumes, exemplify free anaphora. This, then,
is why they are acceptable.
So far, Chomsky*n line of argument is plausible enough. The
pr« ^trns in (14) find (15) can be pronouns of laziness. Therefore,
they can, as Chorasky* s argument requires, be an example of free
anaphora. Consider, however, the following.
(16) One candidate expected Mary to like him*
(17) One candidate expected that he would win.
X hav® argued that an ordinary pronoun commanded by an indefinite ante¬
cedent can only represent a bound variable. In (16) and (17), then,
the pronouns must be an example of bound anaphora. But, if Chomsky*®
conditions are relevant to bound anaphora, (16) and (17) should be
unacceptable. Thus, the acceptability of (16) and (17) casts serious
doubt on the conditions. Consider also the following.
(18) Every candidate expected Mary to like hiia.
(19) Every candidate expected that he would win.
1 have argued that a singular pronoun with an antecedent containing
every can only represent a bound variable. Here also, then, the
pronouns must be an example of bound anaphora. Thus, (18) and (19)
should be unacceptable. That they are not, then, casts further
doubt on Chomsky's conditions.
While Chomsky's conditions appear plausible in the light of
sentences like (6) - (13), consideration of a wider range of anaphoric
phenomena casts serious doubt on them. Postal (1974a) shows that
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the impression that the condition? can account for the distribution
of reciprocals and reflexives is an illusory one# Thus, the conditions
can draw no comfort at all from anaphoric phenomena# Bach and Horn
2
(1976) develop a sustained critique of Chomsky* c. conditions# The
present observations add some additional weight to their critique.
Thus, while my investigations lead to a clarification of Chomsky's
distinction between free and bound anaphora, they also put an
additional nail in the coffin of his conditions on rules.
7.4. The Anaporn Relation
I will conclude this chapter by saying something about Dougherty's
(1969) 'aaapom relation*. Dougherty claims that the following
relation holds.
(1) The set, of surface structure sentences which contain
a preform, that is understood snaphorically is a. subset of
the set, of surface structure sentences which contain
w
a preform that is not understood anaphorically.
Dougherty discusses the relation as evidence against the classical
theory. It does not seem to me that the relation, if it held,
would provide evidence cgsinst the theory* In any event, there is
evidence that it does not hold. This docs net wean, however, that
Dougherty's claim is not of interest*
But somewhat differently, Dougherty's claim is that every pronoun
can be understood non-nnaphorically, but not every pronoun can be
2. Cho-msky ha? responded to this critique in Chomsky (1977a)« For
a critical assessment of this response, see Horn (1977)*
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understood anaphoricaliy. To refute the claim, we need only find
pronouns which can be understood anaphoricaliy# but not aon-anaphorically.
There are various such pronouns. The following examples from Wasow
(1972) illustrate.
(2) Mary washed herself.
(3) The Preeident lost his head.
(4) The chairman gnashed his teeth.
(5) The losers bed to buy beer for the winners# didn't they*
(6) She is a happy girl, is Sue.
(7) The mm who shot Liberty Valance, he was the bravest of them
all*
(8) He is a very wise man# the Maharishi.
Such sentences show that Dougherty's claim is false. The obvious
question is whether they form a natural class.
In the present framework, the obvious suggestion is that ail
counterexamples to the aaaporn relation involve bound variables*
Obviously# pronouns that can only represent bound variables can only
have an anaphoric interpretation. We know that reflexives can only
represent bound variables* Here# the®, we have a ready explanation
for the fact that (2) is an exception to the anaporn relation. It
seems reasonable to suggest that the idioms in (3) and (4) involve
bound variables. It looks# then, as if we can explain why (3) and
(4) 3re exceptions to the anaporn relation. It also seeras reasonable






x be the bravest
of there all
be true of the roan who
shot Liberty Valance^
(10)
be true of the Maharishi^
x be a very vise man
In (7), the lowered NP is left Chomsky-adjoined to the embedded S*
In (8), it is right Chomsky-adjoined. On this analysis* the pronouns
in (7) and (8) represent bound variables. It looks, then, as if
\
we can explain a further class of counterexamples. It also seems
plausible to suggest that (6) derives from (11) through a rule
that copies an * auxiliary*.
(11) *fb» i« a happy girl, Sue.
If it does, She will represent a bound variable in (6), just as it
does in (7). I think, then, that we can explain why (6) is a
counterexample. Hnforunately, there is no obvious meson to think
that the pronoun in (5) represents s bound variable. It is doubtful,
then, whether we can claim that all counterexamples to the ar.apom
relation involve pronouns representing bound variables.
Wasow suggests that all counterexamples to the anaporn relation
are the result of copying processes. Following HoIke (1971), he
assume® that reflexives are represented in underlying structure
by the element self, which has an empty determiner which is filled
by a copying transformation* He assumes that head and teeth in (3)
and (4) also have empty determiners filled by thin transformation.
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Following Cuilicover (1971), he assumes that the tags in (5) and
(6) result from copying transformations, and, following Boss (1967),
he assumes that (7) and (8) involve the copying rules, left and
right dislocation. I argued earlier against the analysis of re¬
flexives assumed here. I also think that the analyses 1 have sketched
for (7), (8), and (6) are preferable to those assumed by Masow*
Notice, however, that one can reject these analyses without rejecting
Wasow's basic suggestion. 1 have argued that the surface form of
bound variables is the result of feature copying. Thus, on my analysis,
as well as on W*«ow*a, these sentences will involve copying. It
looks, then, as if the suggestion that the exceptions to the asaapom
relation are the result of copying can be maintained.
It looks as if the counterexamples to the anaporn relation form
a unified class. 1 think, however, that this is illusory. (5)
remains a problem* 1 think that tag questions may well involve a
copying rule. It seems, however, that this will be quite different
from feature copying. It will introduce new structure, whereas
feature copying simply fills in existing structure. (5), then,
will be different from the other counterexamples. X don't think,
then, that the counterexamples to the anaporn relation form a
unified class.
It seas quite likely that pronouns in tag questions are
pronouns of laziness. This is suggested by the fact that we have
they, not he, when the subject of the main clause is everyone«
If they are, they will be referential pronouns which must have an
anaphoric interpretation. There are other referential pronouns which
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must have an anaphoric interpretation. I argued earlier that the
relative pronoun in a non-restrictive relative clause is a pronoun
of laziness, who in (13)| for example, is a pronoun of laziness.
(13) Sam, who knows about these tilings, says Mary is a spy.
Obviously, who can only have an anaphoric interpretation. It is
thus a referential pronoun that can only have an anaphoric inter¬
pretation. A further example of a referential pronoun that can only
have an anaphoric interpretation is he in (14).
(14) San, and he knows about these things, says Mary is a spy.
It is clear, then, that classifying pronouns in tags as pronouns of
laziness will not present us with any new situation.
Summarizing, we can say that the counterexamples to the anaporn
relation do not lorn a unified class. The main cases involve pronouns
which represent bound variables. There are also, however, cases like





There are two types of pronoun that 1 have not yet considered.
These are what X will call * sentential pronouns* and *intensional
pronouns** In this chapter, 1 will say something about tlusra*
8.1* Sentential Pronouns
By sentential pronouns, I mean anaphoric pronouns with complement
sentences as their antecedents* Such pronouns are illustrated in
the following sentences.
(1) Sans says that Megan is an existentialist, but I don*t
believe it*
(2) I know that Eve is a freudian, but I wouldn't have thought
it of Jim*




. • ' ■ ' ' • : :i
i*e. that they are referential pronouns used anaphorically*
When it is a referential pronoun, it refers to the contextually
unique thing* Among things are included not only concrete physical
objects, but also various kinds of abstract objects* Among such
objects are propositions and propositional functions* it* then,
em be used to refer to a proposition or a propositional function*
Consider now <!)» Following e.g* Delaerus (1976), we can understand
the complement of the first clause of (1) as referring to a
proposition* it, then, refers to the same proposition* Consider
also (2)* Here, X assume that Eve has been lowered into an open
sentence. This open sentence can be understood as referring to a
propositional function. Xt is this propositional function, then,
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that JLt refers fco. Similar to (2), of course, are sentences like
<3), which we discussed in chapter 4.
(3) Brian likes Shakespeare, and that is true of Ron too.
It should be noted that it is quite possible for a non-anaphoric
referential pronouns to refer to propositions and propositional
functions. Hankamer and Sag (1976) give the following example,
(4) Hankamer (observing Sag ripping a phone book in half)i
I don't believe it.
Here, JLt is understood as something like that he's ripping the phone
book in half. Consider also (5).
(5) Same context!
I wouldn't have thought it of hira.
Here, JLt refers to a propositional function presumably something
like that he could rip a phone book in half.
Various linguists have assumed that sentential pronouns derive
through a pronominalization rule from copies of their antecedents.
On this view, (6) represents a more basic form of (1).
(6) Sam says that Megan is an existentialist, but I don't
believe that Megan is an existentialist.
If sentential pronouns were derived in this way, they would not be
ordinary pronouns of laziness. An immediate reason for rejecting
this position is that it treats _it in (1) quite differently from JLt
in (4), although their roles do not appear to be fundamentally
different. There are, however, facts that give it some plausibility.
It is necessary, then, to consider these facts.
Notice firstly that from <l), one can infer (7).
(7) I don't believe that Megan is an existentialist.
If (1) derives from something like (6), the inference from (I) to (7)
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will be a simple instance of the following schema*
(3) (p A q) -4 q
If (1) does not have such a source, it looks as if a special inter*
pretive process will be required to account for the inference* This
is not the case, however. In (1), that Megan is an existentialist and
it refer to the same proposition* Where two KP's have the same
reference, one can normally be substituted for the other* Given
that Cicero and fully denote the same person, one can infer (10)
from (9) (and vice versa)*
(9) Cicero denounced Catilline.
(10) fully denounced Catilline*
This means that the sentence that Megan is an existentialist can be
substituted for it in (1)* Thus, one can infer (6) from (1), and
from this one can infer (7)* Therefore, inferences like that from
(1) to (7) do not motivate a rule of pronominalisation*
Consider next the following sentence*
(11) Steve doesn't believe that Sam caught a unicorn, but
Eve believes it» and she expects him to give it to the zoo*
This exemplifies the 'missing antecedent' phenomenon discussed in
Grinder and Postal (1971)* The pronoun in the third conjunct has no
antecedent on the surface. Rather its antecedent is part of the
interpretation of the sentential pronoun in the second conjunct*
Grinder and Postal discuss the missing antecedent phenomenon in
connection with sentences like (12)*
(12) Brian didn't catch a unicorn, but Jim did, and he gave it
to the zoo*
Here, the antecedent of _it is part of the interpretation of the missing
VP in the second conjunct* Grinder and Postal take such sentences to
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be evidence for the traditional assumption that missing VP's result
from a rule of VP-deletion, It might seem that, if sentences like
(12) motivate a rule of VP-deletion, sentences like (11) will motivate
a rule of pronoriina ligation. This is not the case, however.
Sentences like (11) can be handled quite naturally without a rule
of pronominaligation. In (11), that Sam caught a unicorn and it
refer to the seme proposition. Thus, from the first two ecajuncts
of (11), one can infer (13).
(13) Eve believes that Sam caught a unicorn.
Here, then, we have an antecedent for jh; in the third conjunct.
With sentences like (12), the situation is rather different. One
cannot say that the VP's in the first two conjuncts of (12) have
the same reference, since VP's are not referring expressions. There¬
fore, one cannot substitute one for the other in the sarae way as
one can substitute that Sam caught a unicorn for jit in (11). Thus,
missing antecedents do seem to motivate a rule of VP-deletion,
which is motivated anyway by various other facts. They do not,
however, motivate a rule of pronominalization*
In passing, it should be noted, that many sentences in which
the antecedent of some pronoun is part of the interpretation of a
sentential pronoun are unacceptable. Consider, for example, the
following.
(14) * Jim didn't buy a dragon, but Sam did it, and it singed
his beard*
(15) * Tony wasn't attacked by a dragon, but it happened to
Ron, and it mauled him badly.
Bresnan (1971) assumes that all such sentences are unacceptable, and
takes this as evidence that sentential pronouns are not transformationally
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derived. (H) and many other sentences show her assumption to be
false. As we have seen, however, such sentences do not necessitate a
rule of pronominalization. In (14) and (15), the pronouns with
missing antecedents are subjects. As Postal (1972) points out, such
sentences are generally unacceptable. Where the pronouns are not
subjects, the sentences are much better.
(16) Jim didn't buy a dragon, but Sam did it, and he's having a
job feeding it.
(17) Tony wasn't attacked by a dragon, but it happened to Ron,
and he had a job to fight it off.
Better sentences also result, if the pronoun is not it.
(18) Jim didn't buy any dragons, but Sam did it, and they singed
his beard.
(19) Tony wasn't attacked by dragons, but it happened to Ron,
and they mauled him badly.
The natural suggestion, I think, is that sentences like (14) and (15)
are unacceptable for perceptual reasons. X would hypothesize that
the close proximity of two identical pronouns, where the Interpretation
of the first provides the antecedent for the second, causes perceptual
difficulties.
Having shown that two kinds of facts that appear to support a
rule of pronominalization do not in fact do so, X will now consider
some evidence against such a rule. Xt has often been noted that
sentences like (20) are ambiguous.
(20) Sam believes that the earth is larger than it is.
On one reading, Sam believes a contradiction. On the other, he
believes that the earth is a certain size, but in fact it is not
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that large. Consider now (21),
(21) Sam believes that the earth is larger than it is, but
Eve doesn't believe it.
Hero, there is no ambiguity. The first clause can only mean that
Sam believes a contradiction. If sentential pronouns are derived
through pronominalization, (22) will represent a more basic form of
<21),
(22) Sam believes that the earth is larger than it is, but
Eve doesn't believe that the earth is larger than it is.
But (22) is ambiguous. It is not at all clear, then, on this
account, why (21) is not ambiguous also. Notice that (23), which
derives from (22) through VP-deletion remains ambiguous.
(23) Sam believes that the earth is larger than it is, but
Eve doesn't.
If we assume that sentential pronouns are ordinary pronouns of
laziness, and not the result of pronominalization, the absence of
ambiguity in (21) is fairly straightforward. It is only where (20)
is understood as asserting that Sam believes a contradiction that
it provides a centertually unique proposition for a pronoun to refer
to. On the other reading of (20), what Sam believes is not specified,
only compared with reality. On this reading, then, (20) does not
provide a contextually unique proposition for a pronoun to refer to.
Thus, what is mysterious if sentential pronouns are seen as the
result of pronominalization is quite straightforward if they are seen
as ordinary pronouns of laziness.
Similar evidence against pronominalization is provided by sentences
like (24).
(24) Jim s&ys that many Italians are spies.
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In the present framework, <24) can derive from four different struc¬
tures* many Italians may originate either inside or outside the
complement of say, and it may be either distributive or collective.
Whether (24) has four different readings is not entirely clear. Where
many Italians originates inside the complement, the distributive/
collective distinction seems of no real significance. Where it
originates outside the complement, a distributive interpretation
is most natural, though a collective interpretation is also possible,
I think. Where many Italians originates outside the complement
and is distributive, (24) is equivalent to (25),
(25) There are many Italians each of whom Jim says is a spy*
In the present context, this is the crucial reading. Consider now
(26),
(26) Jim says that many Italians are spies, and Sam says it too*
It is clear, 1 think, that the first clause here cannot mean (25)*
If sentential pronouns derive through pronominalization, (27) will
represent a more basic form of (26),
(27) Jim says that many Italians are spies, and Sam says that
many Italians are spies too.
Here, the first clause can mean (25), and the second clause can have
a parallel meaning* Thus, if sentential pronouns are the result of
pronominalization, it is not at ail clear why the crucial reading
is lacking in (26)* Notice that (28), the result of applying
VP-deletion to (27), has this reading.
(28) Jim says that many Italians are spies, and Sam does too*
If sentential pronouns are ordinary pronouns of laziness, the absence
of the crucial reading in (26) is quite straightforward, (25) des¬
cribes a situation involving a set of distinct propositions* Thus,
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where (24) means (25), it does not provide a contcxtually unique
proposition for a pronoun to refer to* Again, then, we hove
evidence against pronominalization and in favour of the view that
sentential pronouns are ordinary pronouns of laziuess.
1 am suggesting, then, that sentential pronouns are ordinary
pronouns of laziness, and that the interpretation of a sentential
pronoun is simply the substitution of one expression for another
with the same reference. This can be illustrated with (29).
(29) Eve thinks Tony is ill, and Mary thinks it too*




it here has the same reference as the complement in the first clause.




Clearly, this gives the correct interpretation of the second clause
in (29).
A rather different situation is found in (32).
(32) A Rumanian said he was ill, and a Bulgarian said it too.
it in the second clause has only a sloppy interpretation. The clause
can only mean that the Bulgarian said that he himself was ill.
Tills is exactly what the present framework predicts. The clause will




It in the second clause has the same reference as the complement in
the first clause# The latter, therefore, can be substituted for
the former# We know, however, that he in the complement can only
represent a bound variable# The complement, then, is an open
sentence. When this open sentence is substituted for _it the variable
underlying he is no longer within the scope of a Rumanian# "it,
therefore, cannot be bound by a Rumanian# It can only be bound
by a Bulgarian# The result of substitution, then, must be (34)#
(34) S
x be ill
We, thus, correctly predict that It has only a sloppy interpretation#
Rather different again is (35).
(35) One boy said he was a fool before Bill said it.
(35) is ambiguous# The sentential pronoun can have a sloppy or a
strict reading. Again, this is predicted. (35) will derive from
something like (36)#
(36) S
one tooyx soy S before S
x be a fool Bill say it
The complement of say can clearly be substituted for jit# When it is
substituted, the variable is still within the scope of a boy#
Obviously, then, it can still be bound by a boy. This accounts for
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the strict reading of it. To account for the sloppy reading, we need
only allow the variable to be bound by Bill as well*
Inferences like those considered here are discussed in Fodor
(1976), in connection with his contention that equi deletes the
element self* and not a bound variable. He considers the following
argument.
(37)a. The cat wanted to eat the cheese*
b. The mouse got what the cat wanted.
c. The mouse got to eat the cheese*
In the present framework, the infinitive in the first premiss will
derive from the open sentence x eat the cheese* where the variable is
bound by the cat* The inference will involve the substitution of
this open sentence for the anaphoric expression what the cat wanted*
and the binding of the variable by the mouse* Fodor argues that
this rebindiag is not allowed in standard conceptions of variable
binding* He suggests, then, that self is an element that is bound
by the NF that syntactically commands it* For him, then, the
infinitive in the first premiss will derive from something like
self eat the cheese* where self is bound by the est* When this is
substituted for what the cat wanted* self will be bound by the mouse*
Fodor may be right that reblnding is not allowed in standard
conceptions of variable binding* But there is nothing sacrosanct
about standard conceptions* There is no reason at all why
variables should not have the properties that Fodor takes self
to have. % conclude, then, that inferences like that in (37)
provide no support for Fodor*s views on self.
Returning to the main theme, one might suppose that, when
an open sentence is substituted for a pronoun, the variable can be
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bound by any binding elmerit that asymmetrically commands it* This
is not the case, however. That it is not is shewn by sentences
like (38).
(38) dim told Sot h® was drunk, and Steve told Tony*
1 assume that the second clause of (38) derives from something like
(39), with the pronoun being deleted during the course of the
derivation.
(39) S
x tell Tony it
The pronoun in the first clause may be a pronoun of laziness referring
to either dim or Sot. It may also represent a bound variable bound
by either dim or Sot. In this ease, the complement is an open
sentence. (Me might suppose that, when this open sentence is sub¬
stituted for the pronoun in (39), the variable can be bound by either
Steve or Tony. Notice, however, that, while (38) can be interpreted
as (40) or (41), it cannot be interpreted as either (42) or (43).
(40) dim told Sam that he - dim - was drunk, and Steve told Tony
that he - Steve • was drunk.
(41) dim told Sot that he - Sam - was drunk, and Steve told Tony
that he - Tony - was drunk.
(42) dim told Sot that he - dim - was drunk, and Steve told Tony
that he * Tony • was drunk.
(43) dim told Sot that he - Sam - was drunk, and Steve told Tony
that he - Steve - was drunk.
Apparently, if the. variable is bound by dim in the first clause, it
220
can only be bound by Steve in the second clause, while, if the variable
is bound by Sam in the first clause, it can only be bound by Tony in
the second clause. It appears, then, that, when an open sentence is
substituted for a pronoun, if the variable cannot be bound by the
same binding element as the original variable, it must be bound by a
binding element in a structurally parallel position.
1 want now to consider some cases where sentential pronouns lack
clear antecedents in underlying structure. These cases might seem
to present a problem. I will suggest, however, that they do not*
Consider firstly (44)*
(44) Marsha is said to be pregnant, but I don't believe it.
Lakoff (1968) takes such sentences to be evidence that the process
that produces sentential pronouns must be precyclic. He assumes
that the underlying structure of (44) contains two complements of the
following form.
(45) £g Marsha be pregnant
In the first clause, Marsha is extracted from the complement by
raising. After raising, the two complements are no longer identical*
Therefore, the rule that produces sentential pronouns met apply
before raising. It can only do this, if it is precyclie* In the
present framework, (44) will have a rather different analysis.






In the derivation of the first clause of (44), raising and passive
2 1
will apply on S • Then, on S , lowering will substitute Marsha
for the variable x. Jit in (44) refers to the proposition that
Marsha is pregnant* (46), however, has no constituent referring to
this proposition* This might seem to be a problem* In fact, however,





Thus, the contaxtually unique proposition can be inferred from (46)
in a straightforward way* Notice now that (43) is far less acceptable
than (44)* JAJL •
(48) 7 Many women are said to be pregnant, but I don»t believe it*
In Lakof£»s system, there is no obvious explanation for this fact* In
the present framework, it is quite natural* The most obvious inter¬
pretation of the first clause of (43) is something like (49)*
(49) There are many women each of whom is said to be pregnant*
(49) describes a situation involving a set of propositions* Obviously,
then, there is no contextually unique proposition for the pronoun
to refer to* This explanation is essentially the same as that
given earlier for the missing reading in (26)*
A similar situation to that found in (44) is found in the
following sentence.
(50) The police questioned Steve yesterday, and they did it
again today, but it haan* t happened to Son*
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Leaving aside the adverbial, the obvious source for the first clause
of (30) is (51),
(51) S
x question Steve
it in the second clause of (50) refers to the same prepositional
function as the open sentence in (51). But jLt in the third clause
of (50) does not refer to this function. Rather, it refers to the
function the ?x>lice question x. This is no real problem, however,
because (51) is equivalent to (52),
the police question x
Thus, the crucial function can be Inferred in a straightforward way,
1 must now add a note of qualification. 1 have suggested that
it can refer to propositions and prepositional functions. There
appear, however, to be contexts where it cannot readily refer to a
prepositional function. Bach, Bresnan, and Wasow (1975) suggest
that ijt cannot have a sloppy interpretation in (53),
(53) Jack believes that he is allergic to maple syrup, but
I don't believe it,
(53), they suggest, can only roean that 1 don't believe that Jack
is allergic to maple syrup, not that I don't believe that I m
allergic to maple syrup. It seems to me that Che sentence can,
in fact, have the latter reading, but the former is certainly more
natural. In the present framework, this means that JLt here cannot
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readily refer to a propositions! function. The same seems true of
It in (54), to which Postal (1974b, fn. 58) draws attention.
(54) ? Each one of us believes that he is sane, but Arthur
doesn't believe it.
We know that the complement in the first clause of (54) can only
derive from an open sentence, and, therefore, that it must refer to
a propositional function. The oddness of (54) suggests, then, that
it cannot readily refer to a propositional function. There are,
however, many sentences where jLt refers to a propositional function
without difficulty. (2) and (32) are clear examples. Clearly,
then, it is only in certain contexts that jit cannot readily refer
to a propositional function. How exactly these contexts should be
characterised, however, is rather unclear.
It is fairly clear, X think, that sentential pronouns can repre¬
sent pronouns of laziness. X want now to ask whether they can also
represent bound variables. X assume that complements are HP's.
HP's, of course, can bind variables. Xt will be possible, then,
in the absence of special restrictions, for complements to bind
variables. If complements can bind variables, it will be possible
for a sentential pronoun commanded by its antecedent, such as _it
in (35), to represent a bound variable* The question, then, is
whether complements can bind variables.
Two kinds of fact, discussed by HcCawley (1973), suggest that
complements cannot bind variables. Firstly, recall that I have
argued that the pronouns in Bach-Peters sentences represent bound
variables. It follows that, if complements can bind variables, it
should be possible to construct Bach-Peters sentences involving
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complements. It should, that is, be possible to construct sentences
containing two complements each of which contains a pronoun with the
other as its antecedent. This, however, is impossible. Notice that
(55) cannot have the crucial interpretation.
(55) Everyone who thinks that Bill said it has claimed that Max
We will predict this, if we assume that complements cannot bind
variables. Secondly, notice that (56) is ambiguous.
(56) Jim said that the President was streaking.
the President may be Jim*s characterization of the individual Jim
was talking about or the speaker*s. In the first case, (56) will


















If complements can bind variables, it should be possible to derive




the President be streaking
say x
Such a structure would be appropriate, if it were possible for the
characterization of what John said to be provided by the speaker. It
would be appropriate, for example, if it were possible for John to say
Had Harry is up to his tricks again and for the speaker to report
what he said as The President is streaking. This seems to be im¬
possible. Again, we will predict this, if we assume that complements
cannot bind variables. Tentatively, then, I will assume that com¬
plements cannot biiid variables, and, therefore, that sentential
pronouns cannot represent bound variables.
Some further evidence for the assumption that complements cannot
bind variables is presented in Bonney (1976). He points out that there
are no left dislocation sentences involving complements. There are
no sentences, that is, like (60).
(60) * That Max is honest, few people, believe it.
I have suggested that left dislocation sentences involve a specialized
lowering rule. Obviously, only NP's that bind variables can undergo
this rule. Thus, the impossibility of sentences like (60) will be an
automatic consequence, if complements cannot bind variables.
Bonney also points out that there are topicalization sentences
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involving complements. (61) illustrates.
(61) That Max is honest, few people believe.
This suggests that topicalization sentences are derived through a
traditional topicalization rule, and not through a specialized lowering
rule.
An important consequence of the assumption that complements
cannot bind variables is that they will not be full NP*s for the
purposes of (4.1.69). To see this, consider the following sentence.
(62) That Sara is here is certain to annoy Mary.





.2Raising would apply on S , followed by lowering on S • However, if
complements cannot bind variables, (62) cannot have such a source.






This derivation, however, will be blocked by (A.1*69), if complements
are full NP*s» It follows, then, that they cannot be full NP*s*
8.2* Intensional Pronouns
I can turn now to intensional pronouns* Intensional pronouns
are less easy to characterize than sentential pronouns* The best way
to approach them is through an example. Notice, then, that the
following sentence is ambiguous*
(I) The President of the U.S. has more power today than he had
twenty five years ago.
On the first reading, it contrasts the current power of the individual
who is President with the power that individual had twenty five years
ago* On the second reading, it contrasts the power currently
exercised by the President with the power exercised by the President
twenty five years ago* The first reading is quite straightforward.
On this reading, the pronoun is either a pronoun of laziness or a
bound variable. The second reading is more problematic. On this
reading, the pronoun can be called an intensional pronoun.
What, then, are intensional pronouns? One linguist who has
touched on this question is Dahl (1973)* Discussing (1), he suggests
that, on the first reading, he is *preferential* with its antecedent,
while, on the second, it is *cosignifleant*• He also suggests that
the ambiguity can *be described as a possibility of referring back
to either the intension or the extension (reference) of the antecedent*.
These remarks seem to point in the right direction* They are rather
vague, however* It is necessary, then, to consider how they might
be made more precise*
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I want firstly to consider a way of developing Dahl*s remarks
that treats intensional pronouns as ordinary pronouns of laziness*
Specifically, I want to consider the possibility that the antecedent
of an intensional pronoun has as reference its normal sense, and
that the pronoun is a pronoun of laziness with the some reference.
1 start here from some remarks of Cresswell (1973). Cresswell
suggests that definite descriptions might be understood in certain
circumstances as referring to what is normally their sense. He
raises this possibility in connection with sentences like (2).
(2) The Prime Minister of New Zealand will always be a British
citizen.
(2) is clearly ambiguous. It can mean that the current Prime Minister
of New Zealand will always be a British subject, or it can mean that
whoever is Prime Minister of New Zealand will always be a British
subject. One way of analyzing the second reading is to say that
the definite description the Prime Minister of New Zealand has as its
reference not an individual, but an *intensional object*, the latter
being a function from possible worlds to individuals, which, for any
possible world, gives the individual who is Prime Minister of New
Zealand in that world. Returning now to (1)» we might say that, on
its second reading, the President of the U.S., refers to an
intensional object, a function which, for any possible world, gives
the individual that is President of the U.S. in that world. We could
then say that he is a pronoun of laziness with the same reference.
On this analysis, the pronoun in (1) will be coreferential with its
antecedent on both readings of the sentence*.
This way of developing Dahl's remarks is an attractive one, since
It allows us to claim that intensional pronouns, like sentential
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pronouns, are ordinary pronouns of laziness. It faces certain prob¬
lems, however. For a start, it can be questioned whether sentences
like (2) do necessitate the assumption that definite descriptions
can refer to intensional objects. Cresswell, in fact, argues that
they do not. He suggests that the ambiguity in (2) should be inter¬
preted as a matter of scope, specifically as a matter of whether
the Prime Minister cf hew Zealand is outside or inside the scope of
always. When it is outside, the sentence means that the individual
denoted by the definite description the Prime Minister of New Zealand
will always be a British subject. When it is inside, it means that
it will always be the case that the individual denoted, by that
description will be a British subject. An analysis in terms of scope
is not always as obvious as it is with (2). Consider, for example,
(3).
(3) The President of the U.S. is head of the armed forces.
This can be a statement about the current President. It can also,
however, he a statement about whoever is President. We could
analyse this ambiguity as one of reference, and say that, on the
first reading, the President of che U.S. refers to the current
President, while, on the second, it refers to a function from
possible worlds to individuals, which, for any possible world,
gives the individual who is President of the U.S. in that world.
The question is whether the ambiguity can also be analyzed in terras
of 6cope. X think that it can. We can suggest that, on the second
reading of (3), its underlying structure contains an adverb with the
President of the U.S. in its scope, and a meaning similar to that of
always. It looks, then, as if scope analyses may always be possible
for these ambiguities. If so, there will be no independent motivation
for the assumption that definite descriptions can refer to
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intensional objects*
Even if there were independent evidence that definite descriptions
can refer to intensional objects, the present approach would still
be rather dubious. The approach claims that intensional pronouns
refer to intensional objects. Surely, however, a pronoun that refers
to an intensional object should be neuter* The fact, then, that
intensional pronouns need not be neuter suggests quite strongly that
they do not refer to intensienal objects.
It seems, then, that we should look for an alternative way of
developing Dahl* e remarks. 1 want, therefore, to consider the possi¬
bility that the antecedent of an intensional pronoun has its normal
sense and reference, and that the pronoun has the same sense but a
different reference. Notice that this penaits a simple account of
(1), We have seen that the sense of the President of the U.S. is a
function which, for any possible world, gives the individual who is
President of the U.S. in that world. The value of this function, when
it takes the. current world as its argument, is the current President*
If he has the same sense, but is inside the scope of twenty five years
ago, it will have a different reference, namely the individual who
was President twenty five years ago. This, then, seems a promising
approach.
We must ask, of course, what exactly it means to say that a pro¬
noun and its antecedent have the same sense. In the present framework,
to say that two constituents have the same sense is to say that they
have the same or equivalent representations in underlying structure.
It seems reasonable, then, to suggest that intensional pronouns have
the same representations in underlying structure as their antecedents.
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this means, of course, that we need a rule converting definite des¬
criptions into pronouns, this rule will be rather like pronominali-
zation, except that it will not require identity of reference.
It seems, then, that, by assuming a pronominalization-1ike rule,
we can eliminate the need to have definite descriptions referring
to intensional objects, mad avoid the problem of non-neuter pronouns
referring to objects. 1 think, then, that this way of developing
Dahl's remarks is a clear advance on the first way*
The circumstances in which our rule can apply are not at all
clear. Wasow observes that intensional pronouns must follow their
antecedents, noting such contrasts as that between (4) and (5)*
(4) In I960 the President was a Catholic, but now he*g a
Quaker.
(5) Although in 1960 he was a Catholic, now the President is a
Quaker.
Apart from this generalization, the distribution of pronouns is rather
obscure. Partee (1970) notes that, while it in (6) can be an in¬
tensional pronoun, her in (7) cannot be*
(6) The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than
the man who gave it to his mistress*
(7) John was kissing his wife, and Bill was kissing her too*
Notice, however, that it seems possible for the pronouns in the
following to be intensional pronouns*
(8) A Martian worships his wife* A Venusian neglects her*
(9) Martians worship their wives* Venus tans neglect them.
Clearly, there are problems here. They are problems, however, for any
approach to intensional pronouns, not just for the approach 1 am





These are a variety of questions that I have touched on in
passing in the preceding chapters. In this chapter, I want to look
in some detail at just two of them. Firstly, X want to consider
ambient it. Then, X want to look at the structure of noun phrases.
9.1. Ambient jut
In chapter 4, X noted Bolinger*s (1973) contention that _it in
sentences like the following is ambient, that it is a meaningful
element referring to the general situation.
(1) It* s scary in the dark.
(2) It*s pleasant in California.
(3) It's hard to do a job like that.
X went on to argue that there in sentences like (4) and (5) is the
locative form of this it.
(4) There was a Rumanian who sold his soul.
(5) There was a spider in the bath.
Obviously, this analysis is only as plausible as Bolinger*s analysis
ofjltin(l)-(3). It is appropriate, then, to say something more
about Bolinger's analysis.
Bolinger* s claim is that jit in sentences like (1) • (3) is *a
nominal with the greatest possible generality of meaning*• The most
obvious evidence for this claim is the fact that other nominals are
often possible in the same position. Parallel to (1) and (2), we






(7)^Surfing [is pleasant in California.
Hitch hikingj
Notice also that we have the following, which are broadly similar in
meaning to (1) and (2).
(8) Things are scary in the dark.
(9) Things are pleasant in California.
These facts suggest quite strongly that JUt in (1) and (2) is a kind
of nominal, jit in (3) cannot be replaced by other nominals. Notice,
however, that we get sentences like the following from Morgan (1968).
(10) It was dark and snowing and hard to see the runway.
Such sentences show that we have the same jit in sentences like (3)
as in sentences like (1) and (2). Thus, evidence that jJt in (1) and
(2) is a kind of nominal is also evidence that jit in (3) is a kind
of nominal.
The obvious alternative to Bolinger*s analysis of (1) - (3) is
one which takes the its to be inserted by extraposition rules. On
this analysis, (1) - (3) would have the same source as (11) - (13).
(11) The dark is scary.
(12) California is pleasant.
(13) To do a job like that is hard.
Morgan (1968) assumes such an analysis for sentences like (1) - (3).
Such an analysis has been quite widely assumed for sentences like
(3). Taking sentences like (1) and (2) first, we notice that there
are a variety of similar sentences for which an extraposition
analysis is much less plausible. Consider the following.
(14) It's hot on the roof.
(15) It's hot under the roof*
(16) It*s cold when the wind blows.
(17) It's cold without a coat on.
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(18) It*8 cold if you leave the window open*
None of these sentences have equivalents with the constituents after
the adjective in subject position* It is not plausible, then, to
suggest that the jits are left behind by extraposition. But, if these
its are not the result of extraposition, there is little reason to
suggest that those in (1) and (2) are. Turning now to (3), we find,
as Bolinger notes, that a variety of constituents can appear in the
position of the infinitive. Bolinger gives examples like the
following.
(19) Xt*s hard when you try to do a thing like that.
(20) It*s hard if you try to do a thing like that.
There is no evidence that these constituents are extraposed. Again,
then, it is not plausible to suggest that the its are the result of
extraposition. Again, also, if these its are not the result of
extraposition, it is doubtful whether jit in (3) is. If these
various its are not the result of extraposition, it is reasonable to
assume that they are the underlying subjects of their sentences. I
think, then, that Bolinger*s analysis of (1) - (3) is a persuasive
one.
1 want now to look at some constructions which Bolinger does not
consider. Firstly, 1 want to suggest that jLt in sentences like (21)
is ambient.
(21) It seems that Sadie is angry.
This jit cannot be replaced by other nominals. Thus, the first kind of
evidence that we look for is lacking. There is good evidence, however,
that this jLt is not the result of extraposition. As Bresnan (1972)
notes, there are no sentences like (22).
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(22) * That Sadie is angry seems.
This suggests that the complement of seem must originate in its
surface position, and thus that JLt must be an underlying subject.
Further evidence for this view of seem is provided by sentences
like (23).
(23) It seems as if Sadie is angry.
Here, it is even less plausible than with (21) to claim that the
complement is extraposed. While certain predicates take that clauses
as subjects, no predicates take as if clauses as subjects. Again,
then, we can say that the complement must originate in its surface
position, and that it must be an underlying subject. Notice also
that jit in sentences like (23) can be replaced by other nominala.
Thus, we have sentences like (24).
(24) Sadie seems as if she is angry.
One might suggest that (24) derives from the structure underlying
(23) through an extended version of raising. Notice, however, that
we also get sentences like the following.^
(25) Sadie seems as if something has frightened her.
(26) Sadie seems as if her problems have vanished.
Given such sentences, the suggestion has little plausibility. Thus,
sentences like (24) - (26) reinforce the view that we have ambient
it in (21) and (23).
Reviewing these observations, we can suggest that seem can cake
either ambient _it or an ordinary nominal as subject, and either a that
1. It should be noted, however, that some speakers find such sentences
rather dubious.
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clause cr an as if clause in post-verbal position* When the subject
is ambient jit, either a that clause or an as if clause is possible
in post-verbal position* When the subject is an ordinary nominal,
only an as if clause is possible.
I must now say something about sentences like (27)•
(27) Sadie seems to be angry*
(27) is superficially similar to (24)* There is evidence, however,
that such sentences involve raising* The assumption accounts for the
possibility of sentences with there as subject such as (23)*
(28) There seems to be an aardvark under the bed*
It also accounts for the possibility of sentences with idiomatic
subjects such as (29)
(29) Little heed seems to have been taken of Sam's warning.
Further evidence is presented in Postal (1974, 2*2)*
It seems, then, that there is a major difference between (27)
and the superficially similar (24)* This difference is reflected,
I would suggest, in sentences like the following*
(30) ? Sam seems as if he has gone away*
(31) Sam seems to have gone away*
(30) ie not completely ungrammatical, but it is certainly less
acceptable than (31)* We can explain this, if we assume that part
of the meaning of seam is an assumption that the speaker has percep¬
tual experience of the referent of the underlying subject* In (30),
this is Sam* There is an assumption, then, that the speaker has
perceptual experience of Sam* But the content of the as if clause
conflicts with this assumption* Hence the marginal character of (30)*
In (31), Sam is not the underlying subject of seem* Thus, there is
no assumption of perceptual experience* (31), therefore, is quits
acceptable*
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The derivation will involve the substitution of x for jLt cm S* and
the substitution ©f Sadie for x on S1. gather similar analyses are
assumed by Bresnan (1972)* Schwartz (1972)* and Sosenbaura (1967)*
though all assume that it is the surface subject end not a variable
that is substituted for it* Boseabaura also assumes that the ©ample*
\
t _
ment reaches its post-verbal position through extraposition*
Before 1 leave seem* I should note that there is evidence that
it governs a second raising rule* Many speakers accept sentences
like the following*
(33) There seems as if there has been some trouble*
Such sentences seem to require e rule replacing it by a copy of there*
It appears that only there should be copied by this rule* If variables
could be copied* we would expect sentences like (24) to be possible
without any assumption of perceptual experience* 4s (30) indicates*
such sentences are not possible* It seems rather odd to have e rule that
2
applies to a single item* I can see no obvious alternative* however*
———————
2* Essentially the same rule is proposed in Sogers (1974) in connection
with sentences like (i)»
(i) There looks like there*s gonna be a riot*
He proposes a transderivational constraint to prevent it applying when
the result is derivable from some other structure*
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I want now to look at sentences like (34).
(34) It*b odd that J is hates spaghetti.
Unlike seem, odd can have a complement in subject position. (35)
illustrates*
<35) That Jim hates spaghetti is odd*
It looks# then# as if (34) may be the result of extraposition* We
might hesitate to make this assumption# if the complement in <34)
could be replaced by other constituents not plausibly regarded as the
result of extraposition* There seetas, however, to be little possi®
bility of this. I think# then# that it is reasonable to regard (34)
as the result of extraposition. This does not mean# however# that jLt
is not ambient. 1 want to suggest that <34) and <35) derive from
something like <36),
(36) S1
it dim hate spaghetti
In the derivation of (34)# extraposition will adjoin S2 to the end of
S*"# leaving jit alone in subject position. _it is not inserted in place
of en extrapesed complement# but is present in underlying structure
as a sister of the complement. This is essentially the analysis
assumed in Eosenbaum (1967). It allows us to claim that it in <34)
is ambient. It also has the advantage of making sentential extra®
position quite similar to other extraposition rules. Both extra®
position from HP and extraposition of PP break up complex constituents#
as the following illustrate.
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(37) A man who looked like Healey entered the room*
(38) A man entered the room who looked like Healey.
(39) A book about the Assyrians has been published*
(40) A book has been published about the Assyrians*
On the present analysis, sentential extraposition does the same.
When extraposition does not apply, .it is deleted*
Digressing briefly, 1 want to suggest that an extraposition rule
is involved in sentences like (41)*
(41) There is a dragon in the forest*
1 suggested earlier that such sentences involve two locatives in
apposition, ambient there and a more specific expression* (41), then,
will derive from something like (42)*
(42)
NP VP
/ V ^ LocP
a dragon
be there in the forest
I suggested that sentences like (43) are derived through adverb
proposing and subject-verb inversion*
(43) There was an Austrian who liked cricket*
Applying these rules to (42), we will get something like (44)*
(44) S
LoeP V NP
there in the forest be a dragon
To derive (41), we will need a rule moving in the forest to the end
of the sentence* Obviously, this will be quite similar to the rules
involved in the derivation of (34), (38) and (40),
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Returning to the main theme, I want to take a further look at
raising. One predicate that governs raising is certain. With
certain, we have sentences like the following, which, will presumably
derive from a structure like (36).
<45) It's certain that Steve will win.
<46) That Steve will win is certain.
We also, however, have sentences like <47).
<47) Steve is certain to win.
It seems reasonable to derive this from something like <43).
<43)
it a win
How is <47) derived? One possibility is that we have extraposition,
and the raising rule Involved in <27) on S^. and then lowering <® Sl.
So far. then, the rules we have already invoked appear adequate.
Another predicate that governs raising is begin. With begin.
we have sentences like the following.
(49) dim began to sing.
(50) Jim began singing.
Sentences like <5l) from Perlmutter <1970) suggest that beElm takes a
subject complement.
<51) The doling out of emergency rations began.
1 think, then, that It is reasonable to derive <49) and <50) from
something like <52).











How are (49) and <50) derived? For (49), we might suggest a derivation
like that suggested for (47) (although there is no it in (52)). (50),
however, presents a problem. In general, gerunds do not undergo
extraposition* It is not plausible, then, to suggest that (50)
involves extraposition and raising. As hakoff (1963) notes, sentences
like (50) seem to necessitate a rule raising the subject of a
subject complement, and adjoining the rest of the sentence to the
end of the higher VP* Lakoff assumes that all subject-to-subject
raising is accomplished by this rule. He assumes that seem takes a
subject complement* We have seen, however, that there is no inde¬
pendent evidence for this view. In contrast, Bresnan (1972) assumes
that all subject-to-subject raising is accomplished by the first
raising rule. She assumes that begin* like seem* takes a post-
verbal complement. Again, however, there is no independent evidence
for this view. 1 think, then, that we must recognize two distinct
rules of subject-to-subject raising, one applying to post-verbal
3
complements, and one applying to subject complements®
3. Notice that the first rule will be an exception to an important
principle of relational grammar, the relational succession principle.
As Johnson (1977) formulates it, this states that *An HP promoted by
an ascension rule assumes the grammatical relation borne by the host out
of which It ascends*.
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Turning to e different matter, we can relate the present discussion
to the proposals of Hurford <1973), Hurford argues that every indicative
sentence originates as a subject complement of the verb be. Part of
the evidence for this analysis is provided by sentences like (53), which
he takes to be the result of extraposition.
(53) It's not that Alfred doesn't like gorgonzola.
Hurford does not note that we also get sentences like (54).
(54) It*s not as if Alfred doesn't like gorgonzola.
In the light of such sentences, it is not plausible to regard sentences
like (53) as the result of extraposition. We might, then, suggest
that every indicative sentence originates not in the structure S be,
but in the structure it be F. On tbis analysis, an indicative
sentence could be seen as asserting that the general situation is
such that a certain proposition is true.
A final question that arises in the present content is whether
ail apparently empty its are in fact ambient. One it that probably
is is the it that appears before certain factive object complements.
This jit is illustrated in sentences like the following.
(55) Sam resents it that he was criticized.
(56) Jim hates it that people laugh at him.
(57) Mary likes it that everyone asks her opinion.
More problematic is the it of cleft sentences like the following.
(53) It's Kevin who has all the answers.
(59) It was the Mona Lisa that we stole*
Akmajian (1970) suggests that cleft sentences derive from pseudo
clefts through a rule of cleft extraposition. On this analysis, (58)
and (59) derive from (60) and (61).
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(60) The one who has all the answers is Kevin.
(61) What we stole was the Mona Lisa.
If this analysis Is valid, the jLt of cleft sentences wilt not be ambient.
The analysis faces problems, however. There are certain constituents
which can appear in focus position in clefts but not in pseudo clefts.
The following illustrate,
(62) It was to Eve that I spoke.
(63) * What I spoke was to Eve,
In the light of these sentences, it is not at all clear how clefts
should be analyzed. It is not clear, then, whether the it of cleft
sentences is ambient.^
The discussion of this section is quite tentative. I think,
however, that it gives added weight to Boiinger*e views about ambient
it. If one accepts these views, it is quite natural to suggest that
there in sentences like (4) and (5) is, a locative form of ambient it.
I will take this approach » step further in chapter 15, when I
suggest that, as well as ambient _it and ambient there, we also have
ambient so.
9.2, The Structure of RPtg
I have said quite a lot In previous chapters about noun phrases,
including a certain amount about their internal structure. The
internal structure of noun phrases is not of crucial importance in the
present contort. I think, however, that it is worth discussing briefly.
4. For an important recent discussion of cleft sentences, see Pinkham
and Hatikamer (1975),
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1 will begin by reviewing the main assumptions that I have made
in earlier chapters* Following e*g« Montague (1973), 2 assume that
HP's typically consist of a determiner and a noun. The most obvious
determiners are the definite and indefinite articles* A definite NP
refers to the contextually unique member of the set denoted by its
noun."* An indefinite HP establishes the existence of a member of this
set. X assume that a noun may be either simple or complex, the most
obvious examples of complex nouns being nouns combined with restrictive
relative clauses* X also assume, following Bartsch (1973), that a
9
simple noun can be either singular or plural* A plural noun denotes
the set of all subsets of the set denoted by the corresponding
singular noun* The definite article can be combined with a singular or
a plural noun* The indefinite article, however, can only combine with
a singular noun*
X have also assumed that quantifiers like some and many are
determiners* This, however, is a rather dubious assumption. One
might perhaps suggest that some is a plural indefinite determiner*
This suggestion is quite plausible semanticslly. Consider (1)*
(1) some toffees
Xt is fairly clear that this phrase establishes the existence of a
set of toffees* This is exactly what we expect if some is a plural
indefinite determiner* The suggestion faces syntactic problems,
however* tinlike a, some can be followed, not only by a noun, but
also by a partitive phrase. Thus, we have the following contrast*
(2) * a of the toffees
(3) some of the toffees
m m m m m m m
5m As before, X am ignoring definite descriptions containing mass nouns
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This suggests that we should look for an alternative analysis* Notice,
then, that (1) is equivalent to (4), and (3) equivalent to (5),
(4) a number of toffees
(5) a number of the toffees
Given such equivalences, it seems plausible, as Anderson (1974a) and
Hogg (1975) suggest, to derive some from a number. I want, then, to
propose that (1) and (3) derive from structures like the following*
(6) HP (7) HP






of toffees of the toffees
In (6), the HP in the partitive phrase is a generic HP referring to
toffees in general* In (7), the partitive phrase contains an ordinary
definite HP*
many is quite like acme in its distribution* hike some* it can be
followed either by a noun or by a partitive phrase* The following
illustrate.
(8) many toffees
(9) many of the toffees
Hotice now that (8) and (9) are equivalent to (10) and (11)*
(10) a large number of toffees
(11) a large number of the toffees
As Anderson and Hogg note, such equivalences suggest that many should
derive from a large number* X would suggest, then, that (3) and <9)
derive from structures like the following.
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(12)
number x be large of the toffees
These, of course, ©re very similar to (6) ©ad (7).^
One might perhaps suggest that partitive phrases are reduced
relatives. There is, however, good evidence that this is not the
ease* Ross (1967) observes that reduced relatives, like full relatives,
are islands* The following illustrate*
(14) * Who did Sam interview a man who was wanted by?
(15) * Who did Sam interview a man wanted by?
(16) * What did dim talk to a man who was reading?
(17) * What did dim talk to a man reading?
Partitive phrases, however, ere not islands. Thus, the following are
quite acceptable*
(18) What have we got a lot of?
(19) What did dim drink a bottle of?
It seems reasonable, then, to conclude that partitive phrases are
net reduced relatives, and, thus, that they are sisters of nouns in both
6. I will note serae independent evidence for this analysis in chapter 114
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surface and underlying structure.
There is evidence that partitive structures are quite common.
Consider firstly the following sentence, to which Ritchie (1971) draws
attention*
(20) Max wants to buy a Fiat before they get toe expensive.











Given such a source, they will have a clear antecedent in underlying
structure. As Ritchie notes, partitive structures are also motivated
by sentences like the following,
(23) Sam owns a big car and a small one.
(24) Tony brought the new books and the old ones*
We can derive the NP a small one in (23) from something like (25)




Nx S P NP
one x be small of cars
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Partitive phrase deletion is independently motivated by sentences like
<26),
(26) Jim bought a bottle of beer and a can.
If it applies in (23), the NP a big car must derive from a structure
like (25), but with big instead of small. Jackendoff (1968) points
out that English has no pronoun for indefinite mass nouns. Thus,
we have sentences like the following.
(27) Eve drank the red wine and the white*
I would suggest that the second NP here derives from something like
(23), where the head noun is empty.
(28) NP
x be white of wine
The first NP will have a similar source.
Ritchie apparently assumes that all NP*s involve underlying
partitive structures. I will not make this assumption. If one
assumes that an unambiguous expression can have more than one source,
there is no need to make it. In any event, it is not at all clear
how one could require every NP to involve an underlying partitive
structure. One cannot say that every noun must originate in a
partitive phrase because various nouns can be the heads of partitive
structures. I will assume, then, that any simple NP can involve
an underlying partitive structure, but that none need do, accept
where the context requires it.
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I xauet now say something about the derivational processes involved
in these analyses. For (1) and (3), I would propose a rule adjoining
the noun number to the preceding determiner. The complex determiner
that results will be realized as some. We will also need & rule
deleting of in the following context.
(29) Det of N
This will ensure that ot does not surface in (1). In (3), of is
followed by a determiner. Thus, it is not deleted. (8) and (9) will
have similar derivations to (1) and (3), except here it is the complex
noun larae number that is adjoined to the preceding determiner.
Following Ritchie, I would suggest that the derivation of a Fiat from
(22) involves a rule that substitutes the noun in a partitive phrase
for the heed noun. The same rule will apply in the derivation of
a biK car in (23) and the red wine in (27).
If some and many are derived determiners, it is possible that the
9
universal quantifiers all, each, and every are also* X have no proposals
to offer, however, A central problem here is that semantically each
and every are similar and contrast with all* whereas syntactically
each and all are similar and contrast with every. X noted earlier
that each and every function as distributive operators. Thus,
while (30) can be understood distributively or collectively, (31)
and (32) can only be understood distributively.
(30) The boys lifted the rock.
(31) Each of the boys lifted the rock*
(32) Every boy lifted the rock*
all does not function as a distributive operator. (33), like (30)
can be understood distributively or oollectively*
(33) All the boys lifted the rock*
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Syntactically, each and all ace similar in two Important respects*
Firstly, both can be followed by partitive phrases* every cannot*
Thus, we have the following contrast*
(34) each of the boys
(35) all of the boys
(36) * every of the boys
Secondly, both can be postposed* Again, every cannot* The following
illustrate*
(37) The boys each won a price*
(38) The boys all won prizes*
(39) * The boys every won a prize*
There is, however, one important respect in which all and every are
Similar* Both can be preceded by not* each cannot*
(40) Sot ail Italians like garlic*
(41) Not every Italian likes garlic*
(42) * Not each Italian likes garlic*
These complexities suggest fairly strongly that the universal quantifiers
are derived determiners* What they derive from, however, is something
of a mystery*
1 want now to consider the underlying structure of referential
pronouns* 1 have argued that referential pronouns are a kind of
definite description* Like ordinary definite descriptions, they refer
to the contextually unique member of certain sets* he, for example,
refers to the contextually unique member of the set of males* An
ordinary definite description consists of the definite article and
a noun* It is possible, then, that referential pronouns should have
a similar source* Before 1 consider this possibility, I want to look
at demonstrative pronouns*
There is quite good evidence that demonstrative pronouns have
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the + N sources. Consider the following sentences.
(43) The men Eve talked to had more ideas than the ones Steve
talked to.
(44) The men Eve talked to had more ideas than those Steve talked to.
The obvious source for the ones Steve talked to in (43) is something
like (45),
(45) HP
ones Steve talk to x of men
those Steve talked to is clearly equivalent to the ones Steve talked to.
This in itself does not mean that it should have the same source. If
it does not» however, we will need to revise our account of relative
clauses* X have suggested that a restrictive relative clause limits
the extension of the noun with which it is combined* Xf those Steve
talked to does not derive from something like (45), the relative
clause will not be combined with a noun. This suggests quite strongly,
then, that those Steve talked to should derive from something like
(45). All this analysis requires is a rule adjoining one or ones
to the preceding determiner. This will be rather like the rule involved
in the derivation of some and many.
Returning to ordinary referential pronouns, one notices immediately
that they cannot be followed by relative clauses. The following
illustrate.
(46) * The man Eve talked to had more ideas than he Steve talked to.
(47) * The men Eve talked to had more ideas than they Steve talked to.
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Thus, while the semantics of referential pronouns will be simplifies!
if they have the + N sources, the obvious evidence for such a source
is lacking. There seem to be two possible conclusions. Either
referential pronouns are present as such in underlying structure, ha
which case the impossibility or (46) and. (47) is an automatic conse¬
quence, or they have the + H sources and pronoun formation is blocked,
if the noun is followed by a relative clause (or any other modifier).
Which is the correct conclusion is unclear to me.
An important proposal about the internal structure of noun
phrases is Bach's (1963) claim that nouns originate as predicates*
The claim has been accepted quite widely. 1 assume that nouns
originate as nouns. Thus, 1 reject the claim. Clearly, I should
say something about the claim and my reasons for rejecting it.
An initial problem with Bach's claim Is that It is not at all
clear what sort of structures it implies for noun phrases. Bach
himself does not sketch any structures. Carden and Dieterich (1976)
assume structures of the following form.
There are two problems with such structures. Firstly, it is not at
all clear how Det, N and s are supposed to be related semantically.
Secondly, it is not clear how the variables are to be understood.
On the face of it, (43) contains two unbound variables* More promis¬
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We could interpret the empty N here as denoting everything that there
is* The higher H, then, would denote a certain subset o£ everything,
the subset of which the propositional function expressed by the
relative clause is true* 1 think, then, that Bach's proposal could
be made to work. It cannot, however, eliminate the need for an N
node in uwSerlying structure.
Bach develops five main arguments for his proposal. They are
subjected to detailed criticism in Schachter (1973b). I think,
however, that two of them survive Schachter*s criticisms. One is an
argument that is taken up and elaborated by Garden and Dieterich.
1 will discuss this argument at some length.
Bach points out that the following sentence could be used in two
different situations.
(50) The idiot called rae up yesterday.
On the one hand, Smith could say it to Jones when both know only one
idiot* On the other hand, Smith could say it when Jones has said
something like Have you heard from Algernon lately? In the first case,
the idiot is simply a way of referring to a certain person. It can
be paraphrased as 'the one who is an idiot*. In the second case,
the idiot both refers to Algernon and expresses an opinion about him.
In this case, it can be paraphrased as *he, who is an idiot*. Much
the same situation arises with Garden and Dieterich*s example (51).
(51) John Smith spoke at the Faculty Club last night. The
writer was given a standing ovation at the end of the
lecture.
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Like (50), this can be used la two situations* It can be used when
the addressee knows that John Smith is a writer, and when he does not
know this* In the first case, the writer is simply a way of referring
to John Smith and can be paraphrased as *the one who is a writer*.
In the second ease, it refers to John Smith and gives new information
about him. In this case, it can be paraphrased as 'he, who is a
writer*.
It seems, then, that definite descriptions can often be used in
two different ways. They can be used simply to refer, or they can
be used both to refer and to express an opinion or give new information.
In the former case, they are paraphraseable by *the one* and a res¬
trictive relative clause. In the latter, they are paraphraseable by
a pronoun and a non-restrictive relative. In a Bach-type framework,
we can handle this phenomenon quite simply by deriving the noun
from a restrictive relative in the former case, and from a non-
restrictive relative in the latter. We might, then, derive (50)
from (52) and (53).
(52) S








It seems, then, that the dual function of definite descriptions
provides significant support for Bach's proposal.
Carden and Dieterich develop this argument further by comparing
nouns with attributive adjectives. They note firstly that attributive
adjectives can often be paraphrased by either restrictive or non-
restrictive relatives. Thus, (54) can be paraphrased by either
(55) or (56).
(54) The industrious Chinese will prosper.
(55) The Chinese who are industrious will prosper.
(56) The Chinese, who are industrious, will prosper.
They then note that there are situations in which an attributive
adjective can only be paraphrased by a restrictive relative. This is
the case firstly when the adjective is contrastively stressed. (57)
can only be paraphrased by (55).
(57) The INDUSTRIOUS Chinese will prosper.
It is also the case when the noun is followed by a restrictive relative.
(53), like (57), can only be paraphrased with a restrictive relative.
(53) The industrious Chinese that I met all admired Chairman Mao.
Garden and Dieterich go on to show that in these situations nouns
also can only be paraphrased by restrictive relatives, and cannot be
understood as expressing an opinion or giving new information.
Consider firstly (59).
(59) John Smith spoke at the Faculty Club last night. THE WRITER
seemed to enjoy the evening, the rest of us did not.
Here, the writer cannot be paraphrased as 'he, who is a writer', and
cannot be understood as giving new information about John Smith. Thus,
unless we know that John Smith is a writer, the writer must be
understood as referring to someone else* Consider also (60).
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(60) Yesterday, I interviewed two men, one rich and one poor*
The banker that was rich said that***
Here, the banker that was rich cannot be paraphrased as 'the one that
was rich, who was a banker*. It cannot be understood as giving new
information about the rich man. Thus, unless we know that both men
are bankers, this is not a coherent discourse. These facts seem to
strengthen Bach*s argument considerably* It is natural to account
for the interpretation of attributive adjectives by deriving them from
both restrictive and non-restrictive relatives. These facts suggest
that we should account for the interpretation of nouns in the same
way.
It looks, then, as if the dual function of definite descriptions
provides strong support for Bach*s proposal. I think, however, that
this impression is misleading. 1 want to suggest that the phenomenon
can be explained in pragmatic terms. We can begin with (50). 1 have
suggested that a definite description of the form the + N is used when
there is just one member of the set denoted by N that the hearer will
understand the speaker as referring to. In the first situation, this
condition is met in a quite straightforward way. Smith and Jones both
know just one idiot. It is this idiot that Jones understands Smith
as referring to. In the second situation, things are more complex.
Here, presumably, Jones does not think of Algernon as an idiot, the
idiot, therefore, is not a straightforward way of referring to him.
Jones, however, can assume that Smith is abiding by the co-operative
principle (Grice, 1975). He knows that Algernon is the only person
under discussion. He can assume, then, that it is Algernon that Smith
is referring to. He can also ask himself why Smith has used the
expression the idiot to refer to Algernon and not a more straightforward
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expression. The obvious answer to this question is that Smith wishes
to express the opinion that Algernon is an idiot.
We can propose a similar account for (51). In the first situation,
the hearer knows that John Smith is a writer, the writer, therefore,
is a straightforward way of referring to him. In the second situation,
the hearer does not know that John Smith is a writer. Here, then,
the writer is not a straightfowerd way of referring to him. John
Smith, however, is the only person under discussion. The hearer can
assume, then, that the speaker is referring to John Smith and providing
the information that he is a writer.
i am suggesting, then, that the use of definite descriptions
simply to refer in their basic use, and that their use to both refer
and express an opinion or give new information is a derived one. A
definite description has the basic use if the hearer knows that the
individual being referred to is a member of the set denoted by the
noun in the description. If the hearer does not know this, the des¬
cription may have the derived use. This is possible if there is just
one individual that the speaker could be referring to. If this is the
case, the hearer can assume that the speaker is referring to this
individual and that he is using the description in question to convey
the information that the individual is a member of the set denoted by
the noun in the description.
1 must now consider the facts to which Carden and Dieterich draw
attention. Firstly constrastive stress, as the name suggests, con-
trastive stress requires a contrast. Consider (61),
(61) SAM broke the ladder.
This is only appropriate if there are others who might have broken the
ladder* It might be paraphrased as (62).
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(62) It was Earn and not one of the others who broke the ladder.
Such paraphrases are generally possible for sentences involving con-
tr&stive stress. We have seen that for a definite description to have
the derived use there must be just one individual that the speaker
could be referring to. Thus, a definite description can have the
derived use only if there is no question of contrast. Naturally, then,
contrastive stress is impossible when a definite description has the
derived use. The restrictions on restrictive relatives are more
puzzling. The problem is to explain why the banker that was rich in
(60) cannot be used to refer to the rich man and give the information
that he is a banker. The most likely explanation, I think, is that
this stems from the fact that the expression suggests that there is
another banker under discussion who is not rich. If this is the
correct explanation, one would expect it to be equally impossible
for the rich banker to have this use. It seems to me that this is
the case. Carden and Dieterich claim, however, that it can have this
use. Presumably, there is individual variation here. Why some people
should understand the banker that was rich and the rich banker
differently is unclear to me, 1 think, however, that it is reasonable
to suppose that this can be explained in pragmatic terms.
I think, then, that the data to which Bach and Carden and Dieterich
draw attention can be explained without assuming two different sources
for definite descriptions. I do not think, then, that it provides any
support for the view that nouns originate as predicates.^
7. There are, of course, other distinctions to be drawn in connection
with the use of definite descriptions. In particular, there is Don¬
ne 1 lan' s (1966) distinction between referential and attributive uses.
How this distinction should be handled is far from clear. See, however,
Cole (1975) for an interesting proposal.
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The other argument of Bach*s that survives Schachter's criticisms
is one based on certain adjectives. Bach considers NP*s like the
following.
(63) the former president
(64) a real dope
Ke notes that these adjectives cannot be paraphrased with relative
clauses. (65) and (66) are not paraphrases of (63) and (64)#
(65) the president who was former
(66) a dope who was real
It follows that these adjectives cannot have the kind of source that
is generally assumed for attributive adjectives. Notice now that
(63) and (64) can be paraphrased as (67) and (63).
(67) the one who was formerly president
(63) the or.e. who is rerlly a dope
It seems plausible to derive (63) and (64) from (67) and (63)# It
looks, then, as If we have evidence that some nouns originate as
predicate nominals.
This argument seems quite plausible. It is not clear, however,
that it shows that nouns derive from predicates. It only shows this
if predicate nominals are predicates. "Hie question, then, is whether
predicate nominals are predicates. It seems t.o me that this is
unlikely. While it is quite plausible to analyze predicate adjectives
as predicates, such an analysis is not very plausible for predicate
nominals. Notice firstly that predicate nomin&ls are not all of one
kind. Some make assertions of identity. Others make assertions of
set membership. In (67), the predicate nominal is of the first kind.
In (68), it is of the second kind. In the first case, the predicate
nominal seems to be an ordinary NP. In the second case, it is
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probably not* This does not mean that it is a predicate, however*
Notice that such predicate nominals have the same internal structure
as ordinary NP*s*
(69) dim is a man of substance*
(70) Mary is a member of the X*M*G*
(71) Tony is a man who will do anything for money*
In this, they are quite unlike verbs and adjectives* This suggests, then,
that it is unlikely that they are predicates* X£ they are not
predicates, what are they? A plausible suggestion, advanced by
Anderson (1971) is that they are reduced locative expressions* On
this suggestion, (69) would derive from something like (72)*
(72) Jim is in the class of men of substance.
X think, then, that it is likely that predicate nominals are either
ordinary NP*s or reduced locative expressions*
X think, then, that it is very unlikely that predicate nominals
are predicates* Thus, while (63) and (64) suggest that some nouns
derive from predicate nominals, they do not provide any support for
the view that nouns originate as predicates* We can add that, if the
first argument were valid, it would only require the derivation of
nouns from predicate nominals* Xt would not require the derivation
of nouns from predicates* X think, then, that nouns originate as
nouns* Xt seems likely, however, that some nouns originate not in




X have now presented the main body of my proposals about pronouns.
X want, therefore,, to summarise the main conclusions, and indicate
Some further lines of inquiry that these proposals suggest.
The main conclusions that X outlined in chapter 7 remain valid.
There are two taain kinds of pronouns} bound variables and referential
pronouns. The former are much like bound variables in standard logic.
The latter are a kind of definite description. Where they are used
enaphorically, they can be termed pronouns of laziness. In chapter 8
X suggested that sentential pronouns are pronouns of laziness* X
suggested, however, that intensional pronouns cannot be pronouns of
laziness. They appear to be a further kind of pronoun.
As X suggested in chapter 7, my theory can be seen as a synthesis
of the bound variable theory and the theory sketched in Lasnik (1976).
Both theories contain important insights, which X have tried to develop.
Both, however, make the mistake of thinking that pronouns are all of the
same kind. A number of writers have recognized that there is more than
one kind of pronoun, notably Geach, Witten, Partee, and Cresswell. X
think, however, that their accounts contain various inadequacies which
mine avoids*
X think, then, that my account of pronouns is an attractive one.
This does not mean, however, that it does not have weaknesses, or that
it does not face problems. One possible weakness is the fact that the
account assigns a number of different sources to a simple, unambiguous
sentence. As X have said, quite standard arguments lead to this
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position* Furthermore, there are a number of precedents for it,
although it has probably not been assumed so extensively before* 1 am
40t at all sure, then, that this is a weakness* It should be clear,
however, that this is not a central feature of my proposals* 1 am,
therefore, not too concerned about it*
Much more clearly a weakness is the command constraint* This
constraint, taken from Witten (1972), accounts for a variety of
phenomena. 1 am unable, however, to offer any real explanation for
it* Some instances of the command constraint can be attributed to the
interaction of lowering and island constraints* Others, however, cannot*
Moreover, there are two classes of exceptions to the constraint*
Particularly problematic is the fact that these exceptions involve
violations of the complex NP constraint* 1 have no real explanation
for these exceptions, beyond the suggestion that they may have something
to do with analogy. It is possible that the nature of the constraint
and its exceptions will become clearer when island constraints are
better understood* For the moment, however, the situation is far from
satisfactory*
Another area of weakness that I want to consider briefly is high¬
lighted by sentences like (1), from Partee (1975b)*
(1) Every man who loves a woman loses her.
Partee cites this sentence as evidence against Montague*s account of
pronouns* We could have cited it as evidence against the bound
variable theory* On the most obvious reading, a is within the scope
of every. On this reading, a woman will originate inside the relative
clause. Clearly, then, the pronoun cannot represent a bound variable.
Rather similar is (2), from Geach (1972)*
263
(2) Almost every person who borrowed a book frora Snead .eventually
returned it.
Again, a is within the scope of every. Again, then, the pronoun cannot
represent a bound variable* Since these pronouns cannot be bound
variables, they must be pronouns of laziness. Here, however, we seem
to have a problem. As pronouns of laziness, her refers to the
Contextually unique female, and jit to the contextually unique thing.
In (1), however, there is no contextually unique female, and in (2),
there is no contextually unique thing, One might think that these
sentences show that my account of pronouns of laziness is inadequate.
This is not the correct conclusion, however, Hotice that we can
replace the pronouns in (1) and (2) by definite descriptions.
(3) Every man who loves a woman loses the woman.
(4) Almost every person who borrowed a book frora Snead eventually
returned the book.
On my account of definite descriptions, the woman refers to the con¬
textually unique woman, and the book to the contextually unique book.
In (3), however, there is no contextually unique woman, and, in (4),
there is no contextually unique book. It seems, then, that it is ray
account of definite descriptions that is inadequate, not ray account
of pronouns of laziness. How this inadequacy should be rectified,
however, is not at all clear*
An insightful account of any range of phenomena is likely to
raise questions, as well as answer them. 1 want, then, to outline some
of the questions that ray theory of pronouns raises. Perhaps the most
obvious question isi how far does the theory apply to languages other
than English? Obviously, this question can only be answered through
detailed investigation. I think, however, that it is very likely that
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all languages will involve a distinction between bound variables and
referential pronouns# 1 also think that they will probably have much
the same distribution in all languages* Their distribution is to a
Ifirge extent a function of semantic factors. There are good semantic
reasons why the pronouns in (5) and (6) can only represent bound
variables*
(5) An Italian thought he was Gramsci.
(6) Every American thinks he is a genius*
I would expect, then, that the equivalents of these sentences in other
languages will involve bound variables. There are, however, aspects
of the distribution of the two pronoun types which are not due to
semantic factors. The fact that the pronoun in (7) can only be a
pronoun of laziness is a result of the command constraint, not of some
semantic factor*
(7) Steve tried an hors d»eeuvre, and he liked it*
It is also the command constraint, and not some semantic factor, that
accounts for the ungrammaticality of (3)*
(S) * Steve tried every hors d*oeuvre, and he liked it#
Given the problematic nature of the command constraint, 1 would not
like to predict whether the equivalents of (7) in other languages
will only involve pronouns of laziness, or whether the equivalents
of (8) will be ungrananatical. Another fact for which there is no
semantic basis is the fact that an object pronoun in English must
represent a bound variable, if it is a clause mate of its antecedent*
This is because such a pronoun must be reflexive, and reflexives can
only represent bound variables. There are languages where such a
pronoun is not a reflexive. Keenan (1975a) cites Feriag (a Horth
Frisian dialect), Maori, and Gilbertese. 1 would expect that such a
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pronoun can be either a bound variable or a pronoun of laziness in
such languages. There are also languages where reflexives have a wider
distribution than in English. Keenan notes that reflexives are possible
in complement subject position in Japanese and Korean. It would be
interesting to know whether such reflexives must be analyzed as
bound variables.
It is clear, then, that my proposals raise questions about other
languages. They also raise questions about earlier stages of English.
It would clearly be useful to investigate how far ray analysis applies
to fid English and Middle English. 1 suspect that the central elements
will be applicable. Some of the more peripheral aspects, however,
may not be.
My proposals also raise questions for psycholinguistics. It would,
I think, be quite valuable to investigate the ways in which the dis¬
tinctions 1 have proposed figure in linguistic performance and the ways
in which they are acquired* It is quite likely, I think, that an
investigation of these matters would show referential pronouns to be
psychologically more basic titan bound variables. More generally, I
suspect that it would show that referring expressions are mere basic
than bound variables and indefinite KP*s» which do not refer. Some
relevant discussion is provided by Strawson (1961). He suggests that
♦Definite singular terns are singular terras in the primary sensej
"• : • ' ' ' •• •: i
indefinite singular terms are singular only in a secondary or
derivative sense*. He also argues that ♦our theoretical grasp of
canonical notation [i.e. logical symbolism] rests upon our theoretical
grasp of the identificatory function of singular terms*. I think that
these remarks are like to be true psychologically, as well as
philosophica1ly•
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Central to my account of definite descriptions, and thus to my
account of pronouns of laziness, is the notion of contextual uniqueness*
Clearly, this is an important notion. I think, then, that it would be
valuable to investigate the ways in which contextual uniqueness is
established, and the ways in which the relevant mechanisms are acquired*
Matters here are not at all stable* Consider firstly (9).
(9) * Eve talked to Brian and Ron. He was angry.
This is clearly incoherent* The problem is that it is impossible to know
who he refers to. There is, then, no contextually unique male. Consider
now (10).
(10) Brim talked to Ron. He was angry.
Out of context, this is ambiguous. In context, however, it will normally
be clear who he refers to# In context, then, there will be a con-
textually unique male. Consider finally (11).
(11) Brian talked to Ron. He criticized him.
This is unambiguous. The first pronoun refers to Brian, and the
second to Ron. Thus, there is one contextually unique male when the
first pronoun appears, and another when the second appears. Clearly,
we have some interesting problems here. 1 think, then, that a psycho-
linguistic investigation of them would be very valuable.
It is clear, then, that my theory of pronouns raises a number
of questions for further research. I will not pursue these questions,
however# Instead, in the rest of this thesis, I will look at some of
the ways in which constituents other than HP*s enter into anaphoric
relations. We will see that definite descriptions again play an




SOME ASPECTS OF ADJECTIVES ARD ADVERBS
In this chapter, I want to look at various aspects of the grammar
of adjectives and adverbs. This will provide a basis for a consideration
Of adjectival and adverbial anaphora. I will be particularly concerned
Vith the analysis of equative and comparative constructions. Before I
discuss this, however, I want to consider some more general questions
about adjectives and adverbs.
11.1. Preliminary Remarks /
id
I want to begin by talcing a look at what might be terms the
classical transformational analysis of adjectives, This analysis
assumes that all adjectives, whether predicative or attributive on the
surface, originate as predicatives. Surface attributives are assumed
to derive from predicatives in relative clauses, the tall man, for
example, is assumed to derive through whiz-deletion and adjective shift
from the man who is tall. Such an analysis seems quite plausible
for many attributive adjectives. It has been clear, however, at leaut
since Bolinger (1967), that not all attributive adjectives can be
derived in this way. Tie following illustrate.
(1) a rural policeman
(2) a chemical engineer
(3) a criminal lawyer
(4) a constitutional amendment
(5) an utter fool
(6) a former employee
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Beginning with (1) and (2), notice that neither rural nor chemical
can appear in predicative position with the same nouns. Neither the
policeman is rural nor the engineer is chemical are grammatical.
It is fairly clear, then, that they cannot derive from predicative
adjectives, criminal and constitutional can appear in predicate
position, but not with the sense they have in (3) and (4). Again,
then, it is fairly clear that they should not derive from predicatives.
Finally, utter and former cannot appear in predicative positions at all.
Clearly, then, they also should not originate as predicatives. Levi
<1975) discusses such *non-predicating* adjectives at length, and
develops some quite persuasive analyses. Roughly, she proposes that
they derive from either NP's or adverbs. It looks, then, as if we
might suggest that attributive adjectives fall into two categories!
those that derive from predicatives in relative clauses, and those
that have analyses of the kind developed by Levi.
Doubts are cast on this suggestion by some remarks of Cresswell
(1973). In sharp contrast to the classical transformational analysis,
he assumes that all adjectives, whether predicative or attributive
i.
on the surface, derive from attributives. His reason for assuming
that surface attributives are also underlying attributives is that their
meanings are often bound up with the meanings of the nouns they qualify.
He notes the following example from Lyons <1963).
(7) A small elephant is a large animal*
Clearly, the meanings of small and large are bound up with the meanings
of the nouns they qualify. His reason for assuming that surface
predicatives are underlying attributives is provided by sentences like
<8),
(3) Arabella Is large.
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It is fairly clear that a noun is implicit in (8). If Arabella is a
child, (8) may mean that she is a large child. If she is a woman, it
may mean that she is a large woman. Cresswell1s suggestion, then, is
that a predicative adjective like large in (8) derives from a predicate
nominal with an empty noun whose value is determined by the context.
Both Cresswell*s analysis and the classical transformational
analysis assume,' that adjectives have a single source. Even if we
exclude non-predicating adjectives, this assumption is open to question.
Interesting evidence against it is presented in Siegel (1976). She
notes that Russian adjectives have a short and a long form. Both can
appear in predicative position, but only the latter can appear in
attributive position. Siegel argues that short form adjectives
originate as predicates and long form adjectives as noun modifiers.
Bart of Iter evidence is a semantic contrast between the two when they
appear in predicative position* In this position, the short form has an
absolute meaning, whereas the long form has a relative meaning. The
following illustrate. j
(9) Studentka umna
•(The) student (is) intelligent*
!
(10) Studentka uranaja |
•(The) student (is) intelligent*
(9) means that the student is intelligent in general, absolute terms.
|
1
(10) means that she is intelligent compared with other students. If
>
short form adjectives represent predicates and long forms noun modifiers,
this is quite natural, tcona trill originate as a predicate, while
umnaja will derive from a predicate nominal in notch the same way as
Cresswell suggests large in (3) does. The contrast between (9) and
(10) suggests quite strongly, Chen, that Russian adjectives at least have
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more than one source, even when non-predicating adjectives are
excluded.
If Russian adjectives can represent both predicates and noun-
modifiers, it is possible that English adjectives can too. If one
makes this assumption, one need not necessarily assume that the two
types have the same distribution as they appear to have in Russian.
In particular, one need not assume that surface attributives can only
represent noun modifiers. Jackendoff (1972) suggests that attributive
I
adjectives should be generated in their surface position. He suggests,
however, that prenorainal participles derive through whiz-deletion
and adjective shift. If prenominal participles are derived in this
way, it is at least possible that ordinary attributive adjectives should
be also. This is particularly plausible for attributive adjectives
whose meanings, unlike those of lara,e and small, are not bound up with
the meanings of the nouns they qualify. I think, then, that it is
likely that attributive adjectives can represent noun modifiers. I
think, however, that it is also likely that many can represent predicates.
In what follows, 1 will assume that they all can, apart from non-
predicating adjectives. This assumption is not crucial, however. My
"i
proposals will not require any major recasting, if it turns out to be
untenable*
1 want now to say something about adverbs, in particular about
I
manner adverbs. Following Dik (1974), I take manner adverbs to have
three main characteristics. Firstly, they characterize the manner in
which an activity is carried out or e process goes on. Secondly,
they are questioned with how. Finally, they can be paraphrased with





(It) Jim drove carefully#
A number of analyses seem plausible for such adverbs# One might suggest
that they originate in subordinate clauses, so that (11) derives from
something like John drove in a manner which was careful# Such an
analysis is considered but rejected in Kuroda (1970). Alternatively,
one might suggest, as Kuroda does, that they originate in higher
clauses, so that (11) derives from something like The manner in which
Jim drove was careful# Finally, one might suggest, with Dik, that they
originate in conjoined sentences. On this proposal, (11) would derive
from something like Jim drove and the manner of his driving was careful#
Ail three analyses assume that manner adverbs originate as adjectives.
This assumption is by no means necessary, however. In part, perhaps,
[
its acceptance stems from the view that the categories of underlying
structure should be essentially those of standard predicate logic# The
work of Cresswell and Montague shows that this view need not be
accepted# It is arguable that their work involves an unjustifiable
proliferation of categories#* 1 think, however, that it showB that
it is quite reasonable to suppose that the categories of underlying
Structure need not be restricted to those of standard predicate logic#
i
a
We have seen that it is quite likely that we should recognize a class of
noun modifiers# It is possible that we should also recognize a class of
predicate modifiers, and that manner adverbs are members of this class#
•
4 '■ \ p" *
r*
1# As Dowty (1976*229) puts it, Montague grammar 'allows us to multiply
syntactic categories at will# **.whereas generative semantics has
historically been quite parsimonious in the grammatical categories
it admits, Montague grammar seems destined to postulate a plethora
of them'. The same is true ®f Cresswell's framework.
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If we do assume that manner adverbs are predicate modifiers, we
can still assume more abstract sources for other -ly adverbs* Following
gchreiber (1971), for example, we might suggest that a modal adverb
like possibly originates in a structure like (12), and a factive adverb
like unfortunately in a structure like (13)*
(12) S be possible
(13) S and S be unfortunate
Following Dik, we might suggest that an adverb like willingly originates
in a structure of the following form*
(14) S Mid NP be willing S
Finally, with Anderson (1973), we might suggest that carefully in
sentences like (13), where it does not have a manner reading, originates
in a structure like (16)*
(13) Sam carefully changed his position.
(16) S and S be careful of US?
As Lakoff (1973b) points out, deriving non-manner adverbs from structures
involving complements holds out the prospect of a natural account of
the ambiguities of scope and opacity associated with them* If manner
adverbs are predicate modifiers, there should be no such ambiguities
associated with them* 1 have not looked at the matter at all closely,
but it seems to me that this may well be the case.
there may well be a second class of predicate modifiers* Notice




Whereas maimer adverbs can be paraphrased with expressions of the form
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in a ...manner, the adverbs here can be paraphrased with expressions of
the form to a **.extent. Thus, (17) can be paraphrased as dangerous
to an extreme extent* We might, then, call them extent adverbs* Xf
manner adverbs are predicate modifiers, it seems reasonable to suggest
that extent adverbs are also* A possible problem arises from the
fact that extent adverbs can modify attributive adjectives as well as
predicatives* Xf some attributive adjectives can only represent noun
modifiers, we will have to say that extent adverbs are noun modifier
\ modifers as well as predicate modifiers* Perhaps this is a reason for
thinking that all attributive adjectives, except non-predicating
adjectives, can represent predicates*
While there are problems about details, X think it is quite
plausible to suggest that both swsner adverbs and extent adverbs are
predicate modifiers* This proposal is not crucial, however. What
follows is compatible with Various alternatives. It is not necessary,
then, to discuss it any further*
11*2* Squatives and Comparatives
Having considered a minber of general questions about the grammar
of adjectives, X will now develop an analysis of equatives and com¬
paratives* As will become apparent in the next chapter, the former
are particularly important for the analysis of adjectival and adverbial
anaphora.
We can begin with simple predicative equatives like that in (1).
(I) Mary is as tall as Helen.
X think it is plausible to derive this from something like (2).
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(2) S
Mary be tall to the extent,, S
Helen be tell to x
An alternative realisation cf (2) is (3).
(3) Mary is tall to the extent that Helen Is.
This ic presumably the result of relative deletion and VP-deletion. (I)
obviously involves additional rules. A natural suggestion is that it
involves the proposing of to the extent and its realization as ajs. Notice,
however, that to the extent is not a constituent. The crucial structure
is eoro©thing like (4),
If we assume with Schwartz <1972) that only constituents can be moved,
to the extent cannot be fronted. The most plausible solution, I think,
is to assume that the whole of (4) is proposed and the relative clause
subsequently extrapesed. 1 will call the proposing rule *extent phrase
fronting*• X assume that it is also involved in the derivation of
(5) and (6)*
(5) Mary is nine foot tali.
(6) How tall is Mary?
In these cases* there is no subsequent extraposition. Two further
rules are needed for the derivation of (1). One will introduce the
complementizer as into the relative clause. The other will delete
/ - 7
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the be in the relative clause. The latter, of course, is optional*
Equatives also appear in attributive position, of course, as (7)
illustrates.
(7) Mary is as tall a girl as Helen*
If attributive adjectives can represent predicates, (7) might derive from
something like (3)*
Mary be a
x be tall t© the extent S"
*>
- s,A
Helen be a girl, S&
„ "
z be tall to y
The derivation will naturally be quite complex. Whiz deletion and
3 2
adjective shift will apply on 8 , On S , extent phrase fronting will
3 1
apply with subsequent extraposition of S . Then, on S , whiz deletion
and adjective shift will apply again. On the most obvious formulation
3
of adjective shift, S will be fronted along with as tall* Presumably,
the extraposition rule that we have proposed will move it back to its
original position. Once it has applied, another fronting rule will
position as tall in front of the indefinite determiner. The derivation
of (7) also involves considerable deletion. All the material after
Helen is deleted. As before, of course, the deletion ©f be is optional*
We can now turn to sentences like (9)*
(9) Sara has as many books as Sam.












have a number,, S of books
z be large to y
From this, (11) will derive in a fairly straightforward way*
(11) Sara has as large a number of books as Sara.
We suggested earlier that many derives from a large number. We can
account for the appearance of many in (9), if we assume that equative
fronting is accomplished by two rules* one fronting as, the other
fronting the adjective* Once the first rule has applied to (11),
we will have as a large number* This can be realized as as many*
Broadly similar to (9) is (12)*
(12) Sara has as much sugar as Sam*
We can derive this from something like (13)*
%
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* be large to the ex ten S
Sm have a amount S of sugar% "
% be large to y
A fairly straightforward realization of (13) is (14)*
(14) Sara has as large an amount of sugar as Sam*
It seems quite likely that much in a sentence like (13) should derive
from a large amount.
(15) Much beer was drunk.
If equatives are fronted in two stages, it can have the same source in
(12).
Also quite like (9) is (16).^
(16) Sara likes honey as much as Sam.
We can derive this from something like (17).
2. (16) is in fact ambiguous* meaning either (i) or (ii).
(i) Sara likes honey as touch as Sam likes honey.
(ii) Sara likes honey as much as she likes Sam.












San like honey to an extent S
2 be large to y
A straightforward realisation of (17) is the rather unnatural (18).
(13) Sara likes honey to as large an extent as Sam*
If we assume that much can derive from a large extent as well as from
a large amount, the derivation of (16) will be quite straightforward.
I think that this approach to equatives is quite promising. What
I want to show now is that it can be extended in a quite natural way to
cover comparatives. We need just two additional rules to handle
comparatives. We will see in the next section that one of them is
needed independently.
We can begin with simple predicative comparatives like that in
<**).
(19) Mary is taller than Helen.





x -er the extent^ S
Helen be tall to y
-eg here is a predicate meaning 'exceeds' or 'is greater than'. I am
representing it this way because I am primarily interested in its
role as the source of the comparative suffix* If we assume that it
can also be realized as exceeds* (21) will be an alternative realization
of (20)*
(21) Mary is tall to an extent which exceeds the extent to which
This will have a quite simple derivation* The derivation of (19) will
be more complex. 1 would suggest that there is a rule that deletes
suggest* then* that this is realized as the comparative suffix* The
rule that effects this is our second new rule*
As well as simple comparatives like taller* we have complex
comparatives formed with more. (22) illustrates*
(22) Mary is more intelligent than Helen*
One might suggest that this derives from a structure just like (20)
but with intelligent in place of tall* To derive it from such a
structure) one would have to assume that an -er extent can be proposed
by extent phrase fronting and realized as more. This is not obviously
Helen is tall*
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unreasonable, X want to propose, however, that (22) derives from a
more complex structure than (20). Specifically, X want to propose
that it derives from (23).
(23)
Mary be intelligent to an extent^ S
x be large to an extent S
y -er the extent S
-1 •
Helen be intelligent to an extentw S"
w be large to z
X assume that the extent is deleted on S , and that whiz deletion,
2
adjective shift and comparative formation apply on S to produce
larger. Then, on S*, whiz deletion and adjective shift can apply to
produce the phrase to a larger extent. I suggest that it is this
phrase that is preposed by extent phrase fronting and realized as
more. The reason for assuming such a derivation is that it allows
us to claim that more, like many and much, always reflects an under¬
lying predicate of quantity. I assume that a structure like (20) but
with intelligent in place of tall is perfectly well-formed. Its
natural realization is (24).
(24) * Mary is intelllgenter than Helen.
X assume that this is ruled out by an output condition.
Comparatives also appear in attributive position, of course.
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Parallel to <19) and (22), we have (25) and (26),
<25) Mary Is a taller girl than Helen*
(26) Mary is a store intelligent girl than Helen.
These will derive from structures that are related to (20) and (23) in
just the same way as (3) is related to (2). Notice that attributive
comparatives, unlike attributive equstives, follow the determiner, like
simple attributive adjectives.
Notice now that parallel to (9), (12) and (16) we have the following.
(27) Sara has more books than Sam.
(23) Sara has more sugar than Sam.
(29) Sara likes honey more than Sam.
We can derive these from structures like (10), (13), and (17), but
containing the comparative predicate ~er. In all three cases, more
will reflect an underlying large. This suggests quite strongly that it
should in (22). Alternative realisations of the structures underlying
(27) - (29) will be the following.
(30) Sara has a larger number of books than Sam.
(31) Sara has a larger amount of sugar than Sam.
(32) Sara likes honey to a larger extent than Son.
(32), like (18), is rather unnatural.
I think it is fairly clear that we can provide a quite natural
account of comparatives. 1 want now to take a brief look at some
equatives and comparatives that are not often discussed.
Notice firstly that parallel to (9) we have (33).
(33) Sara has as few books as Sam.
It is natural to derive this from a structure just like (10), but with
small in place of large. (34) will derive from the same structure.
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(34) Sara has as small a number of books as Sam.
It seems quite likely that a few in a sentence like (35) should derive
from a sr.;all number.
(35) A few books were reed.
It is not surprising, then, that few shows up in (33)."* Notice now
that parallel to (27) we have (36).
(36) Sara has less books than Sara.
We can derive this from a structure like that underlying (27), but
with small in place of large. (37) will derive from the same structure.
(37) Sara has a smaller number of books than Sam.
Notice next that parallel to (12) and (28) we have (38) and (39).
(33) Sara has as little sugar as Cam.
(39) Sara has less sugar than Sam.
We can derive these from structures just like those underlying (12) and
(28), (40) and (41) will derive from the same structures.
(40) Sera has as small an amount of sugar as Sam.
(41) Sara has a smaller amount of sugar than Sam.
It is natural to suggest that a little in a sentence like (42) derives
from & small amount.
n w—l ■ liw ..wiwiiiwi
(42) A little beer was drunk.
It is not too surprising, then, that little appears in (38). Just as
(38) and (39) parallel (12) and (28), so (43) and (44) parallel (16)
and (29),
m m m m *• m m
3. The situation, however, is more complex than with many and as many,
because we have a few not few, few means 'not many*. It is possible
that as few should have as a few as its immediate source. Similar
remarks apply to a little and as little.
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<43} Sara likes honey as little as Sen#
(44) Sara likes honey less titan Sam.
Clearly, we can derive these from structures like those underlying
<16) and (29), Notice finally that parallel to (22) we have (45).
(45) Mary is less intelligent than Helen.
Obviously, we can derive this from a structure just like (23). It
seems, then, that we can handle these constructions quite naturally.
I think, then, that they provide significant support for the analysis
I m developing.
1 want now to compare sentences like (7) with sentences like (46).
(46) Mary is a girl as tall as Helen*
An important fact about (7) is that it implies that Helen is a girl.
This is shown by the deviance that results if Helen is replaced by a
man*® name. Consider, for example, (47).
(47) * Mary is as tail a girl as dim.
Hie source 1 have proposed for (7), i.e. (8), captures this implication
quite naturally. Notice now that (46) does not imply that Helen is a
girl. (43) is quite acceptable.
(43) Haxy is a girl as tall as Jim.
Clearly, then, (46) must have a different source from (7). Something
like (49) seems appropriate.
(49) S
x be tali to the extent^ S
Jim be tall to y
284
Clearly, this does not imply that Jim is a girl. We will need some kind
of global constraint to ensure that (7) can only derive from (3) and
not from <49), We might suggest a constraint on adjective shift, I
will not pursue this matter, however, 1 simply want to note that
comparatives are just like equatives here, (50) differs from (25)
in just the same way as (46) differs from (7),
(50) Mary is a girl taller than Helen.
While (51) is deviant, (52) is quite acceptable,
(51) * Mary is a taller girl than Jim,
(52) Mary is a girl taller than Jim,
Thus, while (25) derives from a Structure like (3), (50) will derive
from a structure like (49),
Z have now sketched the main components of an analysis of equatives
and comparativeb. Shortly, I will compare this analysis with the
main alternatives. First, however, I want to say something about the
grammar of the same,
11*3* A Note on the same
The grammar of the game has received little attention. In particu¬
lar, it has generally been ignored in accounts of equatives and
comparatives. There are, however, important similarities between the
same and equatives and comparatives. It is important, then, to say
something about it*
In some ways, the same is like similar and different. All three
may be either transitive or intransitive in surface structure. In
the latter case, the subject must be semantically plural. It must,
that is, be either a conjoined NP or a simple plural. The possi¬
bilities are illustrated in (1), (2), and (3)*
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[the same as 1
(1) Alarlc Is]similar to I Theodoric.[different from J
j the same ~)
(2) Alarlc and Theodoric are j similar (L[different J
j the same *)
(3) The Goths are ail j similar |(. different J
One might assume, with bakoff and Peters (1969), that sentences like
(2) and (3) are basic, and that sentences like (1) derive from sentences
like (2) through a rule of conjunct movement. Such a treatment runs
into a nittiber of problems, however. (See, for example, Anderson,
1973b.) It is more plausible, then, to assume that sentences like (1)
©re basic, and that sentences like (2) and (3) derive from the reciprocal
sentences in (4) and (5)*
('the seme as ^
(4) Alaric and Theodoric are j similar to j- each other.[ different froraj
(5) The Goths are all
the same as 1
similar to i each other.
different from)
In other ways, the seme differs from similar and different. It differs
obviously in the presence of the. It differs also in that it can be
followed not only by nouns but also by various other constituents*
The following illustrate.
(" the same as ~)
(6) Marie is \ * similar to > Theodoric is*
I* different- from J
[ the same as 1
(7) The weather is J * similar to f it was last year.
I* different from)
f the same as "]
(8) The situation is]* similar to [we expected.i* different from)
Here, the same is like equatIves and comparatives, as the following
illustrate.
(9 j Aiaric is than
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as tall as Theodoric is*
(10) The weather is {^t^th^i} iC W8S laSt ye**'
(11) The situation is \ ^rse^than l*1® exPecte<3«
It searas, then, that the sarae has quite peculiar properties*
flow are we to account for these properties? X want to begin by
looking at sentences like (12)*
(12) Aiaric has the sane problem as Theodoric.
Here, we have an ordinary NP, so the presence of the Is no problem*
X want to suggest that (12) derives from something like (13), where
same is a predicate of identity*
(13) Sl
Aiaric have a probiemK S




The derivation will be quite simple* On S , relative deletion will
apply and the problem will be deleted by the rule that deletes the
extent in the derivation of comparatives* Then, on S*, whiz deletion
and adjective shift will apply to give the same problem* At some
pointg of course, the second have must be deleted* £ must also be
changed to the* It seems, then, that we can account for sentences
like (12) quite simply* What now of sentences like (14)?
(14) Aiaric is the same as Theodoric.
One way to account for the presence of the here is to claim that the
same is mat HP* This is whet X want to claim* More precisely, X want
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to claim that the same derives from the sane thins* Since (15) Is
rather doubtful, this might seem rather ad hoc.
(15) ? Alaric is the same thing as Theodoric.
Notice, however, that both (16) and (17) are quite acceptable.
(16) Alaric did the sane as Theodoric.
(17) Alaric did the same thing as Theodoric.
1 think, then, that it is quite natural to assume that the same derives
from the same thing.
It seems, then, that our account of equatives and comparatives
provides the basis of a quite natural account of the graraaar of the
game. I think that this provides further support for it.
11.4. Some Comparisons
I want now to consider the main alternatives to the analysis I
have developed here. I will consider the approaches of Postal (1974b),
Seuren (1973), and Bresnan (1973). 1 will argue that none of them
is as promising as the present approach.
Postal sketches an analysis of equatives and comparatives in the
course of an investigation of ambiguities like those in (I) and (2).
(1) Jim believes lie is taller than he is.
(2) Jim doesn't believe he is as tall as he is.
(1) can mean that Jim believes a contradiction or that he believes he
is taller than he in fact is. (2) can mean that Jim doesn't believe
a tautology cr that he doesn't believe he is as tali as he actually
is. Postal develops an analysis in which (3) and (4) will derive from
something like (5) and (6).
(3) Jim is taller than Sam*
(4) Jim is as tall as Sam.
4. An alternative, as James Thome has pointed out to me, is bo assume






Jim be tali to x Sam be tail to y
MORE here is a predicate of comparison, SAME is a predicate of identity,
5
and the variables are understood to range over extents* Postal*s
approach differs from mine in three obvious ways* Firstly, he assumes
that equatives involve a predicate of identity* Secondly, he assumes
that the predicate of identity and the predicate of comparison are
5* Somewhat similar to Postal*s approach is the approach of Cresswell
<1976). In his categorial grammar framework, the predicates of
comparison and identity are members of the category <0,<0,1>,<0,1»,
the category of symbols that take two one place predicates to form a
sentence* (3), for him, would derive from something like (i)*
(i) «Ax<Jim tall,A>x>> er than <Ax<Sara tall,A>x»
This formula incorporate® his view that predicative adjectives are
underlyingly attributive. Also somewhat similar, it seems to me, is
the approach of Bartsch and Venneman (1972)* For than, (3) would derive
from something like (ii)«
<ii) F?(Jira> > F?(Sam)
F* is a measure function for tallness, and > means *is greater than**
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main predicates. Thirdly, he assumes predicate first order. The third
,
point is not an essential feature of Postal's analysis, but the other
two are. I will argue in the next chapter against the view that
equativas involve a predicate of identity. However, even if they do
involve such a predicate, there are arguments against the view that it
and the predicate of comparison are main predicates.
The main reason for rejecting this view is that it involves un¬
necessarily abstract underlying structures and otherwise unnecessary
lowering rules. Postal, in fact, postulates two lowering rules. The
assumption that MORE and SAME are main predicates is central to
Postal's account of ambiguities like those in (1) and (2). In Postal's





he be tali to x he be tall to y
(3)
MORE x
he be tall to x
These capture the two readings of (1) quite adequately. So, however,




he be tall to an extentx
x «er the extent S
y
<1C>
he be tall to y
Jim believe S the extenty S
he be tall to an extent S
z
he be tall to y
e -er x
It seems, then, that we can account ior the crucial ambiguities without
6
assuming that MORE and SAME are main predicates.
0. There is a problem, however, in the derivation o£ (1) from (10),
1 have suggested that the extent is deleted on the -er cycle in the
derivation of comparatives. However, if HP-lowering is cyclic, the
extent will not be present on this cycle in the derivation of (1) from
(10), This could mean that NF-lowering is precyclic or that deletion
of the extent is pestcyclic#
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Interesting evidence against Postal's analysis is presented in
Reinharfc (1974), She notes that there are ambiguities which his
system cannot handle adequately. She considers, for example, (11).
(11) Her headache prevented Sosa from answering more questions
than she did.
In Postal's system, the obvious source for the natural reading of (11)
is something like (12).
(12) MORE x (her headache prevent (R answer x questions)) y (R
answer y questions)
This means, however, that the number of questions that her headache
prevented Rosa from answering exceeded the number that she answered.
This is not the natural reading of (11). Notice now that in the analysis
I have developed (11) can derive from something like (13).
U£>
her headache prevent S the extent S
R answer a number S of questions R answer a number S of questions
A
z be large to an extent S v be large to y
'\
w -er x
Here, the predicate of comparison is within the scope of prevent* A
little reflection suggests, I think, that this captures the natural
meaning of (11) quite adequately. It seems, then, that the analysis
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X have developed can handle the crucial ambiguities rather better
than Postal*s*
1 can turn now to Seuren*s analysis* Like Postal, Seuren assumes
considerably more abstract structures than those X have proposed* X
will argue that this abstractness has no advantages*
Seuren only considers comparatives* His analysis, however, can
be extended in a quite natural way to cover equatives* He suggests, as
a first approximation, that a comparative like (13) derives from
something like <14)*7
<13) John is taller than Bill*
<14) S
V
be tall to e Bill
£ here is a variable ranging over extents* Given such a source for
<13), the natural source for an equative like <15) is something like <16)«
7* Seuren subsequently proposes a more complex analysis according to
which <13) will derive from something like <i>*
(i) 3e(the £(f is an extent & John is tall to f) is great to e &
not (the g(g is an extent & Bill is tall to g) is great to e))
My remarks apply equally to this analysis*
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for sosae a |
6 and S
be tall to e John be tall to e Bill
The central feature of Seuren's analysis is that he assumes,
following Ross (1969a), that comparatives involve an underlying negative*
He suggests that this explains the faet that than clauses constitute
a negative environment* There are two ways in which than clauses
constitute a negative environment. On the one hand, they prohibit
elements that cannot occur in negative contexts* On the other hand,
they allow elements that can only occur in negative contexts* A number
of items that are impossible in negative contexts are illustrated in
the following*
(17) * 1 haven*t already eaten too much.
(13) * I wouidn*t rather be at heme*
(19) * lie didn't do pretty well in the exam*
(t6) * John doesn't still play golf*
All these items are impossible in than douses, as the following show*
(21) * He has got more support than you already have*
(22) * He carries more than 1 would rather do*
(23) * Bill runs slower than I would pretty much like to*
(24) * John can afford less books than he still wants to buy.
A number of items that can only occur in negative contexts are illus¬
trated in (25) «* (28)* All the items can occur in than clauses, as
(29) - (32) show*
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(25) Bob I j- bother leaving a number,
<26) 1 IwTun} M S"*
<27> *>*{„.£?»} l"«-
(23) X j | bear the sound of her voice,
(29) That's more than he will bother thinking of,
(30) The fifth glass was more than I cared to drink,
(31) John runs faster than he need run,
(32) The sound of her voice was more than X could bear.
Given such data, Seuren's analysis seems quite plausible, Notice,
however, that as clauses seem to constitute a negative environment
in just the same way as than clauses. The following illustrate,
(33) * He has got as much support as you already have,
(34) * He carries as much as X would rather do.
(35) * Bill runs as slow as 1 would pretty much like to,
(36) * John can afford as few books as he still wants to buy,
(37) That's as much as he will bother thinking of,
(33) The fifth glass was as much as X cared to drink,
(39) John runs as fast as he need run,
(40) The sound of her voice was as much as X could bear.
Clearly, the negative character of as clauses is not the result of an
underlying negative. There is no reason, then, to assume that the
negative character of than clauses is,
A second advantage that Seuren claims for his analysis is an
ability to account for an ambiguity in sentences like (41),
(41) Planes are safer now than thirty years ago.
He suggests that this is ambiguous between (42) and (43),
295
(42) For every plane there is an extent to which it is safe now,
but was not thirty years ago*
(43) There is an extent such that every plane is safe to that
extent now but thirty years ago every plane was not safe
to that extent*
In Seuren*s system, these two readings can be represented as (44) and
(45)*
(44) Vx 3e (now x is safe to e & not thirty years ago x was safe
to e)
(45) 3e (now Vx (x is safe to e) & not thirty years ago Vy (y
was safe to e))
Seuren is mistaken, however, in thinking that (43) is a possible
reading of (41)* (41) cannot imply that there is a single extent such
that every plane is safe to that extent* It cannot imply that all
planes are equally safe* But this is exactly what (43) implies. X
would suggest that the ambiguity in (41) is a matter of the inter¬
pretation of the subject NP* It can be interpreted distributively
or collectively* In the former case, (41) means (46)* In the latter,
it means (47)*
(46) Every plane is safer now than it was thirty years ago*
(47) Planes as a class are safer now than they were thirty
years ago*
% suggested how the distributive collective ambiguity should be
handled in chapter 4* My proposal may or may not be correct* I think
it is clear, however, that (41) provides no support for Seuren*s
analysis.
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1 can now consider Bresnan's proposals* Bresaan provides a wide-
ranging discussion, considering not only equatives and comparatives,
but also the gramear of too and enough* X have been influenced quite
considerably by this discussion in developing the proposals of this
chapter and the next* Bresnan*s analysis has a number of arbitrary
features, I think that, if these features were eliminated* the result
would be an analysis quite like mine*
for Bresnan, an equative sentence like (43) will derive from
something like (49),











a. Sera be x much, old
•
... • '
. . : . • ••
^ : - • ■
the corresponding comparative sentence (50) will derive from
like (51)*










than Sam be x much aid
A sentence like <52} with an attributive equative will derive fro®
setaething like v(53)*











S much old a man
at Sam be x much eld a
(54), with the corresponding comparative, will have a similar source*
(54) Jim is an older man than Sam*
One rather arbitrary feature of Bresnan** analysis is her generate*
ion of adjectives as left sisters of HP's* Adjectives do, of course,
appear in this position* Equatives are the obvious example* They
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are the exception, however, not the rule. It is much more plausible,
then, to generate attributive adjectives as left sisters of nouns
or to derive theta from relative clauses. 1 suggested earlier that
they may well have both sources.
A second rather arbitrary feature of Bresnan's analysis is her
treatment of as and -er as determiners of quantifier phrases. Tc
treat them in this way is to claim that their role in a quantifier
phrase is like that of the articles in an NP. There is some truth
to this claim where as is concerned. While its semantic role is
quite different from that of the articles, its position is parallel
to theirs. There is no truth to the claim, however, where -er is
concerned. Neither in its semantic role nor in its surface position
is it like the articles. Thus, while there is some basis for calling
as a determiner, it is quite arbitrary to label -er this way. If one
accepts this, one will look for an alternative analysis of -er. The
obvious alternative is to treat -er as the reflection of an underlying
predicate of comparison. If one does, of course, one will have to
revise Bresnan*s conception of a quantifier phrase* The result is
likely to be an analysis of comparatives quite like that I have
advanced,
1 tiiink, then, that the analysis 1 have developed is preferable
to the three main alternatives. Bresnan's analysis is the most
interesting of these alternatives. Unlike Postal and Seuren, she
considers some of the phenomena with which 1 will be concerned in the
next chapter. 1 will be referring to her proposals again, therefore.
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CHAPTER 12
ADJECTIVES AND ADVERBS IN ANAPHORA
I can now consider adjectival and adverbial anaphora* My main
concern will be with so and such* 1 will also consider the expression
lik: h'tat. and then and there* The relevance of the discussion of the
last chapter will soon become apparent*
12*1* so
00 has a variety of uses* a number of which will be considered in
this thesis* Here, I am primarily concerned with the use that is
exemplified in seutences like the following.
(1) Eve is irritable* and she has been so for weeks*
(2) Steve filled in the form carefully* and he*d do it so again.
In (1), we can say that so is a pro-adjective* and that irritable
is its antecedent* In (2)* we can say that it is a pro-adverb with
carefully as its antecedent*
We should note at the outset that this use is subject to a variety
of restrictions. In the present context* they are not too important.
It is necessary* however* to say something about them. A general
observation made by Bolinger (1972) is that pro-adjective and pro-
adverb so are most acceptable in 'indefinite* contexts. He notes*
however* that *the condition of indefiniteness takes subtle forms
that are extremely difficult to define*. One thing the condition
means is that so is acceptable with abstract antecedents* but un¬
acceptable with concrete ones* The following illustrate.
(3) Z thought it acceptable* but he didn't think it so.
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(4) If you thought the questions could be answered courteously,
why didn't you answer then so?
(5) * I thought it solid, but he didn't think it so*
(6) * If you thought the questions could be answered mechanically,
why didn't you answer them so?
The condition also means that j>o is better with an adverb of result
than with a simple manner adverb, as the following show.
<7) I was asked to draw them clearly, and I did ay best to draw
them so.
(8) * I was asked to draw them manually, and I did my best to
draw them so.
Notice also that so is better with an abstract verb like consider
than with a concrete one like represent.
(9) Were the tools sharp? He {^presented} £heTa so*
Another restriction noted by Bolinger is that so is better following
a pronoun than following a noun. The following illustrate.
(10) If you thought that everything should be handled carefully,
why didn't you handle j^fefehe cargo| so?
(IS) When your boss wants things orderly, it is a good idea
, (them 1^ ke.Pj, yoar deEkj»o.
One further restriction is that jo is unacceptable in simple sentences
with contrasting subjects* (12) illustrates.
(12) * Eve is irritable, and Steve is so too.
I have no doubt that there are other restrictions besides these. In
the present context, however, they are not of crucial importance. What
ie important is the source of this sc.
What, then, is the source of this so? One proposal that might
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be advanced is that it is introduced by a rule that substitutes it fcr
the second occurrence o£ a suitable adjective or adverb* This rule
would* of course* be like pronominalization. dust as the existence of
non-anaphoric pronouns argues against pronominalization, so the fact
that this jo has a non-anaphoric use argues against such a rule. The
non-anaphoric use is seen in sentences like (13).
(13) You tie the ends together so*
It is also* 1 think* seen in sentences like (14)*
(14) Xt eo reflects the light that the says are gathered to one
point.
Clearly, these sos cannot ba introduced by the proposed rule. A
proponent of the rule must claim, then* that there is a basic difference
between the anaphoric and non-anaphoric uses of so. Intuitively* li
however, there is no such difference. Another problem with this
approach is that it does not explain why _so is both a pro-adjective
and a pro-adverb* Xt simply treats this as a brute fact* As we will
see* it is not at all a brute fact*
I think it is clear that this approach is untenable. What I want
to suggest, then* is that so derives from in that way* The most
obvious evidence for this suggestion is that so can generally be
replaced by in that way or that way* Further support comes from
comparisons with how, how is a question word for both adjectives and
adverbs, as the following illustrate.
(15) How was Paris? Paris was boring.
(16) How did Henry play? Henry played badly.
It is natural to derive how from in what way. This suggests quite
strongly* then, that so should also involve an underlying way* One
point that should be noted is that a number of unacceptable sentences
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considered earlier become acceptable if so is replaced by that way.
This suggests then, that so is a realisation of in that way in a
restricted range of contexts*
The obvious question about this proposal is» how exactly is that
way interpreted? 1 want to suggest that its interpretation involves
the inferring of m antecedent, rather like the interpretation of
certain sentential pronouns* Manner adverbs can generally be para¬
phrased with a way phrase* In (2), carefully can be paraphrased as
in a careful way* This is not so often possible with adjectives*
In (1), in an irritable way is not a very natural paraphrase for
irritable* This need not be a problem, however. We can suggest
that the underlying element way has a broader meaning than the English
lexical item, and that it is realized not only as way* but also as
manner* state* and mood* We can then assume that, for any underlying
structure of the form in (17), there will be an equivalent underlying
structure of the form in <18)«
(17) X Adj Y
(IS) X in a way^ (gX be Adj),, ¥
1 think, then, that it is quite reasonable to suggest that the antecedent
of that way is inferred.
It is perhaps worth noting that a variety of anaphoric definite
descriptions seem to involve inferred antecedents* Consider, for
example, the following*
(19) Platypuses lay eggs, and spiny anteaters have that property
too*
(20) Harry is wanted by the police, and Mary is in that position
too*
Neither that property nor that position have antecedents in the preceding
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clause* We can, however, infer (21) cad <22) from the initial clauses
of <19) and <20).
<21) Platypuses have the property that they lay eggs*
<22) Harry is in the position of being wanted by the police*
Here, we have antecedents for that property and that position* Consider
also the following*
<23) Steve thinks the earth is fiat, and Sara suffers frcxn that
delusion too*
<24) Steve bowled e full toss, and Sara made that mistake too*
Neither that delusion nor that mistake have antecedents in the preceding
clause* Clearly, however, extralinguistic facts allow us to infer
(23) and (26) from the initial clauses of <23) and (24)*
(25) Steve suffers from the delusion of thinking that the
earth is fiat*
'!
(26) Steve made the mistake of bowling e full toss*
Iter., « ha., •ataaa.tot. far that dal,,^ — t¥f ,
then, that sentences like (19), <20), (23) and <24) provide some
additional support for my account of that way*3
t have argued, then, that jo can derive from in that way* X want
now to suggest that it can also derive from a simple extent phrase*
1* Since people often disagree about the facts, sentences involving
this kind of inference will often be acceptable for seme people, hut
not for others* (i) is acceptable for me, but not, X assume, for
others*
(i) Steve thinks Caliaghan is a socialist, and Sam suffers frcra
that delusion too*
No doubt, there are also those for whom <23) is unacceptable*
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The clearest evidence comes from sentences like <27).
(27) Jim is so tall.
With an appropriate gesture, (27) specifies John's height. It can be
paraphrased as (23).
(23) Jim is tall to this extent.
It is natural, then, to suggest that it derives from something like
(23). It can be derived from such a source through the rule of extent
phrase fronting, proposed in the last chapter. We should note that
this so is fairly restricted. It appears that it cannot be used
anaphorically. To me at least, (29) is unacceptable.
(29) * Jim is six foot tall, and Steve is so tall too.
It becomes acceptable if so is replaced by that. In (27), it should be
noted, so can be replaced by this. Eecall now that we have questions
like (30).
(30) How tall is Jim?
The obvious source for how in such sentences is to what extent. It
seems, then, that both so and how can involve an underlying way or an
underlying extent.
X think it is reasonable to suggest that jbo also derives from a
simple extent phrase in sentences like the following.
(31) He was hurrying so.
(32) It so reflects on his honour that he is unable to continue
in office.
There is a complication here, however. These sentences do not so much
specify an extent as indicate that a certain extent was remarkable.
In Bolinger's terms, they are 'intensifying* rather than 'identifying*.
How this should be accounted for is not at ail clear. It is possible
that it is a matter of conversational implicature, in the sense of
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Grice (1975), but this is by no means certain. We should also note
that these sentences lack corresponding how questions* In the following
how can only mean in what way*
(33) How cfoes it reflect on his honour?
(34) How was he hurrying?
In spite of these points* X think it is reasonable to suggest that so
derives faSBi to the extent or to that extent in sentences like (31)
and (32)*
It should be clear that the analysis I have proposed for (27)
relates it in a quite natural way to equative sentences like (35).
(35) Jim is as tali as Steve,
While so in (27) derives from a simple extent phrase* as...as Steve
in (35) derives from a complex extent phrase. One might think that
so always derives from a simple extent phrase. This is not the case,
however. Notice that we have sentences like (36).
(36) Jim is not so tall as Steve.
Here, the equative follows a negative. It seems that both as and so
are possible in this context. It seems* then, that jso can derive
from both a simple and a complex extent phrase. One might think that
this is also true of as* in view of sentences like (37).
(37) Jim is six foot, and Steve is as tali.
I think, however, that as tall derives from as tall as Jim. Notice
that too is impossible here.
(38) # Jim is six foot, and Steve is as tall too.
It is possible, however, in (39), where that derives from a simple
extent phrase.
(39) Jim is six foot, and Steve is that tall too.
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1 conclude, then, that ajs can only derive from a complex extent phrase*
X want now to argue against a quite plausible alternative to the
analysis of equatives that X developed in the last chapter* On this
analysis, <35) will derive from something like (40)*
<40) S
Jim be tali to the extent^ S
Steve be tall to x
Notice, however, that <41), where same represents a predicate of identity
is just as plausible semantically*
<41) S
x same the extent. S
y
Steve be tall to y
I assume that the derivation of <35) involves extent phrase fronting
followed by the extraposition of the relative clause in the extent
phrase* After these rules have applied to <40), tall is preceded by
to the extent* On ray analysis, then, it is this phrase that is realized
as £S« After these rules have applied to <41), tall will be preceded
by to the same extent* On the alternative analysis, then, it is this
that is realized as as* Xf we assume that so in <36) has the same source
as as in <35), it will derive from the to the extent on ray analysis,
and from to the same extent on the alternative analysis* X have
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suggested that _so derives from to this extent in (27) and from to the
extent or to that extent in (31) and (32). Given such an analysis,
it is clearly preferable to derive it from to the extent in (36).
For this reason, then, I think my analysis of equatives is preferable
to one involving a predicate of identity.
We have seen now that simple way phrases and extent phrases can
be realized as _so. We have also seen that complex extent phrases can
be realized as equatives. It is natural to ask what happens to complex




be in the way^ S
\
Steve be in x
One realization of this, derived through relative deletion and the
deletion of the two ins is (43).
(43) Jim is the way Steve is.
Another realization, 1 would suggest, is (44).
(44) Jim is as Steve is.
In addition to the rules involved in (43), this will involve the
deletion of the way and the insertion of as. If (43) and (44) derive




Play in theway S
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(46) Jim played the way Steve played*
(47) Jim played as Steve played*
A similar proposal is made in Ross (1967)#
X am suggesting, ther, that adjectival end adverbial as clauses
derive from complex way phrases just as equative a_s clauses derive
from couple:: extent phraser* If this is so, one would expect the
former to have the same form As the latter# Thi3 soeras to be the case#
The following illustrate.
ras his father used to be#
(48) Jim is as angry J as Mary said#
as we predicted#
as we expected him to be#
(49) Jim is
as his father used to be#
as Mary said#
as was predicted#
aa we expected hiza to be.
(50) Jim played -
as his father used to play#
as Mary said#
as was predicted#
as we expected him to play#
One would also expect them to be subject to the same restrictions# An
important restriction on equative as clauses (and comparative than
clausaa) is that they cannot contain negatives or factive verba# The
following illustrate#
(51) * Jim was ob angry as Steve wasn't#
(52) * Jim was as irritable as we regretted#
Adjectival and adverbial as clauses are also subject to this restriction,
as the following show#
(53) * Jim was as Steve wasn't#
(54) * Jim was as we regretted#
(55) * Jim played as Steve didn't play#
(56) * Jim played as we regretted#
These parallels are what the present proposal leads us to expect# X
think, then, that they provide significant support for the proposal#
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I have suggested that the derivation of adjectival and adverbial
as clauses involves the deletion of the way and the insertion of as»
It is likely that the rule that deletes the way deletes other consti¬
tuents as well. Notice that we have pairs of sentences like the
following,
(57)a. Eve was angry when 1 talked to her,
b, Eve was angry at the time when I talked to her,
(53)a» Steve was where he said he would be,
b, Steve was in the place where he said he would be.
It is natural to suggest that the a. sentences derive from the b,
sentences. It is likely, then, that the rule that deletes the way
also deletes the time and the place. One difference between way
on the one hand and time end place on the other should be noted.
This is that a relative clause associated with way can only be intro¬
duced by as if way is deleted, whereas relative clauses associated
with time and place can be introduced by when and where whether the
head nouns are deleted or not. This restriction on as seems to
reflect a general restriction that as can only appear in relative
clauses which are no longer adjacent to their heads either as a
2
result of movement rules or as a result of deletion, Equative as
clauses are relatives that have become separated from their heads,
while adjectival and adverbial as clauses are relatives whose heads
have been deleted.
2, This is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one, Ordinary
extraposed relatives cannot contain as, as (i) illustrates,
(i) * A girl came in as was wearing a long red dress.
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I will return to adjectival and adverbial an clauses shortly.
First, however, I want to take a look at such.
12.2. such
Like jo, such plays an important role in anaphora. This is
illustrated in a sentence like (1).
(1) Mary is looking for a fat Italian, but she won't find such
an Italian here.
Roughly speaking, such here is a pro-adjective with fat as its
antecedent. It is fairly clear that such is related to so. A
natural suggestion is that it is an attributive form of so. I will
argue that this suggestion is essentially correct.
One linguist who has discussed such is Postal (1969). He
suggests that such is introduced by a rule that substitutes it for
the second occurrence of a relative clause. On this proposal (i) will
derive from (2).
(2) Mary is looking for an Italian who is fat, but she won't
find an Italian who is fat here.
The proposed rule will substitute such for the second relative clause*
Shis will then be proposed, and whiz deletion and adjective preposing
will apply in the first clause to give a fat Italian. A simpler
example will be (3).
(3) Mary is looking for a man who knows the meaning of life,
but she won't find such a man here.
Here the first relative clause remains intact after such has been
introduced.
The obvious argument against Postal's proposal comes from the
fact that such has a non-ahaphoric use* It can have this use in (4).
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(4) I hate such ostentation.
Obviously, this could appear in a discourse that provided it with an
antecedent. It ecu Id also, however, be; used in isolation by one of a
number of people looking at a certain piece of ostentation. Clearly,
non-anaphoric such cannot be the result of Postal's rule. Therefore,
an advocate of his proposal must claim that there is ft basic difference
between anaphoric and nor-anaphoric, such. There is, however, no such
difference. I think, then, that Postal's proposal is untenable.
A second type of non-anaphoric such is seen in sentences like
the following!
(5) With such men as Bremen, the Australians were invincible.
(6) We need such a philosopher as Russell was.
(7) Such a man ar> you describe was here yesterday.
Here, such is associated with an as phrase or an as clause. Obviously,
Postal's proposal provides no account of such sentences. We will see
shortly that we can provide a quits natural account of them.
As I have said earlier, 1 am going to argue that such Is
essentially an attributive form of so. 1 argued in the last section
that bo can derive from a simple way phrase and a simple or complex
extent phrase. X am going to argue here that such can derive from
a simple or complex way phrase and a simple or complex extent
phrase. I will begin with cases where it derives from a way phrase.
We can consider firstly (1), (3) and (4). Here, we can derive
such from, a simple way phrase. In (1), for example, we can derive






x be in that way
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The derivation will be quite simple- Once whiz deletion has applied,
in that way will be moved into prenoninal position, by adjective shift*
A further rule will then move it into pre-determiner position. This
may not be a new rule. Recall that X suggested earlier that the
equatlve in an N? like (9) reaches pre-determiner position through
two separate rules* one moving as, the other moving the adjective,
(9) as tall a girl as Helen
X think it is reasonable to assume that it in the first of these rules
that moves in that may into pre-determiner position. It should be
noted that, this rule only applies when the determiner is a. The
following illustrate.
(10) A number of philosophers have written books about
Wittgenstein. | philosopher is Anthony Kenny*
(11) Sam Jjas bought a book about the Queen. *c^h^any^" '3°0^8 are
on sale.
&X X sucti
(12) There have been a number of reports of UFO sightings* - ^ guch
reports are being investigated*
In (1), then, such has a fairly simple derivation. It will have &
similar derivation in (3) and (4),
In (1), we can infer an antecedent for that way in the same way
as in the examples of the last section, (2) will presumably involve
a different kind of inference. Here, we apparently need to assume
that, for any underlying structure of the form in (13), there is an
equivalent underlying structure of the form in (14).
(13) X N (_«»»x#.«) Y
X £5 b
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(14) X Nk b« In the way (g...x...)g)g Y
Is many cases# it is likely that the definite description underlying
such should be regarded as non-anaphoric even though its interpretation
depends on the preceding discourse. 1 suspect that this is the case
in sentences like the following.
(15) Sam stole the Grown Jewels. Such audacity is amazing.
(16) Sam can't keep his mouth shut. Such men are dangerous.
These might be compared to sentences like (17).
(1?) When Sam was in France# he met the President.
Here# the referent of the President is determined by the preceding
discourse. There is# however# no HP in the preceding discourse
acting as antecedent. Nor is there any obvious sense in which an
antecedent is inferred. (15) and (16) shew incidentally that the
meaning of the underlying element way includes that of the lexical
item class.
X turn now to (5) - (7). Here# we can derive such from a complex
way phrase. In (5)# for example# we can derive such men as Bradnm
from something like (18).
<18)
Set
x be in the way,, Sy/ -
Bradman be a man S
\
a be in y
The derivation will be just like that of such an Italian, except that
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after the way phrase has bee© proposed the relative clause will be
oxtraposed to be realized after considerable deletion as as Bra&aan.
such a philosopher as Russell was in (6) and such a rum as you describe
in (?) will have similar derivations*
In passing, we should note that as clauses associated with sueh
cannot contain either negatives or factive verbs* the following
illustrate* <
1 \
(19) * Jim is sueh a painter as Picasso wasn't* \
(20) * Jim is such a man as we regretted* \
In this, they are just like the adjectival and adverbial as
clauses considered in the last section* Since they have the same
source, this Is only to be expected* He should also note that
these as clauses conform to the generalization suggested earlier
about the appearance of as* 1 suggested that jag can only appear
in relative clauses that are no longer adjacent to their heads
as a result of movement or deletion* These as clauses, like equacivs
as clauses, are relatives that have become separated from their
heads as a result of movement*
I want now to consider cases where such derives from m extent
phrase* He can begin with (21)*
(21) Sam Is such a fool*
Like soma of the sentences considered in the last section, this is
intensifying rather than identifying* He can compare it with (22),
which is also intensifying*
(22) Sam is so foolish. (\
1 v
I have suggested that so derives from to the extent or to that extent {
in intensifying sentences* (22), then, will derive from someehi
like (23).
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(23) Sara is a fool to the extent*
To derive (21) from (24), we simply need to allow extent phrase fronting
to move an extent phrase around a predicate nominal as well as around
a predicate adjective* This seems a quite reasonable extension of the
rule* It seems, then, that such can derive from a simple extent
phrase. Notice now that we have sentences like (25)*
(25) dim isn't such a fool as Sam*
Just as (21) compares with (22), (25) compares with (26)*
(26) Jim isn't so foolish as Sam*
(26) will derive from something like (27)*
<27) S
Jim isn't foolish to the extentx S
Sam be foolish to x
It is natural, then, to derive (25) from something like (28)«
(28) S
Jim isn't a fool to the extent^ S
Sam be a fool to x
The two sentences will have parallel derivations, involving crucially
extent phrase fronting and extraposition of the relative clause* It
seems, then, that such can derive from both a simple and a complex
extent phrase*
In (21) and (25), we have an extent phrase associated with a
simple predicate nominal* Extent phrases can also be associated with




(29) Jim isn't such an astute politician as Sam,
We can derive this from something like (30)#
(30) S
Jim isn't a politician,, S to the extent,, S
x be astute Sam be a politician^ S to y
s be astute
The derivation will be just like that of (25)#
Notice now that we have sentences like (31)#
(31) I've never known such an astute politician as Sam.
Here, we have not a predicate nominal, but an object NP# Semantically,
(31) is quite different from (29)# (29) is concerned with the extent
to which Jim is an astute politician# (31)» however, is not concerned
with the extent to which I've known an astute politician# Rather,
(31) is equivalent to (32)#
(32) I've never known as astute a politician as Sara.
I want to suggest that it has the same source, (32) will derive from
something like (33).
(33) S
I've never known a politician^ S
Sara be a politician S
z be astute to y
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Central to the derivation of (32) it the shifting of as astute from
post-determiner to pre-determiner position. I have suggested that
this is accomplished by two rules* one moving as. the other moving
the adjective. 1 want to suggest now that as is still to the extent
when the first of these rules applies. Given such a formalization, we
have two alternatives once the rule has applied. We can move the
adjective after it, in which cage to the extent is realized quite
regularly as as, or we can leave the adjective where it is, in which
case it is realized, again quite regularly, as such. 1 think, then,
that w© have a quite natural derivation for (31).
We should note now that, if (31) derives from (33), (29) will
derive not only from (30), but also from (34).
(34) S
Jim isn't a politician S
ft /*■-
Sam be a politician SZ
z be astute to y
(34) is the obvious source for (35).
(35) Jim isn't as astute a politician as Sam.
It is possible, however, that this will also derive from (30). Once
extent phrase fronting and subsequent extraposition have applied to
(30), we will have the following substring.
(36) to the extent a astute politician
As things stand, there is nothing to prevent the adjective being
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•attracted* to to the extent* If it is, (36) will be realized as (37)*
(37) as astute a politician
It seems, then, that both (29) and (35) nay have two distinct derivations*
Just as (31) contrasts with (29), so (33) contrasts with (25)*
(33) I*va never known such a fool as Gam.
Here, such a fool as San is an object NP, not a predicate nominal* It
follows, then, that it cannot have the same source as in (25)* It
seems, though, that it cannot have the kind of source that X have
suggested for such an astute politician as 3_gm in (31), because it
contains no adjective. Notice, however, that (38) is roughly equivalent
to (39),
(39) l*ve never known as big a fool as Sam.
A natural suggestion, then, is that (38) has the same source as (39), i*e*
<40>.
(40) g
I*ve never known a foolx 8
x be big to the extent^ S
Sana be a foolg S
\
Z- z
z be big to y
The two derivations will be the same up to the point when to the extent
is moved into pre-determiner position. Then, while in (39) big is
attracted to to the extent* in (33) it will be deleted. It seems, then,
that we can suggest a fairly plausible derivation for (33).
While certain details might be questioned, X think it is fairly
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clear that such can derive from a simple or complex way phrase and a
simple or complex extent phrase, such is apparently the fom taken
by constituents that are otherwise realised as so. when they appear before
an HP or an N. In this sense, then, it is an attributive form of so.
A number of sentences appear to pose a problem for this generalisation.
Consider, for example, the following.
(41) With men such as Bradraan, the Australians are invincible.
(42) The situation was such as you describe.
In (41), such is followed by an as phrase. In (42), it is followed
by an as clause. One might suggest, however, that such in (41) is
postposed from pre-NP position, and that such as you describe derives
fro® such a one as you describe. X think it is likely, then, that the
generalisation can be maintained. If, however, a more complex charac¬
terization of the distribution of so and such proves necessary, this
will not affect the rest of the analysis.
I want now to look at the analysis of such sketched in Bresnan
(1973). As we have seen, Bresnan is primarily concerned with com¬
paratives and equatives. This is reflected in her analysis of such.
The analysis has sane plausibility where such has an extent reading,
but it is completely ad hoc where such has a way reading.








S much astute a politician
as Sam be x much astute a politician
2
In both derivations, S is extraposed and reduced, and in both much is
. i '
, ' . : ' ' ' ' . . ' ' " ' ' ' ' ' 1 ' ' f ' ? • r'
deleted* These are the only rules of importance in the derivation of
(35), In the derivation of (29), as is converted to so* astute is moved
'4:' ■ ■ » '■ : i\ .* i i . .. : ;ijk\
into post-determiner position, and so is realised as such* (25) will




as Sam be x much a fool
The derivation will simply involve the extraposition and reduction of
S , the deletion of and the realisation of so as such* So far,
then, Bresnan*a analysis is fairly plausible*
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We can now consider way such* Bresnan recognizes that it should be
related to extent such, but she can only do this by allowing empty nodes
that have no syntactic or semantic function* She wauld apparently
















as Bradman be x a a a man
This analysis is quite ad hoc* The empty nodes have no independent
motivation. Their only function is to relate the two such1s. The
fact that they can only be related in this way is a serious weakness.
It is perhaps worth noting that the same situation arises with so.
In (46), we have extent so*
(46) He was hurrying so*




In (48) we have way so*
(48) You tie the ends together so*








Again, X think this is a serious weakness®
One important difference between such and js© is that such has no
corresponding question form in the way that so has how® The nearest
thing to a question form of such is what kind of in questions like (50),
(50) What kind of girl is Eve?
what kind of is in fact the question form of that kind of. The latter,
however, can often be substituted for such® (51), for example, is
the result of replacing such by that kind o£ in (I).
(51) Mary is looking for a fat Italian, but she won*t find that
kind of Italian here.
For this reason, what kind of is rather like a question form of such®
Since that kind of is similar to such, it is worth taking a
brief look at it® One might think that kind is similar to such nouns
as group and number. Notice, however, that kind can be followed by a
singular noun, whereas group and number can only be followed by plurals®
(52) that kind of Italian
(33) a group o£
(34) . number of
The noun following kind can be preceded by an indefinite article, as
(55) illustrates.
(55) that kind of an Italian
It seems, then, that it is an ordinary singular noun. This suggests
that, while a recoup of Italians might derive from (56), that kind of
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Italian should not derive from (57),
(56) NP (57) NP







of Italians of Italian
It seems, then, that we should look for an alternative source.
It is not too difficult to suggest an alternative source. Notice
that that kind of Italian can be paraphrased as (53).
(53) an Italian of that kind
The obvious source for (58) is something like (59), which is similar




x be of that kind
I think it is plausible to suggest that this is also the source of
that kind of Italian. The derivation will be quite simple. Once whiz
deletion has applied, adjective shift can taove of that kind into post-
determiner position. It can then be moved into pre-determiner position
by the rule that moves to the extent and in that way into this
position. All we need to give the correct surface form is a rule
deleting the initial of, a rule inserting of after kind, and a rule
optionally deleting a. This derivation relates that kind of and such
in a natural way, I think, then, that this is a quite plausible
proposal.
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Further support for this proposal comes from sentences like the
following*
(60) Steve isn»t the kind of man that Sam was*
(61) This is the kind of animal that killed Uncle Arthur.
(62) The kind of animal that you describe will eat anything*
We can derive the kind of man that Seta was from something like (63)*
(63) NP
Dot ~N
The derivation will be just like that of that kind of Italian, except
that, after the kind phrase has been preposed, the relative clause will
be extraposed. It will thus be just like that proposed earlier for
such men as Bradman* We can propose similar derivations for the kind
of animal that killed Uncle Arthur and the kind, of animal that you
describe. 1 think, then, that this approach is quite premising*
There are a number of words that are similar to kind* Consider,
for example, sort and type*
(64) that j^ypg j Italian
(65) an Italian of that | typeJ
(66) the \ | of man that Sam was
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It seems* then* that a simple extension of the mechanisms required for
such can account for the behaviour of a number of lexical items* this
would seem to provide additional support for these mechanisms*
12*3* More on as Clauses
I want now to return to adjectival and adverbial as clauses.
Firstly* I want to show that adjectival and adverbial as clauses
present a further problem for the proposals of Bresnan (1973)*
We have seen that the only way Bresnan can relate the two uses of
such and so is through unmotivated empty nodes* We can now show that
this is the only way she can relate adjectival and adverbial as clauses
to equative as clauses* In Bresnan*s system* as we have seen* a
sentence like (1) will derive fram something like (2)*









as S much old
as Sam be x much old
What now of sentences like (3)?
(3) Jim is as Sam is*
Bresnan would have to derive this from something like (4).
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(A)
as Sara be A a A
Again, Chen, we have empty nodes without independent motivation. 'Shis
is a further weakness in Bresnan's proposals.
1 want now to note a difference between adjectival and adverbial
as clauses on the one hand and equative as clauses and as clauses
associated with such on the other. We know that the latter can be
reduced to a single HP. This leads us to expect that the former can
be also. It seems, however, that this is generally impossible with
adjectival as clauses and only sometimes possible with adverbial as
clauses. Neither (5) nor (6) is acceptable*
(5) * Jim is as Steve.
(6) * Jim played as Steve.
Notice, however, that both (7) and (8) are acceptable.
(7) Jim is like Steve.
(8) Jim played like Steve.
It is natural, then, to suggest that an adjectival or adverbial as
clause is normally realized as a like phrase if it is reduced to a
3
single NP. Certain ambiguities support the derivation of adjectival
3. A similar proposal is made in Ross (1967).
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and adverbial like phrases from clauses* Notice firstly that (9) is
ambiguous*
(9) Joen talked to Sue like a child.
It can mean either (10) or (11)*
(10) Joan talked to Sue as a child would have talked to her.
(11) Joan talked to Sue as she would have talked to a child.
This ambiguity will be explained quite naturally if (9) can derive from
the structures underlying (10) and (11). Thus, it supports the derivation
of adverbial like phrases from clauses* Comparable evidence for
deriving adjectival like phrases from clauses is less easy to find*
Consider, however, (12).
(12) Easter was like last year.
i V!: ' ' -r
- ■" : . . , •. ... • , "V
This seems to be ambiguous between (13) and (14).
(13) Easter was as last year was.
(14) Easter was as it was last year.
Clearly, we can explain this ambiguity by deriving (12) from the
structures underlying (13) and (14). It seems, then, that it supports
the derivation of adjectival like phrases from clauses. I think,
then, that the derivation of adjectival and adverbial like phrases
from clauses is quite plausible.
An important fact about like phrases is that they have an
attributive use. We have NP*s like (15).
(15) a man like Callaghan





Callaghan be in y
the derivation will involve the deletion of the way* whir deletion,
2 2
and the reduction of S to a single NP* S must be reduced in this
way* (17) i® unacceptable*
(17) * a man as Callaghan is
(15) is rather like (13)*
(18) such a man as Callaghan
1 assume, however, that this derives from something like (19)*
(19) NP
Det N
Callaghan be a man S
■
z be in y
(Compare the source suggested earlier for such men as Bradman*) (19),
unlike (16), implies that Callaghan is a man* It is easy to show that
this is correct* Notice that, while (20) is quite acceptable, (21) is
deviant*
(20) a man like Thatcher
(21) * such a man as Thatcher
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Thus* (15) and (18) differ in Just the sane way as HP*s like (22) and (23)*
(22) a man as tall as Sam
(23) as tall a man as Sam
Presumably, whatever constraint prevents the derivation of (23) from the
structure underlying (22) will also prevent the derivation of (18)
from (16),
I want to conclude this section by looking at a type of as clause
that 1 have not yet considered* It is illustrated in sentences like
the following*
(24) Carl is reading Dickens, as Jim thought*
(25) Wayne has escaped, as was reported.
(26) Marsha is a witch, as we suspected.
These aa clauses say something about the sentences to which they are
attached. One might think that they are non-restrictive relatives* 1
want to suggest, however, that they are ordinary adjectival as clauses*
Notice that (24) » (26) can be paraphrased by (27) - (29), where
we clearly have ordinary adjectival as clauses*
(27) Carl is reading Dickens* It is as Jim thought*
(28) Wayne has escaped. It is as was reported*
(29) Marsha is a witch* It is as we suspected.
I want to suggest that (24) - (26) derive from the structures underlying
(27) - (29). Their derivations will require no new rules* The rules
that produce non-restrictive relatives will convert (27) - (29) into
(30) - (32).
(30) Carl is reading Dickens, which is as Jim thought*
(31) Wayne has escaped, which is as was reported*
(32) Marsha is a witch, which is as we suspected*
Then, we need only apply whiz deletion to arrive at (24) - (26)* Thus,
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this Is a quite simple proposal*
Apart from simplicity, this proposal has the advantage that it can
explain the unacceptability of sentences like the following*
(33) * Joan is a mertian, as we didn't suspect.
(34) * Sue has gone home, as is odd.
The unacceptability of (33) follows from the fact that negatives are
impossible in adjectival as clauses, while the unacceptebility of (34)
follows from the fact that factive verba are impossible in such
clauses. Notice that neither negatives nor fectives are impossible in
non-restrictive relatives* The following are quite acceptable*
(35) Joan is a martinn, which we didn't suspect*
(36) Sue has gone home, which is odd.
1 think, then, that there are good reasons for regarding the as clauses
in sentences like (24) - (26) as ordinary adjectival j*s clauses and not
as non-restrictive relatives.
12.4. like that
1 want now to consider the role of the phrase like that in adjectival
and adverbial anaphora* It plays quite a considerable role, as the
following illustrate.
(1) Eve is neurotic, and she's been like that for weeks.
(2) Sam polished the brass meticulously, and he'd do it like that
again.
(3) Mary is looking for a man with a big bank account, but she
won't find a man like that here.
In (1) and (2), like that can be replaced by so. In (3), it can be
replaced by such* I want to suggest that it has the same source as
331
po and such > In other words, I want to suggest that it is an idiomatic
realisation of in that way *
The idiomatic character of like that is perhaps not insaediately
apparent. It is not an obvious idiom liks kick the bucket or spill the
beans. I think, however, that a little reflection on (1) - (3) reveals
its idiomatic nature. Consider firstly (I). Does this really say that
Eve is like something? The answer is surely no. Consider also (2).
Does this say that Sam xrould polish the brass like something? Again,
I think, the answer ig no. Finally (3)* Does this refer to a man who
is like something? It is clear, I think, that it does not. Intuitively,
then, it seems fairly clear that like that is an idiom,
I want now to show that like that has two of the characteristic
properties of idioms. It is well known firstly that idiomatic
expressions cannot be paraphrased in the same, way as non-idiomatic
expressions. Notice that, while (4) has both an idiomatic and a literal
reading, (5) has only a literal reading.
(4) Steve kicked the bucket.
(5) Steve kicked the pail*
Thus, we cannot replcce the bucket by the pail when it is part of the
idiom kick the bucket. The situation is similar with like that. We
know that ordinary like phrases can be paraphrased by an as clause.
Thus, if like that in (1) - (3) were an ordinary like phrase, one
would expect the following paraphrases to be possible.
(6) * Eve is neurotic, and she's been as that is for weeks.
(7) * Sam polished the brass meticulously, and he'd do it as that
is again.
(3) * Mary is looking for a man with a big bank account, but
she won't find a man who is as that is here.
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As I have indicated, all three seem unacceptable to me. Iters, then,
like that is like more obvious idioms.
It is also veil known that idioms haw restricted transformational
potential* kick the bucket* for example, cannot undergo tough movement
or topicalization. Neither of the following has an idiomatic reading.
(9) The bucket is easy to kick.
(10) The bucket, Steve kicked.
like that is again similar. Neither tough movement nor top lea1 i?.at ion
can apply when it has an idiomatic reading. The following illustrate*
(11) * Eve is always confident. That* s hard to be like.
(12) * Eve is always confident. That, Joe will never be like*
(13) * San pruned the rosea carefully* That's hard to do it like.
(14) * Sam pruned the roses carefully* That, Joe will never do it
like.
Botlx rules, however, give fairly acceptable results when like that has
a literal reading.
(15) Eve is like an armadillo. That's hard to be like.
(16) Eve is like an armadillo. That, Joe will never be like*
(17) Bern walks like a gorilla. That's hard to walk like.
(13) Sam walks like a gorilla. That, Joe will never walk like.
Again, than, like that is like more obvious idioms*
1 think it is fairly clear that like that is an idiom. It is not
an obvious idiom, however. Its idiomatic meaning is quite similar to
its literal meaning. Thus, there are situations where it does not much
matter whether like that is understood idiomatically or literally.
Consider, for example, the following, said by one of a number of
people watching a particularly fine piece of batting in a cricket
match.
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<19) I wish 1 could bat like that* ,
It is fairly clear that we can replace like that by that way. It is
fairly clear that we can replace like that by that way. It is clear,
then, that it can be understood idiomatically. We can also, however,
interpret like that as * like the batting we're watching'. It seems,
then, that it can be understood literally as well. Consider also (20),
said in the same circumstances as (19),
(20) I admire batting like that.
If like that can derive from in that way in (19), it can presumably do
so here. Again, however, we can interpret like that literally as
'like the batting we're watching'. In both (19) and (20), then, it
seems not to matter whether like that is understood idiomatically or
literally* It seems reasonable to suppose that the idiomatic use of
like that owes its existence to sentences like these,
I have argued that like that is an idiomatic realisation of in that
way, 1 want now to suggest that what,,,like is an idiomatic realization
of in what way. Consider the following question,
(21) What was Paris like?
One could answer this with a sentence like (22),
(22) Paris was like a lunatic asylum.
One could also, however, answer it with a sentence like (23),
(23) Paris was boring.
In the first case, the question has its literal meaning. In the second,
it has the same meaning as (24),
(24) How was Paris?
In this case, then, what«,,like is an idiomatic realization of in what
way.
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Two Important points must be made about the idiomatic use of what*,*
like. Firstly, it seems that it is only possible in adjectival questions*
Consider the following question*
(25) What did Sam talk like?
(26) would be an appropriate answer for this*
(26) Sam talked like a robot*
j
(27), however, would not be an appropriate answer*
(27) Sam talked pedantically*
This is en appropriate answer for (28), \j
(23) How did Sam talk?
Xt seems, then, that only how can be used to question an adverb* what
* *»1ike cannot be used for this purpose*
The second point is that there are circumstances when only what
,*,like can be used to question an adjective. Hotice that, while (29)
is quite acceptable, (30) is rather odd*
(29) What was Paris like in the 14th century?
(30) ? How was Paris in the 14th century?
The explanation, I think, is that an adjectival question involving how
requires an answer based on personal experience* Thus, in the absence
of time machines, (30) requires the impossible* what*.«like must be
used in adjectival questions when there is no requirement of personal
experience* There is a sense, then, in which what**.like is the normal
realisation of in what way in adjectival questions* Unlike how* it




12.5. then and there
We have seen that one can *refer back* to an adjective or a manner
adverb with jic, I have argued that so is a realization of in that way.
X have suggested that such is an attributive form of so. I have also
suggested that a complex way phrase is realized as an as clause or as
such plus an as clause or phrase. Finally, X have suggested that like
that is an idiomatic realization of in that way. It is clear that so
is involved in a complex web of relations. I want now to take a brief
look at two words that are somewhat like so. but which do not involve
the same complexities. These are then and there.
It is fairly clear that then and there allow us to refer back to
adverbs of time and space, respectively. The following illustrate.
(1) Alaric was born in 1950, and Clovis was born then too.
(2) Sam escaped last night, and Mary escaped then too.
(3) Joan is in Provence, and Jim is there too.
(4) Dick went to Naples, and Herb went there too.
We can derive then and there from at that time and in that place in
&
the same way as we have derived _so from in that way. A number of
differences should be noted, hovrever. Notice firstly that that time
and that place have straightforward antecedents. In (1) and (2), the
antecedents of that time are 1950 and last night. In (3) and (4), the
antecedents of that olace are Provence and Naples. Here, then, there
ir. no need to invoke processes of inference. Another difference is
4. The obvious alternative to this approach is one in which then and
there derive from copies of their antecedents. I reject such an approach
for the same reason as I reject the derivation of anaphoric ao and such
from copies of their antecedents.
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that tlfcea and there can appear wherever that time and that place can,
whereas so Is restricted to various kinds of indefinite context* A
further, related difference is that then and there have no idiomatic
equivalents in the way that so has like that* A final difference is
that then and there have no attributive forms*
One way in which then and there are like jso is that they have
related constructions derived from complex definite descriptions* As
we have seen, it is natural to suggest that when clauses and where
clauses derive from complex tine and place phrases in the same way as
as clauses derive from complex way phrases* He can, for example,
derive (5) and (6) from (7) and (3), respectively*
(5) Marsha was evasive when I talked to her.
(6) Brian was where we expected him to be*
(7) S
Marsha be evasive at the timev S* >S
1 talk to her at x
(8) S
he be in x
The derivations will simply involve relative clause formation and the
deletion of the time in (5) and the place in (6)* Here, then, we have
an important similarity between then and there and so*
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It is fairly clear, I think, that then and there are rather less
complex than so» There are, however, some basic similarities* I
think that these are captured quite naturally in the present analysis*
12*6* An Idiosyncrasy
X want to conclude this chapter by drawing attention to a rather
puzzling phenomenon* This phenomenon is associated with NP*s containing
equ&tives, like phrases, or such and an as phrase* 1 m. concerned,
then, with K?*s like the following*
(1) as dangerous a bowler as Lillee
<2) a philosopher like Feuerbach
(3) such men as Lenin
(4) men such as Lenin
1 will show that such HP*s exhibit a surprising property* Unfortunately,
I can offer no real explanation for this property*
The KP*s that I am concerned with are indefinite UP*® involving
complex nouns which contain a definite HP* On the face of it, they are
ordinary indefinite HP*s* I will show, however, that they can be
understood differently from ordinary indefinite HP*s* I want to look
first at cases where both the indefinite HP and the definite HP it
contains are singular. We can begin, then, with (1)* Notice firstly
that the complex noun in (1) denotes the following set*
<5) {xi x is a bowler A x is as dangerous as Lillee}
Consider now the following sentence*
(6) England needs as dangerous a bowler as Lillee*
This means that England needs a member of <5)« Here, then, (I) is
interpreted quite normally* Consider now (7).
(7) With as dangerous a bowler as Lillee, the Australians take
some beating*
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This ought to meas that the Australians take some beating because they
have a bowler who is as dangerous as Lillee. In fact, however, it
means that they take some beating because they have Lillee himself*
Here, then, (I) does net have its normal interpretation. Rather, it
is an indirect way of referring to Lillee. <2) behaves in just the
same way* The complex noun denotes the following set*
(8) {x» x is a philosopher Ax is like Feuerbach}
In (9), (2) is interpreted normally.
(9) The university needs a philosopher like Feuerbach*
This means that the university needs a member of (8). (10), however,
is like (7).
(10) With a philosopher like Feuerbach, anything is possible*
On the most natural interpretation, this means that anything is possible
with Feuerbach* Here, then, (2) does not have its normal interpretation*
Instead, it is an indirect way of referring to Feuerbach. With HP*s
containing such and an as phrase, the situation is somewhat different*
Here, an *abnormal* interpretation seems to be generally preferred*
For me, an abnormal interpretation is most natural in both (11) and
(12),
<U) The university need. { } " »«"*«*•
<">
We can now consider cases where the indefinite HP is plural and the
definite HP it contains singular* We can begin with (13)*
(13) batsmen as brilliant as Richards
In (14), this has a normal interpretation*
(14) England needs batsmen as brilliant as Richards*
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In (15), however, it has an abnormal interpretation.
(15) With batsmen as brilliant as Richards, the West Indians take
some beating*
this does not mean that the West Indians take some beating because they
have certain batsmen who are as brilliant as Richards. It means that
they take some beating because they have Richards and other similar
batsmen. Here, then, (13) is an indirect way of referring to a set
containing Richards* The situation is the same with like phrases*
We can consider (16).
(16) journalists like Levin
In (17), this has a normal interpretation.
(17) Socialist Worker needs journalists like Levin*
In (13), however, it has an abnormal interpretation*
(18) With journalists like Levin, the Times is a laugh a minute*
This means that the Times is a laugh a minute because of Levin and
other similar journalists* Here, then, (16) is an indirect way of
referring to a set containing Levin* Again, HP* s containing such and
an as phrase are somewhat different. For me, both (19) and (20) have
abnormal interpretations.
*—•
(20) With ■} j es Lenin, anything is possible.
We can turn now to cases where both the indefinite HP and the
definite HP it contains are plural. Consider firstly (21).
(21) England needs backs as brilliant as Edwards and Bennett.
Here, the HP has a normal interpretation. In (22), however, it has an
abnormal interpretation.
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<22) With backs as brilliant as Edwards and Bennett, the Welsh take
some beating.
This mans that the Welsh take some beating because they have Edwards
and Bennett and other similar backs* Here, then, the NP is an indirect
way of referring to a set containing Edwards and Bennett* Again, the
situation is the same with like phrases* Consider (23)*
(23) We need batsmen like Richards and Greenidge.
Here, the HP has a normal interpretation* In (24), however, it has an
abnormal interpretation*
(24) With batsmen like Richards and Greenidge, the West Indians
take some beating*
This means that the West Indians take some beating because they have
Richards and Greenidge and other similar batsmen. The HP is thus an
indirect way of referring to a set containing Richards and Greenidge*
Again, HP*s containing such and an as phrase are different. Both
(25) and (26) seem to have abnormal interpretations*
(25) V* •«" {£££*££] •• "lch«d. and Gr.»idge.
(26) With (h"t®ne"«uS } " Kichardt Greenidge, the Weet
Indians take some beating*
I must now consider cases where the indefinite HP is singular and
the definite NP it contains is plural* It seems that such HP*s can
only have a normal interpretation. It is because of this that the
following are rather dubious*
(27) ? With a bowler as dangerous as LiIlee and Thomson, the
Australians take some beating*
(28) 7 With a philosopher like Locke and Berkeley, anything is
possible*
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In both cases, we have an MP that cm only have a normal interpretation
in a contest that favours an abnormal interpretation* It is not too
surprising that these HP's cannot, have an abnormal interpretation* Since
they are singular NP's, it is fairly natural that they cannot be
indirect ways of referring to sets*
I have shown that NP's like (1) - (4) have both a normal and an
abnormal interpretation* On the abnormal interpretation, they function
as indirect ways of referring either to the referent of the definite
HP they contain or to a set containing the referent ©f the definite HP*
I have no explanation for the abnormal interpretation of these HP's*
One point is worth noting, however* This is that in all these HP's the
referent of the definite HP is contained in the extension of the
complex noun* There are three possibilities* Firstly, both the noun
and the definite NP may be singular* In this case, the noun denotes
a set and the definite H? refers to a member of the set* Secondly,
the noun may be plural and the definite HP singular. In this case,
the noun denotes a set of sets and the definite HP refers to a member
of certain of these sets* Thirdly, both the noun and the definite HP
may be plural* In this case, the noun denotes a set of sets and the
definite HP refers to one of the sets* It looks, then, as if we can
say that an indefinite HP involving a complex noun that contains a
definite HP can have an abnormal interpretation if the referent of the
definite HP is contained in the extension of the complex noun* It
seems, however, that this is not a sufficient condition* (29) cannot
have an abnormal interpretation*
(29) a philosopher similar to Feuerbach
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The complex noun denotes the following set.
(30) {xi x is a philosopher A x is similar to Feuerbach}
Obviously* Feuerbach is a member of this set# The condition, then,




A number of linguists have noted that so functions as a presentence
in examples like the following*
(1) Is it raining? I believe so.
In this chapter* I will consider this use of jso. An investigation of
it will take us into setae highly complex questions* 1 cannot claim to
have resolved all these questions* I think, however, that the analysis
I will outline contains some of the elements of a correct solution* In
any event, it seems more promising than the main alternatives*
13*1* Preliminary Observations
Various linguists have assumed that prosentential so derives from
a copy of its antecedent* Ross <1972), for example, assumes that it
is introduced by the following rule*
If one assumes that other anaphors derive from copies of their antecedents,
it is natural to assume that so does also* 1 have argued, however, that
anaphors do not generally derive from copies of their antecedents* Of
the anaphors 1 have considered, only intensions! pronouns have such a
source* This suggests that it is unlikely that jgo is introduced by a
rule like (1). I have argued against the view that various anaphors
derive from copies of their antecedents by showing that they have
(I) X-S-Y-S-Z
1 2 3 4 5 —»
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non-anaphoric uses. It seems that pro#ent®ntial jo does not have a
non-anaphoric use. Here, then, we cannot use the standard argument.
Nevertheless, the fact that anaphora do not generally derive from
copies of their antecedents suggests that it is unlikely that pro-
sentential jo does.
Quite apart from this question, an approach like Ross's faces
problems with the distribution of prosentential so. As Hankamer and
Sag (1976) point out, it cannot appear in subject position.
(2) * So is widely believed.
(3) * So is easy to believe.
As they also note, it is impossible as a raised object*
(4) * We thought so to be widely believed.
(5) * We thought so to be easy to believe.
A proponent of an approach like Ross's might suggest that there is a
constraint preventing (1) from applying to a sentence that either is or
has been a subject. Such a constraint will ensure the correct results.
Thus, this approach can describe the distribution of prosentential so*
It does not explain it, however* It simply treats it as a brute fact*
Clearly, it is desirable to look for an explanation*
What an approach like Ross's misses is that prosentential jo has
the same distribution as an adverb* Adverbs can appear in three
different positions* Most obviously, they can appear in VP-final position*
(6) shows that prosentential j© can appear in this position*
(6) I believe so*
They can also appear in sentence-initial and pre-verbal positions*
so* too, can appear in these positions, although it is quite restricted
in the latter. The following illustrate*
(7) So I believe.
(8) So saying, Sam rode off into the sunset.
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In (2) * (5), jso is not in the position of an adverb* Thus* these
sentences are unacceptable* The obvious conclusion from these ob¬
servations is that prosentential so is an adverb.
If prosentential so is an adverb* it is natural to assume, with
Bolinger (1972)* that it is the adverb considered in the last chapter*
There are problems with this suggestion* however* To suggest that
prosentential so is the adverb considered in the last chapter is to
suggest that it derives from in that way* There is no direct evidence
for such a source* however* It is not generally possible to replace
prosentential so with in that way or that way* Nor is there any
obvious indirect evidence* X have suggested that how derives from
in what way and that adverbial as clauses derive from complex way
phrases* If these were possible where prosentential so is possible* it
would suggest that the latter derives from in that way. They are not
generally possible* however* as the following show*
(9) * How do you believe*
(10) * 1 believe as Sam believes*
Thus* while it seems natural to identify prosentential so with the
adverb considered in the last chapter* a number of facts argue against
such an identification*
X want to suggest that the solution to this problem is to recognize
prosentential so as an idiom* Tentatively, X want to suggest that there
is a pracyclic rule defining the following mapping*
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The way phrase that is introduced by this rule will be realized
obligatorily as so. Otherwise, the transformational component will
treat it just like a way phrase that is present in underlying structure.
There will be no question of either passive or bough movement moving
it into subject position. There will be no possibility, then, of
sentences like (2) - (5) being generated. The fact that (9) and (10)
are unacceptable is a quite straightforward matter on this account.
The only way that such sentences could be generated would be through
additional rules like (11)# I would suggest that they are unacceptable
because there are no such rules.
In passing, we can note that this approach provides some further
support for the analysis of seem that I sketched in chapter 9. Notice
that (12) is a perfectly acceptable sentence.
(12) It seems so#
If prosentential so has the source I am proposing, this will derive







Such a structure will be generated quite naturally if seera has the
kind of analysis that I sketched earlier, but not if it has the
traditional analysis. Here, then, we seen to have further support
for ay analysis.
X want now to compare this account of prosentential jso with the
account of idioms developed in Newraeyer (1974), Central to Newmeyer's
account is an 'idiom inventory'. This is a list of ordered pairs of
semantic representations, the first member of each pair giving the
actual meaning of some idiom, the second giving its literal meaning.
The initial P-marker in the derivation of an idiom is the semantic
representation that gives its literal meaning. The semantic repre¬
sentation that gives its actual meaning is not part of the derivation,
although it constrains it in certain ways. For Newraeyer, then, (14)
will have the same initial P-marker whether it has the idiomatic or
the literal meaning.
(14) Zeno kicked the bucket.
In the former case, however, the initial P-marker is associated with a
semantic representation giving the meaning 'Zeno died*. This association
constrains the derivation in two ways. Firstly, it blocks certain
transformations* For example, it blocks the passive transformation.
(13) can only have the literal reading.
(15) The bucket was kicked by Zeno,
Secondly, it constrains lexical insertion. Host obviously, it requires
the insertion of the lexical item bucket and blocks the insertion of
the synonymous lexical item pail. (16), like (15), can only have the
literal reading.
(16) Zeno kicked the pail.
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This illustrates the main features of Newmeyer*s account. One further
point should be noted. This is that the second member of an entry
in the idiom inventory will not always be a well-formed semantic
representation. This is because there are idioms which have no literal
meaning. Examples are happy p,o lucky, by and large. and to kingdom
come.
It might seem that this account is quite different from that Z
have advanced. This is not the case, however. As we have seen,
Newmeyer suggests that the initial P-marker in the derivation of an
idiom is the semantic representation that gives its literal meaning.
There is no reason, however, why we should not regard the semantic
representation that gives the idiom*s actual meaning as the initial
P-marker. We can then interpret the idiom inventory as a special set
of derivation initial transformations, and the constraints as ordinary
global constraints. Some of the entries in the idiom inventory can be
interpreted as rules that are very much like (11). As we have seen,
there will be entries in the idiom inventory where the second member
is not a well-formed semantic representation. Such entries can be
interpreted as rules whose output is not generated independently.
This is exactly the kind of rule that (H) is. Thus, Newmeyer*s
approach is quite similar to mine. 1 will return to this question in
the section after next.
I think the account of prosentential jso that I have sketched here
is a quite promising one. I have only scratched the surface of the
problems that arise in connection with prosentential so. 1 think,
however, that the account X have sketched provides the basis for a
deeper investigation of these questions,
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13 *2* so and JLt
The obvious question to consider next is when exactly the rule I
have proposed applies* It is clear that it does not apply whenever the
structural description is met. Obviously* it does not apply if the
verb is one that does not take a complement* Also* however* it does
not apply with many verbs that take complements. It does not apply for
example* with regret. (1) illustrates.
(1) * Sam regretted that Mary had left* and Jim regretted so too.
It seems* then* that the rule applies with a subset of complement-taking
verbs. The question 1st what subset?
Two linguists who have considered the distribution of prosentential
«
so are Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971). They claim that factive verbs
\
can only take it, but that non-factive verbs can take both it and so.
They cite the following data. I
(2) John regretted that Bill had done it* and Mary regretted -j'
):
too.
(3) John supposed that Bill had done it* and Mary supposed f" 1*so)
too*
They seek to explain the distribution of jit and jo by reference to the
underlying structure of factive and non-factive complements. They assume
that factive and non-factive complements have the underlying structures
(4> and (5)* respectively.
(4) MP (5) MP
fact s S
They also assume that jit is the result of pronominalization* and that
so is the result of a rule like Boss's* Given these assumptions* the
distribution of it and so follows quite naturally* Factive complements
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are exhaustively dominated only by NP, while non-factives are exhaustively
dominated by both HP and S. Tims, the former can only be replaced by
it, but the latter can be replaced by both and jo. The obvious
problem with this explanation is that it depends on untenable assump¬
tions about the source of rfc and ao* We need not go into this* however,
because the basic generalisation is false*
That this generalisation is false is pointed out in Cashing (1972).
Cashing points out that there are non-factive verbs that cannot take
so* He notes, for example, that suggest cannot* He illustrates with
the following example*
(6) Paul suggested that sentence pronominalisation might depend
f it 1
on factivity, and Carol suggested j#so j too.
Other verbs that Cashing notes are hypothesise* postulate* prove* an¬
nounce. assert* and deduce. In view of such verbs, it is clear that
the Kiparsky*s generalisation is false* Clearly, then, we must look
for an alternative generalization*
Cashing suggests that the key to the distribution of _it and so
is not the feature [+ factive] but a feature £ + stance]* He suggests
that [ 4- stance] verbs take JLt and [ - stance] verbs so. [ + factive]
verbs are a subset of [ + stance] verbs* The fact that many verbs
take jit and so is apparently taken as indicating that they are ambiguous
between [ + stance] and [ - stance] readings.
The problem with this suggestion is that it is not at all clear
that the [ Hh stance] feature has any independent motivation* Gushing*s
characterization of the [ Hr stance] distinction is a vague one. He
suggests that it is a distinction between verbs involving 'specific
acts of adopting a definite stance with respect to the truth or falsity
of the following S* and verbs involving 1passive states of mind, with
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the subject acquiescing or expressing a disposition to the truth of the
following S*. It is not at all clear that this distinction is of any
general significance.
Cashing seeks to add substance to his proposal by relating it to
the lexicalist hypothesis* in particular to the lexicalist assumption
that there are significant parallels between NP* s and S's# He suggests
that complements can be classified as definite or indefinite and that
£ + stanceJ verbs take definite complements and £ - stance] verbs
indefinite complements# He then suggests that it is a definite anaphor
and so an indefinite anaphor like one in (7).
(7) The Hatter ate a pice of cake* and Alice ate one too#
This line of thought adds a further dimension to Gushing*a proposal#
I think* however* that it is quite misconceived.
1 think firstly that the notion of an indefinite complement must
be rejected# We can interpret complements as referring to various
abstract objectst propositions* prepositional functions* or facts.
Given such an interpretation* they must be definite* like other
referring expressions# We can compare complements with proper names#
Lifek proper names* they refer directly* not by way of some set* as
definite descriptions do# There are no indefinite proper names#
Equally, I think, there are no indefinite complements. X think also
that the idea that so is on indefinite anaphor is quite mistaken# so
is not at all like one# (7) says that the Hatter ate one member of a
certain set and Alice another# We can compare this with (8)#
(3) Paul thinks that complementation is partly semantic* and Carol
thinks so too*
Clearly* this does not say that Paul thinks one member of a certain set
and Carol another# It is fairly dear* then* that so is not an
indefinite anaphor#
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I think, then, that Cu$hing*s discussion sheds little light on the
distribution of jit anc! so* Both Gushing and the Kiparskys assume that
the distribution of _it and jso is determined by the meaning of the
associated verb, X want to suggest that it is more fruitful to look
at the function of the associated verb* This thought has occurred to a
number of linguists, I do not think, however, that it has been
developed very adequately,
X want to suggest that a sentence like (9) can be used in two
different ways.
(9) X believe that Sara is mad.
On the one hand, it can be a statement about the speaker* s beliefs* On
the other, it can be a hedged assertion about Sara*1 In the former case,
X believe is used *normaliy** in the latter, it functions as a
hedging device. Similar suggestions have been raade by a number of
linguists* Aijmer <1972), for example, discussing a sentence like
(9), suggests that X believe has a *self-referring* and a *sentence-
qualifying* use. In similar vein, Kimball (1972) suggests that a
sentence like (9) can be *an assertion that the speaker is in a certain
state of belief* or *the expression of a belief on the part of the
speaker** Broadly similar views are advanced by Prince (1976), and by
Hobel (1971), bysvag (1975), and Hooper (1975)* We can also recall
m m m « m m m
1* As James Thome has pointed out to me, it is particularly natural
to interpret sentences like (9) as hedged assertions if that is
deleted* It is particularly natural, that is, to interpret a sentence
like (i) as a hedged assertion*
(i) X believe Sam is sad.
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ltems©«*s (1952) observation that verbs like believe can be 'used to
indicate the evidential situation in which the statement is made* and
hence to signal what degree of reliability is claimed for* and should
be accorded to* the statement to which it is conjoined'» My basic
suggestion* then* is not particularly novel*
I want now to suggest that jit occurs with a verb that is used
normally and so with a verb that functions as a hedging device* Again*
this is not a new idea. It can be found in Aijser (1972)* lysvag
(1975)* and Hooper (1975)* The main evidence for it is data like the
following from, hindholm (1969)*
(10) Was Caesar a Jew? X believe | ®®tJ »
With so* X believe is a hedging device* In effect* then* X believe so is
a hedged yes* As such* it is a perfectly appropriate answer# With
it* however* I believe is used normally. . Tims* I believe it is a
statement about the speaker* s beliefs* As suck* it is not an appropriate
anewer. Similar data is the following from Aijiaer.
(11) Has Peter stolen the money? X guess | •
<12) Did «m b^r a new dress! 1 Megtas {£J .
X think* then* that this suggestion is quite well motivated. It is not
the whole truth about prosentential so* but it is an important part
of it*
We can now consider mae other phenomena that are associated with
hedging* Firstly* X want to suggest that neg~raisiag can apply with
verbs that have a hedging function* but not with verbs that are used
t
normally* Again* this suggestion is now new. Xt is made by Aijmer
(1972)* Kimball (1972)* Hooper (1975)* and* most notably, Prince (1976)*
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Neg-raising lifts a negative out of a complement sentence. It accounts
for the fact that a sentence like (13) has a reading in which the
negative is associated not with the main verb think, but with the
complement verb rain.
(13) X don't think it will rain today.
Xt also accounts for the fact that (14) is grararaatical, although sleep
a wink normally requires a negative in the same clause* as (15) shows.
(14) X don't think Jim slept a wink*
(15) * Jim slept a wink*
Whenever there is some reason for thinking that a verb cannot have a
hedging function* neg-raising cannot apply. Prince suggests* quite
reasonably* that a progressive verb cannot have a hedging function. She
notes then that (16) is ungraaoatical.
(16) * I'm not guessing that Harry slept a wink.
i J
. '. . ' ' ' > •'
This shows that neg-raising cannot apply In this situation. Xt seems
?
reasonable to assume that a verb cannot have a hedging function if it
is associated with an adverb. Notice now that the following are
ungraramatical *
(I?) # X don't ever think that Jim slept a wink.
(13) * I never think that Jim slept a wink#
.
Clearly* then* neg-raising is blocked here. There is quite good evidence*
then, that neg-raising applies with verbs that have a hedging function*
but not with verbs that are used normally.
Next* X want to consider parenthetical constructions like the
following.
(19) Sam is mad* X believe,
(20) Sam is* X believe* mad.
(21) Sam* X believe* is mad.
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I want to suggest that verbs lihe believe normally have a hedging function
in such constructions. Intuitively, it seems fairly clear that I
believe is a hedging device in (19) * (21). Notice also that (22) is
urigrammatical*
(22) * Sam is mad, I'm guessing.
Clearly, this supports the present suggestion. Notice, however, that
(23) is grammatical.
(23) Sam is mad, I always think.
I have suggested that a verb associated with an adverb cannot have a
hedging function. Here, then, we have a verb in a parenthetical
construction which does not have a hedging function. Thus, we cannot
say that verbs like believe always have a hedging function in paren¬
thetical constructions. We can suggest, however, that they normally do.
Finally, I want to look at embedded tag questions. Normally, tag
questions are associated with main clauses. However, Robin Lakoff
(1969) points out that complements can sometimes take tag questions.
(24) illustrated.
(24) I suppose Sam is mad, isn't he?
1 want to suggest that it is only when the preceding verb has a hedging
function that a complement can take a tag question. Much the same
suggestion is made in Hooper (1976). Sentences like the following
provide support for it«
(25) * I'm guessing that Sara is mad, isn't he?
(26) * I always think that Sara is mad, isn't he?
In both cases, we have verbs that cannot have a hedging function, and,
in both cases, tag questions are impossible. 1 think, then, that this
suggestion is well founded. It is worth adding that tag questions can
themselves be regarded as hedging devices* We might, then, regard a
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sentence like (24) as a doubly-hedged assertion,
I have argued, then, that prosentential jo and certain other
phenomena are associated with hedging. In the next section, I will
develop a formal account of hedging and consider how exactly so and
the other phenomena are associated with it.
13,3. Some Analyses
I have suggested that a sentence like (1) can be used in two
different ways, that it can be a statement about the speaker*e beliefs
or a hedged assertion.
(1) I believe that Mary is angry.
I said that I believe is used normally in the first case and as a
hedging device in the second. Implicit in this formulation is the
assumption that it is the second use of such sentences that needs








For the second use, however, a different source is necessary.
Of the various linguists I have noted who touch on the question of
hedged assertions only three have any proposals about their analysis!
Aijmer (1972), Ly&vag (1975) and Hobel (1971). Least plausible are
Aijmer»s proposals. If I understand her correctly, she would derive
(I) from something like (3) when it is a statement about the speaker's
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beliefSj and from something like (2) when it is a hedged assertion,
(3)
Mary be angry
Her reason for assuming a source like (3) in the first case is that she
thinks that a verb like believe is 1 syntactically factive* in this
use. Presumably, this means that it cannot undergo raising. This*
however, is surely false, (4) can surely be a statement about the
2
speaker's beliefs,
(4) I believe Mary to be angry,
1 would suggest, in fact, that this is all it can be* For me at least,
it cannot be a hedged assertion, I don't think, then, that (3) is a
suitable source for (I) when it Is a statement about the speaker's
beliefs. Nor do 1 think that (2) is a suitable source for (1) when
it is a hedged assertion. There is nothing in (2) to make it clear
that the complement is the main assertion and 1 believe a hedging
device. X think, then, that Aijmer's proposals are not very
plausible.
Lysvag assumes a Fillmorean case framework. Within this framework,
he would apparently derive (1) from (5) when it is a statement about
2. Like (4.1.56), (4) is dubious for some speakers. I don't think,
however, that this affects the main point.
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Leaving aside questions about the validity of the Fillmorean framework,
the obvious objection to this analysis is that (6) is no more suitable
than (2) as a source for (1) when it is a hedged assertion* (6) does
not make it clear that the complement is the main assertion and the
rest of the sentence a hedging device. 1 think, then, that this
approach must be rejected*
Nobel's approach is much more plausible* He would derive (1)
from something like (2) when it is a statement about the speaker's
beliefs and from something like (7) when it is a hedged assertion.
<7) S
HP VP ADV
Mary be angry I be1lev®
(1) derives from (7) through adverb proposing. If adverb proposing does
not apply, the result is (8)*
(8) Mary is angry, I believe.
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(7) does make it clear that the complement is the main assertion and the
rest of the sentence a hedging device. It looks* then* as if we have
a quite plausible analysis for hedged assertions* Shortly* however*
1 will show that it is less plausible when certain related phenomena
are considered.
Following Gordon and Lakoff (1971) and Heringer (1972)* I want to
suggest that hedged assertions are one of a number of * indirect
speech acts** All the following can be indirect speech acts*
(9) Could you pass the salt?
(10) Do you think Mary is a spy?
(11) Why don*t you take a holiday?
(9) can be a question about the hearer's abilities* but it can also
be a so-called *whimperative** i.e. an indirect imperative. Similarly*
(10) can be a question about the hearer*s thoughts or an indirect
question about Mary. Finally* (11) can be either a question or an
indirect suggestion. Intuitively* we have a unified phenomenon here.
I think* then* that we require a unified account*
Returning now to Nobel*s account of hedged assertions* we can show
that it cannot be generalised to other indirect speech acts. To
generalise the account* we would have to claim that the constituents
that signal the indirect character of whimperatives, indirect questions
and indirect suggestions originate in sentence-final position.
Initially* this might seem quite plausible in view of the existence
of sentences like the following.
(12) Pass the salt* could you?
(13) Is Mary a spy, do you think?
(14) Take a holiday, why don't you?
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There are problems, however. As Green (1975) points oat, the derive-
tion of a sentence like (10) from a source like (13) requires an other¬
wise unmotivated rule that is the inverse of subject-verb inversion*
More importantly, as Green also notes, there are indirect speech acts
for which no sources like (12) - (14) are available. Green gives
examples like the following.
(15) Would you like to set the table now?
(16) Do you suppose you could let sae finish?
(17) Would you mind closing the window?
(13) How about setting the table?
It is fairly dear, then, that Nobel*s account cannot be generalised.
1 think, therefore, that it must be rejected.
How, then, should indirect speech acts be analysed? One suggestion,
developed by Gordon and Lakoff (1971) and Searle (1975), is that they
are an example of conversational iraplicature in the sense of Grice
3
(1975). On this view, sentences like (1) and (9) - (11) are strictly
speaking unambiguous. In appropriate circumstances, however, they
can convey a second meaning as a result of certain principles of
conversation. (1), for example, is a statement about the speaker's
beliefs, but it can conversationally entail a hedged assertion. (9)
is a question, but it can conversationally entail an imperative. (10)
and (11) will be interpreted similarly. Since the notion of conversa¬
tional implicature is needed quite independently, this is an attractive
3. I follow Cole (1975) in interpreting Gordon and Lakoff as claiming
that indirect speech acts are an example of conversational implicature.
Zt is not certain that this is correct interpretation. For a different
interpretation, see Katss and Bever (1976).
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approach. There are, however, a number of arguments against it. I
will review some of the main ones.
We can begin with the criticisms of Cole (1973). Cole focuses on
sentences that can only be indirect speech acts. He shows that the
interpretation of such sentences cannot be an instance of conversational
implicature. A typical example is (19), which Gordon and Lakoff discuss.
(19) Why paint your house purple?
This can only be a suggestion that the speaker should not paint his
house purple. It cannot be a question, unlike (20), which presumably
has the same source.^
(20) Why do you paint your house purple?
To account for (19), Gordon and Lakoff propose a deletion rule that can
apply only if a suggestion is conveyed. Discussing such cases, Cole
points out that for a certain interpretation of some sentence to be
regarded as an instance of conversational implicature it must be dif¬
ferent from the literal meaning but related to it by a plausible chain
of inference. This is clear from an example with which Gordon and
Lakoff begin their discussion. They note that (21), when said by a duke
to his butler, can be an order to close the window.
(21) It's cold in here.
Clearly, the meaning conveyed is different from the literal meaning.
Clearly, also, it is related to it by a plausible chain of inference.
m <# m m
4. James Thome has pointed out to rae that (19) can be a question for
some speakers. As long, however, as there are speakers for whom it can
only be a suggestion, it will present a problem for the proposal under
consideration•
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(19), however, is quite different. Here, there is no moaning apart
from the meaning conveyed. Clearly, therefore, this is not derived
from some other meaning through, a chain of inference. It seems clear,
then, that such sentences are not an example of conversational
implicature.
Problems also arise with certain sentences that cannot be indirect
speech acts. Consider the following sentences from Sadock (1975).
(22) Will you close the door7
(23) Will the door be closed by you?
(22) can be either a question or a wh imperative. (23), however, can
only be a question. On the approach we are considering, (22) is a
question but can in certain circumstances convey an imperative. Given
such an account of (22), the fact that (23) cannot be a whimperative is
a serious problem. (23) asks the same question as (22). Thus, if
the whimperative Interpretation of (22) is an instance of conversational
implicature, one would expect (23) to have the same interpretation.
The fact that it does not have this interpretation suggests that it
is not an instance of conversational irapiicature in (22).
Broadly similar to (22) and (23) are (24) and (25), also from
Sadock,
(24) Can you close the window?
(25) Are you able to close the window?
Like (22), (24) can be either a question or a whimperative. (25),
however, like (23), can only be a question. Clearly this suggests
that the whimperative interpretation of (24) cannot be an instance of
Conversational implicature. Similar observations are made by Green
(1975) and Ross (1975). They provide further evidence against an
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approach like Gordon and Lakoff»s.
Finally, we can consider certain cooccurrence phenomena# The
approach we are considering assumes that <26} conversationally entails
(27) in just the same way as (21) conversationally entails (23)«
(26) Can you take out the garbage?
(27) Take out the garbage*
(23) Shut the window.
Consider now the following data from Davison (1975).
(29) Take out the garbage, please, since ray hands are full*
(30) Can you take out the garbage, please, since my hands are
full.
(31) Shut the window, as it's my turn to move in the chess game*
(32) * It's cold in here, as it's my turn to move in the chess
game.
These show that whimperstives, like ordinary imperatives, can be
followed by a clause giving the reason for the request, but that a
declarative sentence that conversationally entails an imperative
cannot be followed by such a clause* Similar data is adduced by
Sadock* Such data suggests that indirect speech acts have the
cooccurrence properties of the corresponding direct speech acts, not
those of related instances of conversational implicature* Thus, it
provides further evidence against the approach we are considering*
None of the examples of the preceding paragraphs involve hedged
assertions* It is easy to show, however, that the view that hedged
assertions are an instance of conversational implicature is no more
plausible than the view that other indirect speech acts are* We have
seen that a sentence like (33) can only be a hedged assertion.
(33) I believe so*
It Is, therefore, just like (19), and, for the same reason, cannot
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be an instance of conversational implicature. Notice also the contrast
between (34) and (35).
(34) I believe that Eve has left.
(35) What I believe is that Eve has left.
(34) can be either a statement about the speaker's beliefs or a hedged
assertion. (35), however, can only be the former. This contrast is
just like that between (22) and (23). The latter shews that the
whimperative interpretation of (22) cannot be an instance of conversa¬
tional implicature. In the same way, the former shows that the hedged
assertion interpretation of (34) cannot be.
It seems fairly clear, then, that indirect speech acts, including
hedged assertions, are not an example of conversational implicature.
This does not mean, however, that they have nothing to do with it. it
is quite possible that they have their origins in conversational impli¬
cature, This is the central contention of Cole's paper. It is also the
view of Sadock, Green, and Davison, It is, X think, a plausible one.
If indirect speech acts are not an example of conversational
implicature, what are they? An observation of Sadock's suggests a
plausible answer to this question* Sadock observes that indirect
speech acts have much the same properties as idioms. Notice, for
example, that (36) and (37) are very much like (22) and (23).
(36) Tony kicked the bucket.
(37) The bucket was kicked by Tony.
(36) has both a literal and an idiomatic reading. (37), however, has
only a literal reading. Notice also that (38) and (39) are like
(24) and (25).
(38) Marsha buried the hatchet.
(39) Marsha buried the axe.
365
(38) has both a literal and an idiomatic reading, but (39) has only a
literal reading* It seems* then* that indirect speech acts are quite
like idioms. I want to suggest that they are a kind of Idiom and can
be analysed in much the same way.
Consider firstly the following sentences.
(40) Sara kicked the bucket*
(41) Sam died.
It is clear that these say the same thing. It is clear also that they
are appropriate in different contexts. Roughly* (40) is appropriate
in informal contexts. 1 would suggest* then* that (40) is a realization
in such contexts of the structure underlying (41). Consider now the
following.
(42) Can you wash the dishes?
(43) Wash the dishes.
We can suggest that these also say the same thing but differ in the
contexts in which they are appropriate. Roughly, (42) is appropriate
in polite contexts. We can suggest, then* that (42) is a realization
in such contexts of the structure underlying (43). We can propose
a similar account for the following*
(44) I believe that Jim is here.
(45) Jim is here.
Specifically, we can propose that (44) is a realization in tentative
contexts of the structure underlying (45). the main features of these
analyses are represented schematically in the following* (S stands for
surface structure, L for underlying (logical) structure, and C for
context.)"*
5, I follow Ross (1970) and Sadock (1975) in assuming that declarative
sentences originate as complements of a performative verb of saying.
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(46) S. Sam kicked the bucket.
L. 1 say to you (Sam past die)
C. informal
(47) S. Can you wash the dishes?
L. I request of you (you v?ash the dishes)
C. polite
(43) S. 1 believe that Jim is here*
L. 1 say to you (Jim be here)
C. tentative.
We can suggest similar analyses for other indirect speech acts*
It is clear that these analyses require some quite complex rules*
For (40), we will need something like (49)* (I place contextual
conditions in square brackets*)
(49) X die Y X kick the bucket Y ! [informal]
For (42), we might suggest something like (50).
(50) I request of you (you VP) I ask you (you can VP) /
[polite]
For (44), something like (51) might be appropriate.
(51) I say to you X sa=^ I gay to you (I believe X) /
[tentative]
(49) will be a completely idiosyncratic rule with no particular
similarities to any other rules. In contrast, both (50) and (51) will be
members of quite large families of rules with various features in
common. These rules will probably be derivation-initial* As we have
seen, Nevmayer (1974) assumes, in effect, that idioms involve
derivation-initial rules* Finally, we should note that there will be
various global constraints associated with these rules to prevent
the derivation of sentences which cannot have idiomatic readings*
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We can return now to prosentential so. I suggested earlier that it
is the result of the following rule.
I also suggested that it occurs with a verb that functions as a hedging
device. This suggests that <52) applies just in case the verb is a
hedging device. If the verb is a hedging device, it will itself be the
result of an idiota rule. It follows, then, that (52) cannot be
derivation-initial. Rather, it will follow rules like (51). Thus, we
will have derivations like the following.
<53) I say to you it
1 say to you <1 believe it)
I say to you <1 believe in that way)
I believe in that way
I believe so
Here, then, we have evidence that Newneyer1s conception of idioms is
not entirely adequate. A second point about (52) is that it involves a
global condition. Nothing in the input structure shows that the verb
is a hedging device. It is only the fact that it is the result of a
rule like (51) that shows this. Thus# to say that (52) applies just in
case the verb is a hedging device is to say that it applies just in
case the verb is the result of a rule like (51). Clearly, this is a






changing rule. The meaning of (54) will not be predictable from the
input to (52), because this structure id.11 appear in the derivation
of (55).
(54) 1 believe so.
(55) 1 believe it#
(55), of course, cannot be a hedged assertion.
Before we return to the other phenomena that I have associated with
hedging, J want to suggest an analysis for yes. As (53) indicates, 1
* " . t}' '< '
assume that a sentence like I believe so Is the form taken in a tentative
context by (36).
(56) 1 say to you it.
It is natural to ask what happens to (56) in a norms!, non-tentative
context. The obvious suggestion, I think, is that it if. realised as
yes. As (53) indicates, 1 assume that a sentence like I believe so
is the form taken in a tentative context by (56).
(56) I soy to you it.
It is natural to ask what happens to (56) in a normal, non-tentative
context. The obvious suggestion, I thinlt, is that it is realised as
yeg. I want to suggest, then, that yes is the realization in normal
contexts of a pronominal object of a declarative performative.^
m m m m «• e* m
6. It is interesting to note in connection with this proposal that,
according to the 0.E.D., jo could be used for yes in Middle English.
Also of interest is the fact that the French equivalent of X believe so
is Je crois que oui.
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W« can Return now to neg~raisirig* I suggested earlier that this
applies with verbs that have a hedging function but not with verbs
that are used normally. It would seen, then, that it is rather like
(52). There is on® difference, however. Whereas (52) is obligatory
with a verb that has a hedging function, neg-raiging is optional*
Notice that both (57) and (58) can be hedged denials*
(57) 1 believe Jin isn't happy.
(58) I don't believe dim is happy*
(The former can also be a statement that the speaker holds a certain
negative belief. The latter can also be a denial that the speaker
holds a certain belief,) Apart frees this, neg-raising is very much like
(52), tike (52), it involves a global condition. It can apply just
in case the verb is the result of a rule like (51), It is also a
meaning changing rule. The meaning of (53) is not predictable from
the input to neg-raising, because this structure appears in the
derivation of (57), which has a meaning not shared by (58)*
Next, we can return to parenthetical constructions like the following*
(59) Steve is a Pabloite, I believe*
(60) Steve is, I believe, a Pabloite.
(61) Steve, I believe, is a Pabloite*
One approach to such sentences would derive them from (62)*
(62) I believe that Steve is a Pabloite.
This is the approach of Eardin (1975), who suggests that (59) derives
from (62) through a rule of sentence raising, and that (60) and (61)
derive from (59) through a rule of sentence shift. It is also the
approach of Boss (1973), who calls these rules elifting and niching*
In (59) - (61), I believe is a hedging device* Thus, if we adopted this
approach, we might suggest that sentence raising, like neg-raising,
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applies with verbs that have « hedging function. There are* however,
a number of arguments against this approach, in particular against
sentence raising. Clearly, we must consider these.
One argument, advanced by Stillings (1975), focuses on sentences
like the following*
(63) X don*t think John isn't going to the party*
(64) John isn't, I don't think, going to the party*
to the most obvious formulation of sentence raising, (64) will derive
from (63). The two sentences, however, have completely opposite
meanings. (64) is equivalent not to (63) but to (65)*
(65) I think John isn't going to the party.
On the face of it, this is a serious problem. There is a simple solution
to it, however. Firstly, as Rardin notes, it is clear that sentence
raising cannot apply with a negative verb, (66) illustrates.
(66) * Steve is a Pabloite, 1 don't think.
Thus, (64) will not derive from (63), All we need, then, is some way
of deriving (64) from (65)* For such derivations, Rardin suggests a
rule of not distribution applying after sentence raising and sentence
shift. Given such a rule, (64) will derive from (65) by way of (67)*
(67) John isn'tj 1 think, going to the party*
7
It seems, then, that this argument carries little weight*
A second argument, also advanced by Stillings, centres on sentences
like the following.
(68) I think that George is a fool, but Mary won't believe it.
4# <4#- m m m .4# »
7. Ross (1973) accounts for sentences like (64) rather differently*
He assumes that aeg-raising is accomplished by copying and deletion
and that deletion is blocked if slifting intervenes*
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(69) George, I think, is « Cool, but Mary won't believe it.
Ao Stillings points out, (68) is ambiguous, it can be understood as
that I think that George is a fool or as that Geor&e is a fool. (69),
however, is unambiguous. Here, itj, can only be understood as the
latter. This looks like a problem. In fact, however, it is not a
problem within the framework 1 have developed. Notice that the first
clause of (63) can be a statement about the speaker's thoughts. In
this use, it will derive from (70).
(70) S
George be a fool
It can also be a hedged assertion, in this use, it will derive through
a rule like (51) from (71).
(71) S
HP VP
George be a fool
In contrast, the first clause of (69) can only be a hedged assertion,
and, therefore, can only derive from (71). Thus, the proposition that
1 think that George is a fool can figure in the underlying structure
of the first clause of (68) but not in the underlying structure of the
first clause of (69). It is only natural, then, that JL| can refer to
this proposition in (68) but not in (69).
A third argument of Stillings* is less easy to counter. It
involves sentences like the following.
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(72) Is Sam finished, do you think?
The obvious source for (72) is (73).
(73) Do you think Sam is finished?
Applying sentence raising to (73) gives the ungrasamatical (74),
(74) * Sam is finished, do you think?
To derive (72), we will have to apply subject-verb inversion in the
raised sentence. This is rather problematic, however* for subject-
verb inversion to apply in the raised sentence, it must have an
interrogative status* think, however, cannot take an interrogative
complement. It is not at all clear how a complement can acquire an
interrogative status when it is raised. I think, then, that sentences
like (72) pose a real problem for sentence raising.
It may be that sentence raising can be maintained, in spite of
sentences like (72). My inclination, however, is to reject it. In
the present framework, it is quite easy to suggest an alternative.
Instead of assuming that a sentence like. (75) derives through (51) and
sentence raising, we can suggest that it derives through something
like (76).
(75) Jim is ill, X believe.
(76) I say t© you X X say to you X, I say to you (I
believe) / [tentative]
We can suggest a similar rule for (72). We can suggest that (73)
derives through something like (77), when it is an indirect question.
(77) I ask you S "«■*«> I ask you (you think s) / [polite]
For (72), then, we can suggest something like the following.
(78) I ask you S x ask you S, X ask you (you think) /
[polite]
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I think, then, that rules like (76) and (78) provide a quite plausible
alternative to sentence raising.
It is appropriate at this point to return briefly to sentences like
<79).
(79) Open the window, cm you?
Sadock assumes that such sentences derive from wb imperatives through a
rule of 'fracturing*. On this account, (79) will derive from (80).
(80) Can you open the window?
Fracturing is clearly rather like sentence raising, and it faces a
similar problem. Just as the interrogative status of sentences like
(72) pose a problem for sentence raising, so the imperative status of
sentences like (79) poses a problem for freeturing. Their imperative
status is shown by examples like the following.
(81) Do light a fire, v0n*t you?
(82) Don»t light a fire, will you?
I think, then, that fracturing is rather dubious, I would like to
suggest, therefore, that (79) is the result not of (51) and fracturing
but of something like the following,
(83) I request of you (you VP) I request of you (you VP),
1 ask you (you can) / [polite])
This, of course, is very much like (77) and (73),
Finally, we can return to teg questions. If tag questions are
a hedging device, it is natural to assume that they are the result of
a rule like (51). It would seem, however, that they cannot be the
result of a derivation-initial rule. As has often been noted, the
shape of a tag question is dependent on the surface chape of the




I think that the analysis I have sketched lias considerable attrac¬
tions* Xt also faces serious problems* however* In this section*
I will take a look at these problems* 1 have no real solutions*
All X cm do is indicate seme lines of thought that might lead to
solutions*
The most serious problem that the analysis faces is that the main
underlying assumption is apparently false* The starting point for
the analysis is the assumption that proaentential so* nag-raising*
and certain parenthetical constructions are symptomatic of hedging,
Xt seems fairly clear that a verb like believe cm function as a
hedging device only if it is first person and present tense* It seems
clear* in other words* that sentences like the following cannot be
hedged assertions*
(1) Frodo believes that Aragorn is mad*
(2) I thought that Eve had left.
This suggests that prosentential so, neg-raising and parenthetical
constructions should be impossible with verbs that are not first person
and present tense. It is clear* however* that this is false. The
following illustrate.
(3) Girali believes it will rain* and Legolas believes so too.
(4) Sam thought there would be trouble* and X thought so too*
(5) Steve doesn't think he slept a wink*
(6) X didn't think Sam had slept a wink*
(7) Sam is mad* Jha believes*
<8) Son was mad* X thought*
Xt looks* then* as if the assumption that these phenomena are symptomatic
of hedging is false*
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As we have sees* a number of linguists have considered these
phenomena and suggested a connection with hedging* In general, they
have not noted the problem that sentences like (3) - (8) pose for
such suggestions* An interesting case is Hooper (1975)* Hooper suggests
that verbs like believe have a literal reading and a *parenthetical*
reading, and that prosentential so, neg-raising, and parenthetical
constructions are symptomatic of the parenthetical reading* The
problem with this suggestion is that it is not at all clear what is
meant by a parenthetical reading* It is clear that to say that a
first person present tense verb has a parenthetical reading is to say
that it functions as a hedging device* Hooper makes this clear when
she remarks that X believe so is 'equivalent to a weakened or qualified
yes** and that (9) is a 'qualified assertion*•
(9) 1 believe John is here
The problem is that it is not at all clear what it means to say that
verbs that are not first person and present tense have a parenthetical
reading* Certainly, Hooper offers no clear account of this* 1 think,
then, that the term 'parenthetical reading* serves to gloss over a
serious problem*
How, then, should we account for sentences like (3) - (8)? As
far as (3) - (6) are concerned, a natural suggestion is that we
should revise the prosentence rule and neg-raising* I have suggested
that both can only apply with verbs that have a hedging function*
An obvious way to accomodate (3) • (6) would be to say that they only
apply with first person present tense verbs if they have a hedging
function, but they apply more or less freely elsewhere* Revised in
this way, the two rules will give us something like the right results*
An obvious objection to this approach is that, as things stand,
we cannot accomodate (7) and (3) in a similar way* X suggested in
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the last section that sentences like (10) and (11) involve something
• j • •
like <12), followed by the prosentence rule and nag-raising,
respectively*
(10) 1 believe so*
(11) 1 don*t believe 1 slept a wink*
<12) I say to you I say to you <1 believe X) / [tentative]
I rejected, however, the view that sentences like <13) have a similar
derivation.
<13) Hary is here, 1 believe*
I rejected, that is, the view that they involve <12), followed by
sentence raising* Instead, I suggested that they are derived directly
through something like (14)*
<14) I say to you X I say to you X, I say to you (I
believe) / [tentative]
Thus, as I have analysed sentences like <13), there is no rule that
we can invoke in connection with (7) and (3) in the way that we can
invoke the prosentenee rule and neg-raising in connection with (3) -
(6). One might take the existence of sentences like (7) and (3) as
evidence that sentences like (13) should be derived through (12) and
sentence raising after all* If we do derive them in this way, we
could then suggest that sentence raising, like the prosentence rule
and neg-raising, only applies with a first person present tense verb
if it has a hedging function, but applies more or less freely
elsewhere*
It is possible that an approach like this might prove viable*
It hardly inspires confidence, however. The most obvious objection is
that it: involves three rather strange rules* Quite apart from this,
a number of observations suggest that a rather different approach
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might be appropriate. Particularly important are the observations of
Prince (1976).
Prince is concerned with neg-raising in English and French. She
focuses mainly on first person present tense sentences* but she also
considers sentences that are not first person and present tense, she
suggests* as I have done, that the former are hedged assertions. She
suggests, in other words* that (5) has much the same import as (15).
(15) Steve says he doesn't think he slept a wink.
Support for this suggestion comes from an observation of Jackendoff
(1971). He notes that a number of verbs that allow neg-raising in
first person present tense uses do not allow it with other persons
and tenses. He notes* for example* that the negative can only be
associated with the main verb in the following.
On Prince's suggestion* ail this means is that certain verbs can
appear in hedged assertions* but not in reports of hedged assertions.
This seems a fairly natural situation.
Prince's suggestion* then, is that sentences like (5) and (6)
are understood as reports of hedged assertions. It is natural to
ask whether we can say the same thing of sentences like (3) and (4)
and (7) and (3). In connection with the latter* we can note Aijtner's
suggestion that (17) is understood as a report of John's saying (18).
(17) Peter is fat* John Believes.
(18) Peter is fat, I believe.
We can also note Urmson's suggestion that X is. Jones believes. at home
is understood as a report of Jones' statement X ig. I believe, at home.
Urrason goes on to suggest that sentences like (7) and (8) are
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impossible when there is no question of a report being involved*
Specifically, he suggests that, on seeing Jones making his habitual
dash to the railway station during a railway stoppage, one could say
(19), but not (20),
(19) Jones believes that the trains are working*
(20) The trains, Jones believes, are working*
it seems quite natural, then, to interpret sentences like (7) and (3) 88
reports of hedged assertions*
What, then, of sentences like (3) and (4)? Again, 1 think requests
are involved* That they are is suggested by the dubious character of
(21).
(21) ? Sara says that Mary is a fool, but he doesn't believe so*
If ths second clause of (21) is understood as a report, it will have
much the same import as (22)*
(22) Sam says he doesn't believe that Mary is a fool*
(21), then, will attribute contradictory statements to Sam* Notice
that (23) is quite acceptable.
(23) Sara says that Mary is a fool, but he doesn't believe it*
Here, there is no question of the second clause being understood as a
report* It seems fairly plausible, then, to suggest that sentences
like (3) and (4) involve reports of hedged assertions.
Assuming that they are sound, how should these observations be
accounted for? This is sot at all an easy question* One possibility
is that the sentences we are concerned with derive from explicit
reports* On this view, the sentences in (24) would derive from those
in (25).
(24)a, Tony believes so*
b. Jim doesn't think Mary slept a wink,
c* Steve is arrogant, San believes.
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(25)a» Tony says he believes so*
b. Jim says ha doesn't believe Mary slept a wink*
c. Saa says Steve is arrogant, he believes*
An obvious problem for this approach is that the sentences we are
concerned with do not have exactly the same significance as explicit
reports* Botice, for example, the contrast between (26) and (27)*
(26) diss asked if it would rain, and Sam said he thought so.
(27) ? dim asked if it would rain, and Sam thought so.
Another problem is that it is not at all clear how sentences like those
in (25) should be analysed* In it is not at all clear hew
the complements should be analyzed. One might suggest, with Kuno
(1972a), that they originate as direct quotations. On this proposal,
the sentences in (25) would derive from the following*
(23)a» Tony says *1 believe so*,
b* dim says *1 don't think so*,
c* Sara says "Steve is arrogant, I believe*.
It is clear, however, that direct quotations pose serious syntactic
and semantic problems (Fartee, 1973a). Thus, even if the sentences
we are concerned with derive from explicit reports, our problems will
not be over* I think, then, that it is quite natural to interpret
sentences like (3) - (8) as reports of hedged assertions. How this
should be accounted for, however, is not at all clear to me, I must,
therefore, leave the problem that such sentences pose unresolved*
A farther weakness of the analysis I have sketched is that it
ignores differences between hedging devices* This weakness is par¬
ticularly clear if we consider tag questions* Consider, for example,
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(29) Eve Is here, isn't she?
Tliis is certainly a hedged assertion* It is more than this, however.
It is also a request for confirmation. It is clear, then, that (29)
is different from a 'pure' hedged assertion like (30).
(30) I believe Eve is here.
1 would suggest that there are also differences between pure hedged
assertions. I would suggest, for example, that there are differences
of connotation between (30) and (31), and between (30) and (31) and (32).
(31) I suppose Eve is here#
(32) 1 imagine Eve is here.
So far, X have ignored all such differences. Xt is clear, however,
that they must be accounted for in soma way.
Quite relevant at this point is Lakoff's (1974) discussion of
•syntactic araaigarag*• By a syntactic amalgam he means *a sentence
which has within it chunks of lexical material which do not correspond
to anything in the logical structure, of the sentences rather they
mist be copied in from other derivations under specifiable semantic
and pragnatic conditions'* Lakoff suggests that sentences like the
following are amalgams.
(33) John invited you'll never guess how many people to his
party.
(34) John is going to, I think it's Chicago on Saturday.
More importantly in the present context, he suggests that tag questions
and parenthetic®Is are amalgams, tie considers here incidentally not
only parentheticals that function as hedging devices but also
parenthetical® that make concessions like that in (35) and paren¬
thetical® giving the source of information like that in (36).
(35) John, X admit, cannot play the tuba wail.
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(36) Kangaroos, Hie Times reported, are decreasing in numbers.
Lakoff»s proposals are quite tentative, but they are of considerable
interest*
• • - • ' f ...
As I have analysed indirect speech acts, they are quite like
amalgams* They contain lexical material that does not correspond to
anything in their logical structures* This material is introduced under
certain pragmatic conditions* It is not copied from some other
_^ ... ' 'W: v « \
derivation, however* The fact that this material is more than just a
»
signal of the context suggests that it perhaps should be* It suggests,
in other words, that indirect speech acts could be re-analyzed as
amalgams* I have no explicit proposals to make* X think, however,
that such a re-analysis could well be the right way to account for
the differences between hedging devices*
We should note perhaps that Lakoff himself does not regard simple
hedged assertions or wfrimperatives as amalgams. He continues to assume,
with Gordon and Lakoff (1971), that they are instances of conversational
implicature* This is related perhaps to the fact that his focus is
mainly syntactic. Bis concern is with problematic surface structures,
not with problematic speech acts* The surface form of simple hedged
assertions and whimperatives like (37) and (33) poses no obvious
problems*
(37) X believe Sam is making hie will*
(38) Could you put the cat out?
Semantically, however, they are just as problematic as (39), which
Lakoff would regard as an amalgam*
(39) Sam is making his will, I believe.
I think that Lakoff is mistaken in concentrating on sybtactic factors*
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1 think it Is quite likely that all indirect speech acta will turn out
to be amalgams, not juat those that have problematic surface
structures*
We should also note that, if indirect speech acts are re-analysed
as amalgams, they will be less like ordinary idioms than I have
assumed, this is quite reasonable, X think. Structurally, Indirect
speech acts contain additional lexical material compared with the
corresponding direct speech acts, whereas ordinary idioms simply
contain different lexical material from the normal expression of the
same meaning. Semantically, 1 think, indirect speech acts have
additional content in a way that ordinary idioms do not. This is
obviously true of tag questions. It is also true, 1 think, of pure
hedged assertions and other indirect speech acts. None of this
means that there are not important similarities between indirect
speech acts and ordinary idioms. It does suggest, however, that my
original analysis exaggerated these similarities somewhat.
These remarks are quite vague. I think, however, that it is
quite likely that they point in the right direction. X think, then,
that differences between hedging devices are rather less of a problem
than sentences like (2) - (3).
IS.5# Further Constructions
In the last two sections, X have been investigating the proposition
that prosentential so is associated with hedging. There is much truth
to this proposition. It is clear, however, that it is not the whole
truth, even if the problematic sentences of the last section are
reports of hedged assertions. There are at least three constructions
involving what is apparently prosentential so that X have not yet
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considered. Of these constructions, only one has anything to do with
hedging*
The first construction I want to consider is exemplified by
sentences like the following.
(1) Steve is a Tribunite, or so 1 believe.
We might regard this as a kind of hedged assertion. The second clause
is a kind of retrospective hedge. Hie speaker makes an assertion,
and then hedges it. (1) is equivalent to (2), where the speaker
explicitly takes back part of what he has said,
(2) Steve is a Trihunite, or at least 1 believe he is.
There are sentences like (1) where the second clause contains a verb
that cannot appear in an ordinary hedged assertion. The following
illustrate.
(3) Tony is over the hill, or so I would claim.
(4) Mary is six foot, or so I would estimate.
(5) and (6) show that the verbs cannot appear in ordinary hedged
assertions.
(5) * I claim so.
<6> * I estimate so.
There are also sentences like (1) where the second clause is not
primarily a hedging device. Consider, for example, (7) and (3).
(7) Albert is an empiricist, or so Sara argues.
(8) Roberta is a Geordie, or so Brian says.
Here, although the second clause relieves the speaker of part of the
responsibility for the first clause, its main function is to indicate
the source of the information contained in the first clause. All these
Sentences, incidentally, have equivalent parenthetical sentences. The
following illustrate.
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(9) Steve is a TribuniC** I believe#
<10) Tony is over the hill* X would claim.
(11) Albert is an empiricist* Sam argues#
X assume that so is the result of the prosentence rule in this
construction# Apart from this* however* I have little idea as to how
the construction should be analysed.
The second construction X want to consider is exemplified by
sentences like (12)*
(12) So 1 believe#
One might think that this is a hedged assertion just like (13)#
(13) X believe so*
It seem* however* that this is not the case# Unlike (13)* (12) is not
a natural answer to a yes-no question. Rather* its natural use is to
confirm or endorse a statement* Tints* we have exchanges like the
following#
(14) At Eve is emigrating#
Bi So I believe#
Unlike hedged assertions* this construction can contain what Karttunan
(1972) calls seai-factive verbs# The foilwing illustrate.
( realise I
(13) So X j notice L[see J
( realize 1
(16) * I | notice ' «^see
How this construction should be analyzed is not at all clear# Xt seems
likely* however* that so is the result of the presentence rule.
Finally* we can consider the do so construction. This is
illustrated in sentences like the following.
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(17) Roberta paints murals, and Sue does so too.
Here, the main elements of an analysis seem fairly clear. It is
fAirly clear that we are dealing with prosentential so. This jso has
the same adverbial properties. It cannot appear in subject position,
as the following illustrate*
(18) * So is often done.
(19) * So is easy to do.
Nor can it appear as a raised object*
(20) * We thought so to be often done.
(21) * We thought so to be easy to do.















Eventually, the way phrase will be realised as so. One thing that is
not very clear is the exact distribution of do so and do it. Bolinger
(1970) suggests that do so is favoured in contexts which involve un¬
favourable connotations. There is perhaps some truth to this,
although some of Bo linger* s judgements seem rather dubious. I will not
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pursue this matter, however*
It is clear that procentential so has nothing to do with hedging
in sentences like (12) or in the do so construction. It is clear,
then, that there is more to prosentential so than its association with
hedging. I think, however, that this association is of considerable






In this chapter, I want to look at two further constructions which
might be thought to involve prosentential so. These constructions are
illustrated in sentences like the following.
(1) They say the Prime Minister is mad, and so he is.
(2) Joanna is reading the Beano, and so is Alicja.
Anderson (1976) and Ross (1972) argue that so is a presentence in
confirmative sentences like (1). McCawley (1970b) suggests that it is
a presentence in conjunctive sentences like (2). This suggestion is
dropped, however, in the revised version of this paper (McCawley,
1974a). I will argue that jo is not a prosentence in either of these
constructions. Instead, I will suggest that it is a realisation of
and.
14.1. Critical Preliminaries
Before we consider the problems involved in claiming that these
constructions involve prosentential so. we must get a clear idea of their
character. It is clear that they are quite similar. Both involve
so. a subject HP, and an auxiliary verb. The main difference is that
the conjunctive construction involves subject verb inversion, whereas
the confirmative construction does not. A few examples will illustrate
these points.
(1) Sam said the king was eccentric, and so he was.
(2) They say the Mekon is living in Monte Carlo, and so he is*
(3) They say Mary may be a martian, and so she may.
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(4) they said Eve had eloped with Zen©, and so she had*
(5) The Hans were a nuisance, and so were the Visigoths*
(6) Roberta was arrested, end so was Steve.
(7) Brian must go to Milan, and so raueh Dick*
(3) The Vandals sacked the city, and so did the Suevi,
The similarities between the two constructions suggest that it is quite
likely that they have similar analyses*
When Anderson and Ross claisa that so is a presentence in confirma¬
tive sentences, they are claiming that it is the result of a rule
like (9).
(9) X-S-Y-S-Z
1 2 3 4
(
r 2 ~i1 |f sol
X \| | 1
1I 60 i l,4 J
McCawley probably had a similar rule in mind when he claimed that jso
is a presentence in conjunctive sentences* I have argued, of course,






I will argue that jso cannot be the remit of this rule in confirmation
and conjunctive sentences* I will then return briefly to (9), and show
that it is no more promising.
Ue can look firstly at (I). Hero, we are concerned with adjectival
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be* Following in essence Ross (1969c), 1 think it is likely that this
is a transitive verb, taking a full HP and an open sentence as its
argumenta."*" 1 think, then, that it is quite likely that the complement





Given such m analysis, it would be possible to derive the second clause








(1), then, dees not seem too problematic.
Consider now (2), Here, we are concerned with progressive be. One
might think that this too is a transitive verb. Huddleston (1974)
argues, however, that it is intransitive. The equivalence of sentences
like the following points to this conclusion.
(13) The inspector was checking the figures.
(14) The figures were being checked by the inspector.
So, too, does the existence of sentences like the following with
idiomatic subjects.
1, I will present some evidence for this view in the next chapter.
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(15) Tabs are being kept on ail Gorton sympathizers.
Sueh evidence is quite persuasive. It suggests, then, that the comple¬
ment in the first clause of (2) will derive from something like (16).
(16)
be true of the Mekonx
x live in Monte Carlo
If progressive be is intransitive, it will be impossible to derive a
suitable input structure for (10). It will be impossible, then, to
derive the second clause of (2) through (10).
As Huddleston notes, evidence like that just cited suggests that
a number of auxiliaries are intransitive. One is epistemic may. Here,
the evidence suggests that the complement in the first clause of (3)










x be a martian
if epistemic may is intransitive, it will be impossible to derive the
second clause of (3) through (10). Another auxiliary which appears to
be intransitive is perfective have. If it is, the complement in the
first clause of (4) will derive from a structure like (17), and it will
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again be impossible to derive the second clause through (10).
It seems fairly clear, then, that sc cannot be introduced by (10)
in confirmative sentences. Obviously, vie can extend this conclusion
to conjunctive sentences. 1 will now argue that (9) works no better.
We can return firstly to (1), Here, if the complement of the
first clause derives from (11), it would be possible to derive the
second clause from a similar structure through (9). Consider now (2).
X have suggested that the complement in the first clause derives
2
from (16). The operation of raising on S » and lowering end deletion




live in Monte Carlo
3
X assume here that raising triggers the pruning of S under Ross's
(1967) convention that S nodes that do not branch are pruned. This
convention has been challenged by Postal (1974a). He argues that
raising (and equi) result not in pruning but in the demotion of the
affected S to the status of a *quasi clause'. On this view, then,





live in Monte Carlo
Which of these views is correct is not too important in the present
context. What is important is that it is fairly clear that raising
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results in the disappearance of the affected S* Tims# if progressive
be is intransitive, the S nodes that (9) requires will be lacking in
(2). It will be impossible# then, to derive (2) through <9). in the
SfiKne way, if epistesaic may and perfective have are intransitive, it
will be impossible to derive (3) find <4) through (9), It seeme,
then, that (9) fails in just the same circumstances as (10), although
in a rather different way.
It seems fairly clear, then, that so is not a presentence in
confirmation and conjunctive sentences* Obviously, than, we must look
for a different account* In the nest section, I will develop one*
14*2* Emphatic Conjunction
Although he regards so as a presentence in confirmative sentences,
Anderson (1976) suggests that it is not a presentence in conjunctive
sentences. Instead, he suggests (fn* 10) that it is related to also*
This seems a quite plausible suggestion* X want# then# to investigate
it* The first question that it prompts 1st what sort of word is also?
The obvious answer is that it is a signal of emphatic conjunction,
like too and as well and, in negative conjunctions, either* Sentences
like the following illustrate.
(1) Briea read 'The 18th Brunaire'# and she read 'The Class
Struggles in France* also*
(2) Steve is an economist, and he's a historian too*
(3) Eve went to Spain, and she went to Portugal as well*
(4) Jim doesn't like the Stones, and he doesn't like the Who
either.
It is necessary# then# to take a look at emphatic conjunction*
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The most extensive discussion of emphatic conjunction is that of
Green (1973)* She suggests that there are two types of emphatic
conjunction) one in which both conjunets are of equal importance, and
one in which the second conjunct is added almost as an afterthought*
She suggests that the former involves two falling intonations, one on
too or either* and one before it, while the latter involves Just one
falling intonation on too or either* I doubt whether many people con*
slatently make such a distinction* Presumably, however, there are
some who do*
Assuming predicate-first order, and utilizing TOO as a predicate
of emphasis, Green suggests (5) and (3) as underlying structures for
ordinary emphatic conjunction, and (7) and (3) as underlying struc¬
tures for *afterthought* conjunction*
(5) S (6) S
TOO S TOO S
AND S AND S
S S S S
NOT NOT S
<7> S <8) S
AND AND g
s s s
TOO NOT S TOO S
NOT J
Conjunction copying and predicate raising apply to these structures to
derive a wide range of surface forme*
The derivational processes envisaged by Green can be illustrated
with the following sentences*
$94
(9) Jica isn't a Pableite, and he !»»•£ • Behactmanite either*
<10) dim isn't a Pabloite, nor a Schactaanite either.
<11) dim is neither a Pablo ite nor a Sehactaaaite.
<12) dim is both not a fabloite mad not a gehactsaaaite.
<1$) dim isn't a Pablo ite, and nor is ha a Schaetmanite.
Green suggests that <9) « <12) have both ordinary emphatic and after¬
thought readings, but that <1$) has only an afterthought reading.
He ems consider ordinary emphatic readings first. Here, after
conjunction copying, (6) become# (14).
<u) £
y y
too s4 too V
MB S6 Am) s7
HOT ""g8 HOt S9
the derivation of (9) is fairly simple. It will involve simply the
deletion of the initial TOO and AMP, and the realisation of the second
TOO as either by a mechanism outlined below. <10) is slightly more
Complex. It will involve predicate raising on S5, giving the complex
predicate £4gg£M0t]J. this will be realized as nor. TOO again will
be realised as either. (11) is again more complex. Here, predicate
2 $ 4 5
raising applies ©n S , S , S and S , creating two complex predicates
©f the form £TOOfAKPfMOtlll. these are realized as aeithsr and nor.
2 $
(12) is rather different, involving predicate raising on S and S .
Two complex predicates of the form [TOQEamdI] result, which are
realised as both and and.
He can turn now to afterthought readings. Her®, conjunction





AND S4 AND V
6 7
NOT $ 700 S
HOT S8
(9) is fairly straightforward, involving deletion of initial AND and
realisation of TOO as ^either* (10) is more problematic. Here the HOT
7 3
of S must somehow be raised onto the AND of S * Clearly, this will
involve an extension of predicate raiting* (11) will involve predicate
raising on S3, S3 and S5» Two conplex predicate, HmDrKOffl and JjsgD
fTOOrHOTin will be fomed. The former will be realized as neither.
3
and the latter as nor* (12) will involve predicate raising on £ ,
and the realization of AID) as both and ("AHPfTOOll as (stressed) and*
(13), which has only an afterthought reading, will involve predicate
raising on S", creating fTOOfNOTll* which is realized as nor











One thing that is suggested quite strongly by these rules is that TOO
and AND are in fact the same element* Notice that both fTOOfANDfHOT"!11
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r^rXCjOfKOTl"]"1 can be realized as nor. Similarly, rANPfHOTll
i • ' V ■*
and rxOOfNOrll can both be realized as nor* In ranch the sane way,
TXPOfAHD*]"] and rANDl~TOOn can be realized as and* If TOO and
AND are interchangeable, as this suggests, it would seem reasonable
to identify them* As things stand, however, this is difficult,
because XOO is associated with a single sentence, whereas AND is
associated with a set of sentences* I will return to this matter
shortly*
The least plausible aspect of Green's analysis is her account of
either* She suggests that either is the realization of TOO under
♦ the shadow of an immediately lover negative'. She illustrates this
conception with the following sentence.
(17) She doesn't have a 1951 penny either, does she*
This, she suggests, will derive frora something like <18), in which
the S in square brackets represents a presupposition*
(18) S
S
1951 HAVE she 1951
PENNY PENNY








To this a rule of NOT-copying applies, formulated ae in (20)*
<20> TKClf-™0st"01 *3
1 2 3 tTrrtfr
Z + 1 2 3
This rule produces a complex predicate of the form [N0T[T00["AND"1''1"1>
which is realized as either*
As independent evidence for this treatment, Green considers
sentences like (21).
(21) Such Issues are either black or white*






BLACK x25 WHITE x^
Clearly, conjunction copying and predicate raising can apply here
to derive two constituents of the form fNOTfTOOfANDl11* But (22)
will not do as the underlying structure of (21)« The truth conditions
of (21) are not those of (22)* (21) asserts that one of two propos¬
itions is true* (22) denies that both of two prepositions ere true*
Unlike (21), it leaves open the possibility that they might both be
false* Thus, sentences like (21) do not provide independent evidence
for Green's proposal*
Green's account of eithor is subject to a number of other problems.
Consider firstly a sentence like (9) on the afterthought reading* As
we have seen, this will derive from a structure like (15)* In (9),
AND shows up on the surface* It is not incorporated into any other
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constituent* It would seem* then* that both the rule of NOT-copying
and the lexical insertion rule for either will need modifying to
allow the complex [NQT[T0033 to be realized as either* Next* consider
a sentence like (9) on the ordinary emphatic reading* As we have seen*
this will derive from a structure like <14)* In <14}* however* HOT
is not immediately below TOO* The rule of NOT-copying will have to
be extended to deal with such cases* Finally* there are problems
with sentences like <10}* The ordinary emphatic reading is reasonably
Straightforward* HOT will be raised onto AND to produce nor* and then
copied onto TOO to produce either* The afterthought reading is more
difficult* HOT will have to be copied onto WO to produce either*
Then* the original HOT will have to be raised onto AND* Clearly* this
will involve an extension of predicate raising* It seems* then* that
Green** account of either has neither independent support nor the kind
Of simplicity which she supposes it to have*
I have now outlined the main elements of Green*s analysis* The
analysis hag much to recommend it* It also has its weaknesses* however*
I went* then* to propose a number of revisions* When I have outlined
these revisions* 1 will return to so* One aspect of Green*s analysis
that 1 will not question is her assumption that AND and HOT originate
in sentence-initial position* If they are predicates* consistency would
require that X drop this assumption* 1 doubt that they are predicates*
If they are* though* my proposals will not require any great recasting*
In what fellows* X will ignore Green's distinction between ordinary
emphatic and afterthought conjunction*
We saw earlier that there is evidence that emphatic conjunctions
involve two AHDs* Xt is difficult* however* to incorporate two ANDs
in underlying structure* There is a simple solution to this problem*
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This is to assume that the second AND is introduced by a copying rule*
1 want, then, to suggest that there is a rule of the following form*
(23) S S
AND S AND 8
AND
This will apply to the final conjunct of a conjunction, and will be
triggered by certain presuppositions* Shortly, I will propose a second
copying rule*
Now, we can return to either* We can suggest firstly that either
represents an underlying disjunction in sentences like (21)* In (9),
then, we have a conjunction realised by the normal realisation of a
disjunction* To account for this, I want to propose the following
constraint on lexical insertion*
(24) If a conjunction, C, asymmetrically commands a negative,
N, in underlying structure, and a descendant of C follows
a descendant of N and is commanded by it in shallow
structure, the descendant of C will have the same realiz¬
ation as a disjunction*
We can illustrate the operation of this constraint fairly briefly*




NOT S NOT S
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Conjunction copying will convert this into (26)
(26) J
S S
AND S AND 6
NOT S NOT













Here* the final AND follows a negative and is commanded by it* Under
i
(24), then, it has the same realisation as a disjunction* The second
«» m m m en m m
\\ ; ' i!. . • i. J.I •. ... - 1 - ' ' '•
2* Actually, 1 doubt whether a simple copying rule is the correct
mechanism for associating conjunctions with conjunct** The fact that
conjunct* can be spoken by different speakers, a* in the following
example, argues against this approach*
(1) At Mary is a fool*
Bt And Jane is*
In the present context, however, this is not too important*
4C1
AND follows a negative but is not commanded by it# This, than, is
not realized as a disjunction# The first AND is* of course deleted#
We should not® that, for the constraint to work, lowering must
precede (23)# If (23) applied first, we would have not (2d) but <29)»
<29) S
NOT
Here, the final AND follows a negative, but it is not commanded by it#
It would not, then, be realized vs either# It might be possible to
revise some aspect of the analysis so as to avoid the need for this
restriction# I will not pursue this matter, however#
I want now to show that (24) accounts for certain other phenomena#
Consider firstly (10)# I want to suggest that this involves a rule
which X will call •neg-attachment*# How exactly this rule should be
formulated is none too clear# X assume, however, that it attaches
a negative to the left of certain constituents# In the derivation
of <10), it will convert a structure like <23) into one like (30)#
<30)
s- ~S
AND ^ S NO* AND " S
NOT AND
X assume that nor is the normal realization of NOT + j)R# T» (30),
we have NOT + AND# Given (24), however, the AND will be treated like
OR. NOT + AND# then, will be realized as nor.
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can note her® that nog-attachment plays similar role in this
system to that played by predicate raising in Green's system* Predic¬
ate raising, however, attaches HOT to the right of AMP* Per Green,
than, nor is a realisation of rAMPfKOT"!! in sentences like <10)*
thus, she casmot invoke a constraint like (24) in connection with
Consider now (19)* X want to suggest that this involves a second
copying rule of the following form*
(91) S 8
AMD 8 «—» AND g
zz ^s.
AMP
hike (29), this will apply to the final conjunct of a conjunction*
Applying to a structure like (27), it will give us the following*
(92) J
S ~~~8
AND 8 AND S
NOT AND NOT





Then, in accordance with (24), NOT + Aii3 will be realised as npr*^
U We should perhaps note the existence of sentences like <i>*
(i) Jim isn't a Dabloifce, and nor, either, is he a Schacteumite*
Presumably, such sentences involve both the copying rules I have
nripsssl»
m
Filially, we can consider <!!)• We can derive this frori a struc¬
ture like (34)»
<343 S
HOT $ , •
. , . , •
OR •• ~ ... 8 . ..
S
'ST
St seeras reasonable, however, to derive it from a structure like (25)
as well* Sa this derivation, conjunction copying and neg-attaehaeat




HOT &m NP AND HP
A copying rule will convert this into (34)*
(36)
/ \
HOT AHD NP HOT AND HP
Then, the two HOT + AND complexes will be realised es neither and nor*
in accordance with (24)*
I want now to look briefly at some ether phenomena which are net
discussed by Green* Notice firstly that (3$), not (39) is equivalent
to (37 ),
(3?) Brian doesn't like Audea, and he doesn't like Speeder*
(38) Brian doesn't like Auden or Spender.
(39) Brian doesn't like Auden and Spender*
To account for this, Horn (1972) proposes a rule of 'factoring', which
converts an and into an or when it is ?aoved into the scope of a negat-
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ive* Arguing against this approach, LeGrand <1974) suggests that
(38) derives not front (37) but from a structure like (34). Me can
suggest a somewhat different account* We can derive (38) from a
structure like <34)* We can also, however, derive it from (37)*
Given (24), such a derivation will require no special rule*
Notice now that the following sentences are unacceptable*
<40) * Every dog didn't have a bone*
<4i) * Each boy didn't leave*
X would like to suggest that the structures underlying these sentences
are realised as (42) and (43), respectively*
(42) No dog had a bone
<43) No boy left*
We cm allow for such derivations quite simply. We can assume firstly
that neg-atfcachaient is obligatory in such structures, producing MOT +
EVERY and NOT + EACH* We can then suggest that there is a constraint
like (24) requiring a universal quantifier to be treated as m exist¬
ential quantifier in such complexes* I think, then, that we can
account for sentences like (40) and (41) with a fairly simple extension
of the mechanisms required for emphatic conjunction*^
We can return now to so* Firstly, we can consider conjunctive
sentences like (44)*
(44) Jim is reading Hegel, and so is Mary*
Xt seems quite plausible to suggest that such sentences involve the
4* Broadly similar proposals are raade in habov (1972) and Seuren
<1974a)* Seueen assumes, however, that quantifiers and negatives
are predicates and that the negative is combined: with the universal
quantifier through, negative raising*
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second copying rule* (31)• It seems plausible* in ether words* to
relate such sentences to sentences like (45)*
(45) Jim doesn't like Kierkegaard* and nor does Mary#
It must be said* however* that there is an important difference between
the two sentence types* VP-deletion must apply in the former* but it
need not apply in the latter* the following illustrate*
(46) * Jim is reading Kegel* and so is H*ry reading Kegel*
(47) * Jim is reading Hegel* and so is he reading Feuerbach.
(48) Jim doesn't like Kierkegaard* and nor does Mary like
Kierkegaard*
(49) Jim doesn't like Kierkegaard* and nor does he like
Heidegger*
1 have no explanation for this contrast. 1 don't think* however* that
it detracts to any great extent £rem the plausibility of the present
proposal.5
We can now consider confirmative sentences like (56)*
(50) All said he was the greatest* and so he was*
Here* there are no parallel sentences with nor* (51) illustrates*
(51) * Tony said ho wasn't a spy* and nor he was*
There are* however* sentences like (52)*
(52) Tony said he wasn't a spy* and nor was he*
Such sentences are confirmative in just the saute way as sentences
like (50)* Sentences like (52) will presumably involve (31)* It
seems natural* then* to suggest that sentences like (50) do also*
so *» m m en «• ae
5* Parallel to the sentences noted in fn* 3«* we have sentences like
(i)*
(1) Jim is reading Hegel* and so* too* is Mary*
Presumably, both copying rules are again involved.
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It seems, however, that we have a further difference between so and
nor, bo does not trigger subject verb inversion in confirmative
contexts, whereas nor triggers it as usual.
Seme sentences which might be thought to pose a problem for this
proposal are the following,
(53) Ali said he was the greatest* and indeed he was*
(54) * dim is reading Hegel* and indeed is Mary#
these appear to suggest that .Meed is an alternative to go in confirm¬
ative sentences but not in conjunctive sentences. Strictly speaking*
however* indeed is not an alternative to jjo since both can occur in
a single sentence, (55) illustrates*
(55) Ali said he was the greatest* end so indeed he was*
X don't think* than, that the contrast between (53) and (54) poses
any real problems*
One further point is that too also is possible in confirmative
sentences* (56) illustrates*
(56) Ali said he was the greatest* and he was too*
This suggests that (23) also applies in confirmative sentences. It
should be noted, however* that also is impossible in confirmative
contexts*
(57) * Ali said he was the greatest* and he was also*
X have no explanation*
X think* then* that Anderson was right in relating conjunctive
so to also, and thus to emphatic conjunction* X think* however* that
he should also have related confirmative so to emphatic conjunction*
Both uses of so seem to fit naturally into an analysis of emphatic
conjunction. X think, then, that it is quite plausible to regard
conjunctive and confirmative so as realisation of AND, just like
elso* too and either
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14*3* Hw ag Clauses
I want to conclude this chapter by taking a look at some more
as clauses* They are illustrated in sentences like the following*
(1) Sent is a poet, as his father was before him*
(2) Eve has gone to Ithaca* as Jim has*
Superficially* they are rather like adverbial as clauses* Unlike
the latter* however* they are preceded by comma intonation* They
also often allow subject verb inversion* which adverbial as clauses
do not* The following illustrate*
(30 Sam is a poet* as was his father before him*
(4) * Jim played as did Steve*
I want* then* to look at these clauses*
How should these clauses be analysed? Looking firstly at (1),
we might suggest that it Involves an adverbial as clause* <1} is
equivalent to (5)*
(5) Sam Is a poet* He Is as his father was before him*
Me might suggest* then* that (1) derives from (5)* It seems* however*
that we cannot propose a similar analysis for (2)» There is no sent¬
ence like (5) from which (2) could derive* (6) is clearly unaccept¬
able*
(6) * Eve has gene to Zthaca* She is as Jim has*
Nor is this kind of analysis very plausible for (3)* given the
ungracasatlcal ifcy of (7)*
(7) * He is as was hig father before him*
Thus* while (1) might derive from (5)* we require a different analysis
for (2) and (3)*
I think that the analysis I have suggested for <1) is probably
correct* What* then* of (2) and (3)? I want to suggest that they
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derive frora ordinary conjunctions, and Chat; as is an idiomatic
realisation of and. The as clauses in these sentences can be
regarded as an example of syntactic analogy in the sense of Hankamer
<1972), Cole (1974) and Clements (1975)* They are not a simple
example, however* In part, they mimic adjectival as clauses* They
begin with as* They also involve the same kinds of deletion as
adjectival jm clauses* Where they involve subject verb inversion,
however, the? seem to mimic the second clause of sentences like (8),
(3) dim is a positivist, and so is Mary*
It seems, then, that these eg clauses are quite complex* 1 think,
however, that the analysis I have suggested is quite plausible*
We should perhaps note finally that the ag clauses of sentences
like (1) and (2) can be replaced by like phrases* The following
illustrate*
(9) Sam is a poet, like his father before him*
(10) Eve has gone to Ithaca, like Jim*
These sentences pose no problems* They are equivalent to (11) and
(12), respectively*
(11) Sam is a poet* (In this) he is like his father before him*
(12) Eve has gone to Ithaca* (In this) she is like Jim*




A* the title suggests* the topics in this chapter are quite
unrelated* There are three topics that X want to discuss* Firstly*
I want to consider two classes of pseudo-pronouns* Then, X will
look at what I will tens ambient so* Finally* I will say something
about Sampson's (1975) discussion of the single mother condition*
15*1* Pseudo-pronouns
X suggested in the lest chapter that it is likely that adject¬
ival be is a transitive verb* taking a full NP and an open sentence
as its arguments* On this view* (1) will derive from something like
(2).




Anaphoric sentences like (3) provide support for this analysis*
(3) Dan Dare is courageous* and Digby is that too*
So* too* do pseudo cleft sentences like (4)«
(4) What Dan Dare is is courageous*
1
X think* then* that it is quite plausible* X also noted that there
1* tee problem for this proposal is the fact that adjectives can
hove complements as subjects as in (i)«
(i) That Mary is mad is obvious*
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is evidence that progressive fee, epistmic mg£ and perfect ive* have
are intransitive verbs* On this view, (5) will derive iron something
like <6),
(3) Prod© is playing backgammon.





















I have argued, however, that complements cannot bind variables* Perhaps,
we should conclude that adjectival be is both a transitive and an






<7) and (3) will have similar sources*
(7) Beran may be ambidextrous*
(8) Huria has gone to bed*
In addition to the evidence noted earlier* support for such analyses
comes from the absence of sentences like (3) and (4) with these verbs*
the following illustrate*
(9) * Frodo is playing backgammon, and Sam is that too*
(10) * What Frodo is is playing backgammon*
<11) * Berea may be ambidextrous* and Luthien may that to©.
<12) # What Bereft may Is be ambidextrous*
<13) * Burin has gone to bed* and Turin has that too*
<14) * What Burin has is gone to bed*
It seems fairly clear* then* that those verbs are not transitive* It
is natural* then* to assume that they are intransitive*
Two classes of sentences appear to pose a problem for this
conclusion* The following illustrate*
(IS) That Frodo is playing bcehgaauMMk* which he is* is amassing.
<16) That Baren may be ambidextrous* which he may* is surprising*
(17) That Kurin hag gone to bed* which ha has* is fortunate*
(13) They say Frodo is playing backgammon* and that he is*
(19) They say B<aren may be ambidextrous* and that he may*
<20) They say Burin has gone to bed* and that he has*
We might take such sentences as evidence that these verbs are transitive
after all* If we do* however, the ungrausaaticality of sentences like
<9) * (14) will be a problem* So* too* will the evidence considered
earlier* The correct position* I think, is that these verbs are
intransitive* and that it is sentences like (15) • <20) that are the
problem* How* then* should we account for such sentences? 1 want
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to suggest that the pronouns are not real pronouns* Esther they are
idiomatic realisations of Notice that we have sentences like
the fel lowing*
<21) that Frodo is playing backgasaaon* and he is* is arms ing*
(22) That Beffen my be ambidextrous* and he may* is surprising*
(23) That Her in has gone to bed* and its has* is fortunate*
(24) They say that Frodo is playing backgaaiaoa* and so he is*
(25) They say Keren may be ambidextrous* and so he may*
(26) They say Hurin lias gone to bed* and so he has*
In (21) » (23), we have and* la (24) » (26)* w© have jg* which, I
have argued* is a realisation of AMD* (21) • (26) pose no real
problems* Nor will (15) » (20)* if we interpret the pronouns as
idiomatic realisations of AND* 1 think* then* that this approach is
quite plausible*
Some independent support for this approach comes from sentences
like the following*
(27) Jim was criticised by Mary* which lie wasn't by Helen*
(23) Sam is kind to animals* which he isn't to children*
(29) Jim looked ill to Mary* which he didn't to Sam*
(30) Helen was arrested in France* which site wasn't in Germany*
Here* it is not at all plausible to regard the pronouns as real
pronouns* In (27)* the apparent antecedent of which is not criticised
by Mary but criticised* But which is not adjacent to criticised*
(28) • (30) show the same peculiarity* Notice now that we have the
following sentences*
(31) Jim was criticised by Mary, but he wasn't by Helen*
(32) Sam is kind to animals* bur he isn't to children*
(33) Jim looked ill to Mary* but he didn't to Sam*
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(34) Helen was arrested in France# but she wasn't in Germany*
We can suggest that (2?) - (30) are alternative realizations of the
structures underlying (31) * (34)* We should note that sentences
like (27) - (30) are only possible when there are parallel sentences
with but* (35) and (36) are untraumatical*
(35) * John played football# which he didn't cricket*
(36) * Mary appears eager# which she doesn't competent*
So# too# are (37) and (33)*
(37) * John played football# but he didn't cricket*
(38) * Mary appears eager, but she doesn't competent*
2 think# then# that the view that certain pronouns are idiomatic
realizations of AMD is quite well motivated*
The use of which and that as realisations of can be regarded
as an example of syntactic analogy comparable to the as clauses
considered in the last chapter* The basis for the analogy is provided
by sentences liko the following*
(39) That Gil-Galad is angry# which he is# is surprising*
(40) They said Elendil was brave# and that he was*
(41) Galadriel is perceptive# which Celebom isn't*
Hera# we have adjectival be* Thus# the pronouns can be real pronouns*
X have argued# thai# that there are two classes of pronouns that
are not real pronouns* Instead# they are idiomatic realizations of
AMD* This proposal allows us to maintain the assumption that progress¬
ive be, epistemic may and perfective have are intransitive# in spitenmBS MMWMHS ~ m
of sentences like (15) - (20)* It also accounts for sentences like
(2?) - (30)* It appears that these pronouns can ba regardad as an
example of syntactic analogy*
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15*2# Ambient so
As Z said at the end of 9*1*, I want to orgy© that there is m
ambient so as well as an ambient JLfc and an ambient there* Ha© so
that Z m interested in is illustrated in sentences like the follow¬
ing*
(1) Angus is agitated* Is that sot
(2) If that is so, we'd better look out*
Perhaps the obvious suggestion is that this so is an adjective with
much the same meaning as true* If it is an adjective, however, it is
m unusual one, in that, es Anderson <1976, fn* 11*) points out, it
has no comparative or superlative form* This easts doubt on this
proposal* In any ©vent, I think there are good reasons for deriving
this so from a simple way phrase, like otiter sos that I have consid¬
ered* .V
I want to suggest that this j© derives freest a simple wag phrase
and that the definite description in the way phrase is ambient in the
sense that it refers not to seme specific manner or condition but
to the way * things* are* In this sense, it is as ambient jo* One
problem for this proposal is that this jo cannot be replaced by a
simple the way* The following illustrate*
(3) * Angus is agitated* Is that the weyf
(4) * If that is the way, we'd better look wit*
Notice, however, that it ©an be replaced by the way it is.
(5) Angus is agitated* Is that the way it is?
(6) If that is the way It is* we'd better look out*
Here, we have a complex definite description involving a relative
clause that contains ambient it* Clearly, this definite description
has much the same import as the simple definite description underly¬
ing so in (1) and <2)« Notice also sentences like the following*
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(7) Angus tg agitated# Is that how it is?
(8) If that is how it is, we'd better look out#
Z assume that ft how clause* like an as clause* derives from a complex
way phrase* I assume, then* that (7) and (8) have the same source as
(5) and (6)* (5) - (8) suggest that the uaacceptability of (3) and
(4) is an idiosyncratic fact* and not something fundamental* X don't
think* then* that it detracts too greatly from the plausibility of the
present proposal*
The plausibility of the proposal is enhanced somewhat by sentences
like the following*
(9) Angus is agitated* Xs that the case?
(10) If that is the case* we'd better look out*
Here* case is ambient in the sense that it refers to the general
ease* not to seme specific case* (9) and (10} contrast with (11),
where the case refers to the case just described* and is thus non-
ambient*
(11) Tony's wife has run off with the milkman and his son has
been arrested on a drugs charge* the case Is a difficult
one*
Rather like the case is the situation* Parallel to (9) and (10), we
have the following*
(12) Angus is agitated* Xs that the situation?
(13) If that is the situation* we'd better look out*
Here* the situation is ambient* Parallel to (11)* we have (14)* where
the situation is non-ambient*
(14) Tony's wife has run off with the milkman and his son has
been arrested on a drugs charge* The situation is a
difficult one*
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la the light of these sentences* it seesas quite natural to suggest
•a;. <; i , '■ J K ■■ \ % ; : ' v • \ .V ' ..
that sentences like (1) and (2) involve an ambient the way.
I think* then* that the analysis 1 have advanced is quite plaus¬
ible# It seems* then* that we have an ambient so* as well as ambient
it and ambient
15*3# In Defence of Single Mothers
1 turn now to Sampson's <1975) discussion of the single toother
condition#2 The single mother condition is the requirement that no
node should have more than one mother# It ie central to the defin¬
ition of e tree* es the term is normally understood in linguistic
theory# Sampson argues that the condition should he dropped* and
that trees should be replaced by 'semitrees** He argues for this
change on the basis of certain anaphoric phenomena# It is natural*
then* that I should say something about his argument#
1 want to begin by stressing the radical character of the change
that Sampson is proposing# Although he speaks simply of dropping
tho single mother condition* his semitrees include structures that
are three steps removed from ordinary trees# Notice firstly that
one could drop the single mother condition but continue to require
that if a node A is to the left of a node I then no daughter of A
can be to the right of a daughter of 8# This would allow structures
like {!)* but not structures like (2)#
it) s <a> •
y y a *
C D g C © g
2# This discussion owes much to conversations with John Anderson#
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Secondly, notice that one could allow structures like (1) and (2)
but require that if a node A Is to the left of a node B a daughter
of A that Is also a daughter of I must be the leftmost daughter of
B. This would rule out structures like (3).
(3) 8
G D S
Sampson allows structures of all three kinds* Clearly, then, he is
proposing a quite radical change* Obviously, good reasons must be
advanced for such a change.
If X understand it correctly, Sampson's claim is that this change
eliminates certain kinds of arbitrariness inherent in accounts of
anaphoric phenomena within a theory which only allows ordinary trees*
The first kind of arbitrariness he finds in accounts of anaphoric
pronouns* He assumes that the classical theory is essentially correct
in taking anaphoric pronouns to derive from NP*s lexically and
referentiaily Identical to their antecedents* He takes the theory to
involve the assumption that only MP's that are lexically identical
can be marked as coraferantial. He suggests, then, that this is quite
arbitrary in a theory that only allows ordinary trees* He suggests
that this arbitrariness can be eliminated quite simply in a theory
allowing semitreas. He proposes that an anaphoric pronoun and its
antecedent derive from a single node with two mothers. (4), for
example, would derive from something like (5).
(4) John said he was angry.
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be angry
Since John and he derive from the sane referring node* they must have
the same reference. There is no longer any need to allow HP's to be
marked as preferential if and only if they are lexically identical*
Instead* one can require any referring node to be distinct In reference
from any other*
The obvious problem with this argument is that its starting point
• the classical theory - is untenable. More particularly* the
assumption that NP's can be marked as preferential if and only if
they are lexically identical is untenable* There are two reasons
for rejecting it* Firstly* it necessitates highly complex and other-
vise unnecessary transformational machinery* Not only pronouns like
it in (6) but also definite descriptions like the girl in (7) would
have to be derived transformationally.
(6) Jim read the article quickly, it didn't say anything new.
(7) Sam was talking to the girl from Athens* The girl was
shouting*
Secondly* as 1 argued earlier* the assumption misrepresents the
nature of reference. It suggests that NP's can have the same refer¬
ence only if they have the same meaning* This is simply false* Since
the basic assumption is false* this argument establishes nothing*
Sampson finds a second* more general kind of arbitrariness in the
fact that transformations can require identity but not non-identity.
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In a theory which only allows ordinary trees, this follows from no
other fact* In this sense* then, it could be said to be arbitrary*
In a theory allowing geaitrees, the fact that a transformation can
require identity follows from the fact that nodes can have more
than one mother* A transformation requiring identity will have a
structural description containing a noda with two mothers* VP-dele¬
tion, fox example* might have the following structural description*
(8) S S
N? Aux VP HP Aux
the fact that transformations cannot require non-identity follows
from the fact that there is no way to specify in a structural
description that two constituents must not be identical* it looks*
then* as if we have some motivation for allowing semitrees* A problem
arises* however* when we lode at the proposal more closely*
An Important consequence of Sampson*s proposal is that identical
surface constituents can bo exponents of two identical nodes or
exponents of a single node with two mothers* Where the constituents
are referring expressions, we can give a simple interpretation to
this difference. We can say that in the first case the expressions
have different referents while in the second they have the same*
In (9), then, the two Johns could be derived from different nodes
when they have different referents, and from the same node when they
have the same referent*
(9) John said John was angry*
Where the constituents are not referring expressions* wo can give no
such interpretation to the difference* Consider (10)*
(10) Jim saw a spider* and Sam saw a spider
Here* there is no ambiguity that can bo attributed to the two sources
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of the identical VP's# Thus, while Sampson's proposal eliminates
one kind of arbitrariness, it introduces another*
1 suggested earlier that good reasons are necessary for a change
as radical as that proposed by Sampson* 1 think it is fairly clear
that Sampson has not provided good reasons* % think, then, that the
single mother condition should be retained*
CHAPTER 16
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this final chapter, I want to draw together the main conclus¬
ions of the last five chapters and of the thesis as a whole- Apart
from reciprocal pronouns and deletion processes# we have now considered
all the rain anaphoric phenomena of English* It is possible, then,
to make some general points about anaphora in English* I suspect
chat the validity of these points will not be Halted to English*
In the last five chapters, 1 have looked at tome of the ways in
which constituents other than NP's enter into anaphoric relations.
The simplest anaphors I have considered are then and there* J have
argued that they derive from at that time and in that plaee. respect¬
ively. Rather more complex are jso and such. As anaphors in sentences
like the following, they appear to derive from in that way*
(1) Steve is anxious, and he* s been so for some time.
(2) Joan is looking for a tall Italian, but she won't find
such an Italian here.
Both, however, can also derive from simple or complex extent phrases,
and such can derive from a complex way phrase as well* We have
examples like the following*
(3) Sam Is so foolish.
(4) Sam is such a fool*
(5) Jim isn't so foolish as Sam*
(6) Jim isn't such a fool as Sam*
(7) With such men as Bradoan, the Australians were invincible*
Clearly, then, they are quite complex*
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A further complexity of bo is its prosentential use, illustrated
in exchanges like the following*
(8) Does Brian like <Soni Mitchell? 1 think so*
1 cannot claim to have solved all the problems associated with this
use* I think* however* that it is reasonably clear that this so is
an idiomatic realisation of a sentential pronoun* Another idiomatic
arsaphor is like that in sentences like the following*
(9) Dick is delirious* and he*a been like that for days*
I have argued that this is an idiomatic realisation of in that way.
It seems* then* that English has two Important idiomatic anaphora*
Perhaps the most important conclusion to emerge from these invest¬
igations is the central position of definite descriptions in English
anaphora* In the first half of the thesis* 1 argued that pronouns
are of two main kindst bound variables and referential pronouns*
1 argued that the latter are a kind of definite description* In the
last five chapters* I have argued that certain elements that involve
underlying definite descriptions play a crucial role in non-nominal
anaphora* In this way* then* definite descriptions are central to
English anaphora* Definite descriptions* of course* are not limited
t« an anaphoric use* It follows* then* that English anaphora depends
to a largo extent on elements that are not essentally anaphoric*
Another important conclusion is that anaphora do not generally
derive from copies of their antecedents* Probably only intensional
pronouns and the null anaphora in sentences like the following have
such a source*
<16) Sam likes Buffy Saint© Marie* but Jim doesn*t»
(11) dim plays tennis* and Sam cricket*
(12) Someone attacked the rector* but we don't know who*
423
If anaphora did generally derive fro® copies of their antecedents,
adjectives and adverbs would be on a per with HP's where anaphora
is concerned* As it is, however, they are not on a par* HP's enter
anaphoric relations directly as antecedents of bound variables or
pronouns of laziness* Adjectives and advarba only enter anaphoric
relations indirectly through inferences* In (13), for example,
irritable enters into an anaphoric relation through an inference
which establishes an antecedent for the definite description under¬
lying so*
(13) Eve is irritable, and she's been so for weeks*
the same is true of carefully in (14)*
(14) Steve filled in the form carefully, and he'd do it so
again*
Hera, than, we have an important contrast between HP's and other
constituents* This is another important conclusion*
Z want now to sketch a taxonomy of English anaphors* The main
contrast I want to draw is between those anaphors that are essentially
anaphoric and those which are not* I will call the former 'essential
anaphora' and the latter 'accidental anaphors** Bound variables
obviously fall into the former category* So, too, do reciprocal
pronouns* It also includes anaphors that arise transformationally,
such as iatensional pronouns and the null anaphora in sentences like
(10) * (12)* In the latter category, we have anaphoric definite
descriptions and pronouns of laziness* Here also, we have then and
there and so* such and like that* Z have noted that presenfceoafcialxrntummmm mtmmr anmuaHSM* «OU*i>mnmiwm*OMMUS* w
so seems not to have a non-anaphoric use* Z have argued, however,
that it is a realization of a sentential pronoun, i*«* of a pronoun




In a sense, English has a third class of anaphora* In the last
chapter, I argued that which and that in sentences like the following
are idiomatic realisations of 4KB*
(15) That Prodo la playing backgammon, which he 1*, is amusing*
*
(16) They say Prodo is playing backgaosBon, and that he is*
4s such, they are pseudo-pronouns* In chapter 14*, I argued that jg
is a realisation of ASP in sentences like the following*
(17) They say the Prime Minister is mad, and so ha is*
.i
(13) Joanna is reading the Beano, and so is Alieja*
We can regard this jso as another pseudo-anaphor* it seems, then,
that English has an important class of pseudo-anaphora* Of course,
pseudo-anaphora are net really anaphora at all* It is convenient,
however, to include them in this classification*




bound variables, reciprocal pronouns, intentional
pronouns, null anaphora in sentences like (10) - (12)*
b* Accidental anaphorst
0 anaphoric definite descriptions, pronouns of lasinsss,
then* there* qo« such, like that* prosentential jo*
c* Pseudo-aaaphorst
which in sentences like (15), that in sentences like
(16), so in sentences like (17) and (13)*
This, then, is the picture that emerges from our investigations*
The obvious question to ask about the conclusions X have been
outlining is* how far do they apply to languages other than English?
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I think the main conclusions may well apply universally* It is like¬
ly* I think, that definite descriptions will be central to anaphora in
all languages. It also seems likely that most snaphers will not
derive from copies of their antecedents in *11 Isngauges* finally,
1 think it is likely that all languages will involve a contrast
between NP* s and other constituents where anaphora is concerned* Of
course, these questions can only be decided by detailed investigations#
Here, then, there is ample room for further research.
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